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Corporate and Product Identity in the 
Postnational Economy: Rethinking 
U.S. Trade Laws 
Lan Cao 
In the global economy, a General Motors automobile may involve 
South Korean assembly; Japanese engines; German design and style engi-
neering; Taiwanese, Singaporean, and Japanese small components; British 
advertising and marketing; and Irish and Barbadian data processing. 
What is the country of origin of this product? How should U.S. trade laws 
evaluate a product's origin, if it is a global composite with research, 
assembly, processing, and manufacturing performed in different countries? 
Similarly, corporations have become increasingly global in orientation and 
operations. Even "national" corporations have lost their territorial ties to 
the state of their nationality. Through a phenomenon termed "global 
outsourcing" and foreign direct investment, and as a result of the trans-
formation of the economy from an industrial to a postindustrial one, cor-
porations are engaging in global webs of cross ownership and strategic 
alliances outside their home territories. 
The trade laws of the U.S. are replete with references to "domestic 
industry, " "domestic" corporations, and "domestic" products. U.S. trade 
laws, like those of other countries in the world trading system, remain 
rooted in antiquated understandings of "nationality" and "national 
origin. " Without a thorough reassessment of these two concepts, the U.S. 
responds to the challenges posed by globalization in a piecemeal manner, 
its trade laws vacillating between the pull of nationalism and internation-
alism. The Article proposes an alternative that balances the current global 
reality with the nationalist call for a return to the local. To the extent that a 
"national" market can still be accurately identified, its identification does 
not come from the traditional conceptions of a national corporation or a 
national product, but from the one factor in the production process that is 
still territorial rather than globally oriented: the national workforce. Any 
company that meets what is termed a substantial socioeconomic participa-
tion test should be granted the benefits of nationality available under U.S. 
trade laws. 
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A product's "national origin" should also be reassessed. Despite 
calls from nationalists to fortify national boundaries to protect domestic 
products and industry, products that are globally sourced are in fact the 
products of no one country in particular. Country-of-origin designations 
thus merely perpetuate this chimera of nationality in a world of interna-
tionality. The Article proposes to revise the interpretation of current rules 
to accomplish two objectives: first, to reflect the emergence of the postin-
dustrial economy, and second, to address the nationalist fault lines re-
quired to ensure the continued political survival of the current trading 
system. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to determine the 
national origin of a product or the nationality of a corporation. Products 
appear to be made everywhere and also nowhere in particular, as shown on 
the following computer circuit label: "Made in one or more of the 
following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of 
origin is unknown."1 
Similarly, corporations with a global presence have become increas-
ingly denationalized, that is, unbounded by the territorial borders of their 
state of nationality. Even corporations that have been identified with a par-
ticular country may no longer be as "nationally" identified. "Americans 
may know that Jaguar cars are now American. But do they know that 
Burger King or Winchell's Donuts are British?"2 Indeed, global corpora-
tions now wish to present themselves not as nationals of a state but rather, 
as cosmopolitans of the world. A former executive of IBM was quoted as 
saying, "[f]or business purposes the boundaries that separate one nation 
from another are no more real than the equator. They are merely 
convenient demarcations of ethnic, linguistic and cultural entities .... Once 
management accepts this world economy, its view of the marketplace-and 
its planning-necessarily expand .... "3 Cross-border alliances and pro-
duction have blurred the national identity of enterprises and products. 
Without a thorough understanding of these developments, many coun-
tries, the United States included, still maintain trade policies that are often 
disjointed and contradictory. For example, in 1991, the U.S. Customs 
Services refused to designate as ''North American" Hondas built in Ohio 
I. BENJAllnN R. BARBER, JIHAD vs. McWoRLD 14 (1995). 
2. Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: DiversifYing, Developing, 
Not Dying, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 115, 132. Winchell's Donut House is currently owned by 
Shato Holdings, a British Columbia company. 
3. Quoted in Tom Nairn, Internationalism and the Second Coming, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, 
at 155, 157. 
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and Ontario, charging that the Hondas at issue had less than 50% local 
content (a requirement of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement) and 
hence would not qualify for duty-free treatment when shipped from 
Honda's plant in Canada to the United States. The fact that Honda's opera-
tions in the United States at the time included a $2.2 billion central Ohio 
complex that supported a payroll of $7.3 million for 10,000 workers4 was 
not significant to the Customs determination.5 
While U.S. Customs was charging that Honda Civics built in 
Marysville, Ohio, were not sufficiently North American, the United States 
was trying to convince the Europeans that Honda Accords also made in 
Marysville, Ohio, and shipped to the European market were all-American. 
The Bush Administration argued that the U.S.-assembled Hondas could not 
be included in the European Community and French quotas on Japanese 
imports because "the nameplate doesn't matter. This is an American car."6 
The United States, like other countries, is ill-equipped to address a 
fundamental issue that underlies trade laws today-how to think about 
nationality in a postnational and increasingly internationally integrated 
world.7 Despite the globalization of economics, the assumption underlying 
the trade laws of most countries is that the competitiveness of their national 
economy is essentially tied to the competitiveness of their "national" com-
panies8 as a matter of course. Yet, as a General Motors executive remarked, 
"[w]hat's nationality got to do with it anyway?"9 Globalization has trans-
formed the very meaning of "nationality" and called into question the 
4. Paul Magnusson eta!., Honda: Is It an American Car?, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1991, at 105. 
5. As a result, Honda was faced with $20 million in back tariffs. And Canada, wishing to protect 
the Canadian jobs provided by Honda's Alliston, Ontario plant, had prominent Canadians lined up to 
defend Honda as North American and denounce U.S. action as "economic arson," Frederic P. Cantin & 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S. FTA, and the Honda Case, 87 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 375, 383 n.37 (1993) (statement of Paul Martin, a Liberal Member of Parliament and the son of the 
Minister for External Affairs in the government of Prime Minister Pearson), and "terrorism," 
Magnusson, supra note 4, at 105 (statement of the former president of the Canadian Automotive Parts 
Manufacturers' Association), and U.S. officials as ''real thugs." /d. (statement of the former president of 
the Canadian Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association). 
6. Magnusson, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills). 
7. See, e.g., Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 230, 231-32 (1992) 
(describing "a central notion of GATT: that all merchandise has a single nationality"). 
8. See, e.g., Laura D'Andrea Tyson, They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters, 
AM. I'ROSPEcr, Winter 1991, at 37 ("The tradition of identifying nations and corporations extends far 
back into the past when corporations served the monarchs who gave them special charters."); Robert B. 
Reich, Who Is Us?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53. 
9. Jenny King, Auto Industry Reaches the Point of Domestic BMWs and Toyotas and Imported 
Chryslers, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1999, at 4. Consumer preferences, langnages, geography, temperature, 
and safety standards might be influenced by nationality and thus might be relevant in a company's 
business or marketing decision making. But the nationality of a corporation no longer has much to do 
with where its products will be made. 
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relationship between the state and the market, as states appear to relinquish 
their power to a market that increasingly transcends national boundaries.10 
Indeed, the two gravitational centers of power in the international 
order today, the state and the market, have spawned a complex configura-
tion of ancillary and dualistic rivalries: nationalism versus international-
ism, political versus economic, sovereignty and self-sufficiency versus 
integration and interdependence.11 For some, the state is thought to be the 
sole or primary institutional entity that is capable of defending the political 
ideals of nationalism and sovereignty against economic globalization, 
where corporate production is easily globalized and manufacturing facili-
ties are closed in one national jurisdiction and opened in the next. For oth-
ers, the state's continued insistence on archaic categories, such as 
nationalism and territorial frontiers, merely stands in the way of open bor-
ders, of greater trade liberalization and greater harmonization of national 
laws deemed necessary for the removal of trade barriers. These recurrent 
disciplinary rivalries between the state and the market-the politics of 
identity versus the economics of profit12-are all the more pronounced now 
because of the increasing globalization of production and the increasing 
mobility of goods, services, and capital across, and without regard for, 
national borders. 
There are different responses to the apparent conflict between market 
and state. Generally speaking, nationalists defend the state as the site for 
politics, governance, and national cultures, and argue for a national trade 
policy that defends the national market, national corporations, and national 
products from the international by fortifying national borders. 13 This has 
generally meant favoring protectionism against "foreign" companies and 
"foreign" goods in favor of "domestic" ones. Nationalists advocate 
national, at times even localized, particularistic identities, as championed 
by the state14 against cosmopolitan rootlessness, market expansions, and 
10. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman observed that globalization has eroded ''the 
traditional boundaries between politics, culture, technology, finance, national security and ecology." 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 15 (1999). Given the imperatives of the 
global economy and ''the difficulty of government regulation of international economic 
behavior .•. there is today hardly any subject that can be said to be effectively controlled by a single 
national sovereign." John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J.lNT'L 
EcoN. L. 17,24-25 (1996). 
I I. See generally Nairn, supra note 3, at 159 ("Since the fall of Napoleon's empire, these two 
world views have existed in a permanent, uneasy tension with one another, the Siamese twin brothers 
of a single world-historical process."). 
12. See BARBER, supra note 1, at 7. 
13. For a discussion of the nationalist response, see infra Part 1. 
14. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the state has been the site of personal identity. Yet, in recent 
years, for many people, identity and loyalty are clustered around other nonstate forms, such as 
ethnicity, religion, or tribe. Take, for example, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, Quebec, and 
Indonesia, to name a few. See generally BARBER, supra note 1; see also infra note 30. 
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global economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization 
("WTO"). 
Internationalists, on the other hand, do not condemn globalization on a 
wholesale scale, but rather defend internationalization and the international 
order in various ways and at various levels. 15 The internationalist relation-
ship with nationalism has ranged from suspicion and mistrust of nationalist 
passion to attempts at managing and channeling nationalism in ways that 
are acceptable to the internationalist sensibility. On the whole, aside from 
the occasional call for a tighter regulatory framework, internationalists, 
especially in the economic field, are more or less comfortable with an in-
ternational economic system that transcends the national or the cultural in 
order to insulate economic rationality against the interference of the state. 
There are still other antiglobalization responses, both from the left and 
the right, that are neither strictly nationalist nor internationalist but a popu-
list mix of the two. 16 Witness the rise of grassroots movements that demand 
a return to more meaningful forms of democratic participation and local 
control-"the democratic taste for the neighborhood,"17 so to speak; or the 
proliferation of religious, environmental, organized labor, student, and 
other ad hoc groups, all opposed to economic globalization and the anti-
national, antisovereign, and antidemocratic tendencies perceived in interna-
tional institutions such as the WTO. 18 
Yet, current responses, whether nationalist, internationalist or a mix 
thereof, have been inadequate for two separate but interrelated reasons. 
First, they do not pay sufficient attention to the impact globalization has 
had on the way corporations conduct themselves-that is, globally and not 
just nationally, resulting in an increasing disassociation between the corpo-
ration's activities and its state of nationality. Similarly, products are no 
longer produced in one or even two countries but are often composites of 
parts, each designed, assembled, processed, or manufactured in different 
national jurisdictions. These developments have eroded, as a practical 
15. For a discussion of the internationalist response, see infra Part I. 
16. A much more blunt characterization of the antiglobalists was offered in Jim Chen, 
Globalization and its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157 (2000). 
17. Benjamin R. Barber, Constitutional Faith, in FOR LovE OF COUNTRY 34-35 (Joshua Cohen 
ed., 1996). Communitarians, for example, bemoan the emptiness ofliberal cosmopolitanism and urge a 
return to a society marked less by "'the politics of difference,"' Richard Rorty, The Unpatriotic 
Academy, BALTIMORE SuN, Feb. 17, 1994, at 19A, and more by "the emotion of national pride," id., 
and "the idea of a national identity," id., joined by "habits of the heart." AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT 
OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, REsPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 24 (1993). 
18. Globalization vs. Nature, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1999, at Al5 (advertisement number two in a 
series on economic globalization for The Turning Point Project, http://www.turnpoint.org) ("With the 
emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), democracy has moved to the back burner. It no 
longer matters what democratic societies want; what matters is what global corporations want, as 
expressed and enforced by global trade bureaucracies in Geneva.") The Turning Point project is a broad 
coalition of environmental, labor, religious, and other disparate groups opposed to globalization. The 
ads are posted on the group's web site. 
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matter, the structures needed to maintain distinctions between the 
"national" and the "foreign." This fact should have profound implications 
for trade laws and policies, which are still anachronistically premised on a 
clear distinction between what constitutes "national" corporations and 
"national" products versus "foreign" corporations and "foreign" products. 
Yet, the nationalist response to these developments is merely to rein-
force the boundaries of the national at the expense of the international; that 
is, to make corporations be more national in orientation even while the 
market is global; or to promote national products even though the national 
identity of a product is less than clear. Conversely, the internationalist re-
sponse is merely to proceed along the current globalized order, even ex-
pand the boundaries of the international and insist on more liberalization, 
without regard to the rifts among groups within and among nations nor the 
antitrade, anti-international backlash19 that has deepened as a result of 
globalization.2° 
Second, current responses to globalization also fail to effectively ad-
dress the distributional fault lines sparked by global transformations. As I 
argue below, the nationalist tendency to erect barriers to international eco-
nomic movements is counterproductive because it is wealth decreasing for 
19. See generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 217 (1998) (discussing how and 
why productive arrangements might generate political backlash and complicate economic analysis); G. 
Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade 
Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 907 (1995) ("Any governance structure for global trade that focuses 
too narrowly on maximizing wealth without taking into account distributional consequences is likely to 
encounter strong, perhaps even violent, resistance from the lowers in the distributional tug-of-war.''). 
Antitrade protests in recent years include the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in November 1999, see The 
Battle in Seattle, THE EcoNor.nST, Nov. 27, 1999, at 21, the anti-Summit of the Americas protests in 
Quebec in April200I, see Alfredo S. Lanier, Unfair? Free Market Is Still the Best Option, CHI. TRIB., 
May 27, 2001, at IC, and the labor-led antiglobalization protests in Washington D.C. in April 2000 
against the China trade bill and other international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, see 
Joseph Kahn, Unions Prepare to Hit the Street in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,2000, atA16. 
20. A new globalized world where companies could easily move production facilities to lower-
wage countries has meant a "shifting of opportunities for wealth and incomes from the older, richer 
societies to the poorer ones," WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NoT: THE MANIC LoGIC OF 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 42 (1997), hence a concomitant sense of anxieties among the working and middle 
classes in the advanced, economically developed world. 
Antitrade critics like Greider, however, tend to ignore the benefits to "older, richer" societies that 
free trade still brings. Free international trade generally benefits people of all countries, whether rich or 
poor; it benefits consumers, productive workers, workers in competitive sectors, and productive and 
efficient firms. Trade also pushes a country, rich or poor, either to improve any domestic sector that is 
economically inefficient and lagging, or in the alternative, to transfer resources to those sectors in 
which it has a comparative advantage. In the process, there are those who are displaced if they are in an 
industry that lacks a comparative advantage. The solution is not to succumb to protectionism. Workers 
displaced could instead simply be given direct transfer payments or cash compensation. See John 0. 
McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L. REv. 511, 520-25 
(2000). For a summary of the positive effects of increased international trade, see JuNICHI GoTO, 
LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON JAPANESE-AMERICAN ISSUES 82 
(1990). See also infra note 84. 
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rich as well as poor countries.21 On the other hand, the internationalist ten-
dency to disregard the significance of nation and national constituents with 
territorially based attachments is also counterproductive because it fails to 
address effectively the fact that in this epoch of globalization, labor is for 
the most part territorially bound, hence most concretely associated with the 
nation, while capital is increasingly global, hence less so. The internation-
alist thus must come up with a response that defends unequivocally the free 
trade norms of international economic law but at the same time revises, 
where feasible, international trade rules to allow considerations of legiti-
mate nationally based interests in ways that do not promote economic na-
tionalism or protectionism. 
This Article provjdes a proposal that would resolve these difficulties. 
The Article sets forth an alternative to the conventional national and inter-
national responses to the postnational economic system. Part I discusses 
the nationalist and internationalist positions. It highlights the intellectual 
traditions, characteristic sensibilities, and biases in these two intellectual 
disciplines and explores the dichotomous responses to globalization each 
has promoted. Part II frames the nationalist and internationalist debate 
within the context of globalization in trade, production, and investment. It 
explores how the global logic of commerce and capital has changed the 
meaning of "nationality" and the relationship between market and state 
actors in both economically developed and underdeveloped regions. 22 In 
this way, Part II demonstrates that international economic law generally, 
and U.S. trade law particularly, should be re-evaluated in light of these 
transformations. Part III proposes a new framework to address and manage 
the conceptual difficulties involved in defining the "national" in a postna-
tional economic system. This proposal is designed to achieve two objec-
tives: first, to reassess the concept of "nationality" and "national origin" in 
trade law and second, through this revised understanding of"nationality,"23 
21. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with 
Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 539, 550 (1993) 
("[P]rotectionism raises prices, entrenches inefficiency and destroys more jobs than it saves."). 
22. I will use the terms "economically developed," the "North," the "First World," the 
"industrialized countries," or ''rich" countries interchangeably in this Article. "Economically 
undeveloped," "developing countries," the "Third World," the "South," or "poor" countries will be 
used interchangeably. 
23. As opposed to through the adoption of redistributive tax laws, or through the incorporation of 
the social compact under United Nations ("U.N.") auspices and stressing a code of conduct for 
multinational corporations in their labor practices. For a discussion of progressive taxation as a means 
of addressing the needs of lower-skilled workers in the United States faced with competition from the 
global economy, see Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, 
"Globalization," and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 731 (2000). While progressive taxation 
may be appealing if the focus is on the rich and poor in one country, for example the United States, the 
issue becomes more complicated when international questions are considered to include not just the 
rich and poor in the United States, but the poor in the developing world. For a discussion of labor and 
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to strike the necessary balance between the national and the international, 
the state and the market. 
Part Ill addresses the need to reassess corporate nationality. Given the 
ease with which products and technology, capital and corporations cross 
national boundaries, national labels as traditionally understood can no 
longer be accurately worn. To the extent that a "national" market can still 
be accurately identified at all, its identification does not come from the tra-
ditional conceptions of a national corporation, but from the one factor in 
the production process that is still territorial rather than globally ori-
ented: the national workforce and its ties to the national and local commu-
nity where it is located. Consequently, companies that meet what I term a 
"domestic participation" test, that is, substantial participation in the na-
tional and local community in which they conduct their businesses,24 
should be granted the benefits of nationality (including a newly proposed 
"participation offset" right),25 regardless of whether they are in fact incor-
porated in that state, whether the seat of management decision making is in 
that state, or whether the majority of their shareholders or directors are na-
tionals of that state. 26 This revision is designed to bring into the global ter-
rain of international economics the territorially based considerations, such 
as those represented by the interests of community and labor. 
Part Ill also suggests ways to re-examine product nationality through 
a reassessment of national origin rules. I propose general guidelines for 
trade, see Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes, Labor Standards and Global Governance: Examining 
the Dimensions of institutional Engagement, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259, 262 (2000). 
At the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, even the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan issued a rejection of linking trade and labor standards within the WTO, offering the following 
compact to business instead: the U.N. would '"make the case for and maintain an environment which 
favors trade and open markets.'" Id. at 266 (quoting UN press release SG/SM/6881/Rev.l, Kofi Annan, 
Secretary-General of the U.N., address to the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 1 February 
1999). 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. See infra Part III.A.2. The participation offset right, in brief, would entitle companies deemed 
domestic under the domestic participation test to be exempt from the payment of rules of origin tariffs 
as well as those additionally imposed pursuant to the various import relieflaws and the so-called unfair 
trade laws-to the extent that the calculated value of the company's domestic participation exceeds the 
amount of duties owed. From a practical standpoint, a participation certificate denominated with a 
certain face value could be issued to the company (the value of the certificate would vary depending on 
the degree of participation of that company). The certificate would be the equivalent of a "free pass," 
allowing the company to have the freedom to import whichever products it chooses, up to the amount 
of the certificate, without having to pay tariffs and charges that would otherwise have been owed 
pursuant to various trade laws. For a discussion of whether this proposal is consistent with General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") obligations, see infra note 255. 
26. This proposal accords with recent theories on nationality and citizenship, favoring an 
interpretation of nationality not formalistically but effectively, "having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of 
reciprocal rights and duties." Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (second phase), 1955 I.C.J. 
4, at 23 (Apr. 6). Corporations that demonstrate a level of participation or embeddedness in the national 
economy of a state will be granted the benefits of nationality under that state's trade laws. 
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rethinking the rules of origin in a way that will foreground distribution con-
cerns more effectively. As Part III makes clear, rules of origin have 
become so politicized, unwieldy, and convoluted that the profound impact 
they have on poor countries and high-volume workers in rich countries is 
hidden by a facade of technical and seemingly innocuous details. In my 
sketch of an alternative set of origin rules, I emphasize the ways in which 
the rules could be revised (1) to reflect more accurately the postmanufac-
turing economy and (2) to spread the benefits of international trade more 
evenly. The critique and proposal for reform are meant to be applicable to 
the international trading system as a whole, although I intend to focus on 
the United States merely for purposes of illustration. 
Reassessing the concept of nationality along the lines I propose is 
necessary to address, on a practical level, the fact that nationality has been 
muddled by globalization. At the same time, by conferring the grant of 
domestic nationality on any global corporation that demonstrates a level of 
participation in the national economy, the proposal achieves the additional 
objective ofbringing into focus a balance between the global and the local, 
the international and the national, the market and the state, capital and la-
bor-without favoring either unchecked globalization on the one hand, or 
economic nationalism and protectionism on the other hand. Using a revised 
understanding of "nationality," I argue for a return to the national and the 
relevance of place in a way that is not antimarket and anti-international. 
I 
NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM 
A thorough study of nationalism and internationalism, and of each 
discipline's history and development, is beyond the scope of the Article. 
Instead, my aim in this Part is merely to highlight the competing sets of 
ideas that give each discipline its respective zeitgeist or characteristics. Na-
tionalism and internationalism have long vied for intellectual dominance.27 
Nationalism is itself a contested term subject to multiple meanings and in-
terpretations,28 and no unitary definition or description is possible. For 
27. E.g.,WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 
(1964) (identifYing in this landmark book two categorical imperatives termed modern state-nationalism 
and modern internationalism); Nathaniel Berman, Between "Alliance" and 
"Localization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 449, 449 
(1994) (describing the "international legal preoccupation with nationalism"); Thomas M. Franck, Clan 
and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 
(1996) ("In historical terms, both nationalism and transnational regimes have long bid (sometimes 
competitively) for the adherence of persons."); S.R. Insanally, Nationalism: No Longer a Domestic 
Dispute, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 439, 440 (1994) ("There is nothing new about the 
tension ... between internationalism, which the United Nations above all personifies, and 
nationalism."). 
28. See generally Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 7, 7 (1995) ("[Nationalism] means such different things to different people. There are many areas 
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some, nationalism lies in the realm of inventions: '"nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they 
do not exist. "'29 Nations themselves are not natural entities endowed with a 
predestined physical existence.30 Although there has been much 
intellectual debate over the origins of nationalism and the many historical 
meanings the term has been associated with,31 nationalism now refers to 
that which is associated with claims surrounding the international system 
of nation-states or the rights of cultural, historical, or ethnic "nations" 
aspiring for statehood.32 The nation as an entity is constructed around some 
of disagreement."); John A. Hall, Nationalisms: Classified and Explained, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, 
at I ("[N]o single, universal theory of nationalism is possible."); Symposium, Reconstrncting Nations 
and States, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993. For historical accounts of nationalism, see BENEDICT 
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COM!IIUNmES: REFLECf!ONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 
(rev. ed. 1991) and ERIC HOBSBAW!II, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRA!II!IIE, MYTH, 
REALITY (1990). 
29. Hall, supra note 28, at4 (quoting ERNEST GELLER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 169 (1964)). 
30. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 49 (1983). For Gellner, it is inevitably 
difficult to define a "nation," because the sociological attributes that make up the essence of "nation," 
common language, religion, etlmicity, are theiUSelves unfixed. ld. at 49 (''Nations are not inscribed into 
the nature of things, they do not constitute a political version of the doctrine of natural kinds. Nor were 
national states the manifest ultimate destiny of ethnic or cultural groups."). Gellner was highly critical 
of Hegel's assertion that it is the destiny of nations to evolve into states. CARLTON J. H. HAYES, THE 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALISM 159 (1931) (describing the demands in Europe 
"that each nationality should be a political unit under an independent constitutional govermnent which 
would put an end to despotism, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical influence"); GEORG W. F. HEGEL, 
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WoRLD HISTORY 134 (H. B. Nisbet trans., 1975) (''Nations may 
have had a long history before they finally reach their destination-i.e. that of forming theiUSelves into 
states .•.. "). 
Between nation versus state, "the term nation or tribe suggests an affinity group that has placed 
certain values high on its agenda: shared genealogical origins, language and historic myths, as well as 
cultural and, perhaps, religious compatibility." Franck, supra uote 27, at 362. States refer to a more 
politically based form of association than one based on commonalities from past history. In this sense, 
many states are not nation-states in the sense that they are multinational, for example, India, Canada, 
Nigeria, and Switzerland. When the "nations" within the state wish to free theiUSelves from the state, 
for example, "nation" is not interchangeable with "state" but rather, conflicts with "state." Before the 
World War I peace and minorities treaties, see infra notes 42-47, international law, with its statist 
foundation, was reluctant to recognize "nations." See, e.g., Nationality in International Law, 28 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS Soc'y 151, 151-52 (1943). 
/d. 
The word ''Nationality" does not mean what it says, nor does it say what it means. 
Etymologically it would mean the condition of belonging to a nation, of being a national. In 
International Law ''nations" are an unknown quantity •... The word "national," if used in 
International Law, has a technical meaning ... [and] means a member or a subject of such a 
State. 
31. HoBSBAW!II, supra note 28, at 16-24 (noting the term "nation" has been used in reference to 
nonstate identifications, such as guilds, corporations, feudal estates). 
32. FRIEDMANN, supra note 27, at 21 ("More and more, from the sixteenth to the early twentieth 
century, the national state, in many cases coalescing from the older and smaller entities of dukedoiUS, 
principalities, and city republics, became the sole source of legal power and the exclusive focus of 
political allegiance."). Nationalism in its current modem incarnation can be traced to the Wilsonian 
post-World War I world composed of "people" who have a right to self-determination and by 
implication their own nation-state. See WOODROW WILSON, The Fourteen Points Address (1918), 
reprinted in 1 WAR AND PEACE 155 (1970); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Nationalism and 
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common mooring, whether of language, ethnicity, religion, culture, or 
some other essential characteristic33 upon which the state's "homogenizing 
project''34 can be established. Nationalism in its simplest and most general 
meaning may mean "simply that one identifies with the claims of one's 
nations and one's co-nationals, and takes them as one's own."35 
By contrast, internationalism is generally built around a different set 
of preoccupations. In the United States especially, internationalism has 
been linked to a liberal framework of cosmopolitanism.36 Unlike the 
nationalist whose identification is with the nation, the cosmopolitan's 
Internationalism: The Wilsonian Legacy, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 493, 493 (1994). John 
Maynard Keynes was particularly distressed at the balance struck in the Treaty of Versailles between 
nationalism and internationalism. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A Revision of the Treaty, reprinted in 3 
THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES I, 8 (Royal Econ. Soc'y Ed., 1971). Keynes 
commented: 
/d. 
The Wilsonian dogma, which exalts and dignifies the divisions of race and nationality above 
the bonds of trade and culture, and guarantees frontiers but not happiness, is deeply 
embedded in the conception of the League ofNations as at present constituted. It yields us the 
paradox that the first experiment in international government should exert its influence in the 
direction of intensifYing nationalism. 
33. Brilrnayer, supra note 28, at I 0 ("There is also controversy about what exactly the defining 
characteristic of a nation is. A nation is an entity that is fairly homogeneous with respect to some 
particular variable-it is a community that shares some attribute-but it is difficult to say precisely 
which attribute that should be. The usual candidates are language, religion, ethnicity, culture, and race; 
but for every potential defining characteristic, counterexamples can be found."). 
34. Katherine Verdery, Whither "Nation" and "Nationalism", in DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 
37,43. 
35. Brilmayer, supra note 28, at 8. 
36. David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. lNT'L L. 9, 
22-25 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Nationalism Versus Internationalism: Another Look, 26 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L & PoL. 585, 585 (1994). As Professor Kennedy notes: 
one generally does not find in the United States ... international lawyers who are also 
nationalists. International law in the United States after I 945 provided a congenial intellectual 
home for a large number of immigrants, among them European and Jewish refugees, whose 
American patriotism was cosmopolitan rather than jingoistic and who have been among the 
field's strongest intellectual leaders. 
Kennedy, supra, at 23; see also id. at I I ("Legal internationalists in the United States for most of the 
last 50 years have linked their status to the reputational ups and downs of a broadly liberal 
cosmopolitanism .... "). 
Between the two, internationalism, rather than nationalism, is generally more friendly to the spirit 
of cosmopolitanism. Writing about a universal international order composed of a cosmopolitan and 
republican federation of liberal states governed by law, Immanuel Kant, for example, rejoiced in the 
coming of a Weltbiirger (citizen of the world) and denounced "the demand of fools in Germany for 
national pride." HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS AND 
BACKGROUND 401 (1944) (citing Kant's HANDSCHRIFrLICHER NACHLASS, No. 1099, at 489); Linda 
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447, 494-95 (2000). Bosniak 
argued: 
/d. 
The ethical cosmopolitan view, in its classical form, rejects particularist loyalties ... ; it is a 
perspective committed to the well-being of humanity at large, rather than any particular 
community of persons .... In such a view, therefore, grounding one's solidarity in the 
nation-state is unacceptably narrow and parochial. 
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"allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings.'m To the in-
ternationalist, nationalism is the "alien," the "other" whose unruly nature 
and primitive urges are to be tamed and contained by, or managed within, a 
modem and rational international order.38 Internationalism associates na-
tionalism with "particularism and parochialism," and proclaims itself to be 
allied with ''universalism and cosmopolitan sophistication.''39 The political 
cosmopolitanism that underlies the international project has meant an over-
all preference for international or multilateral over bilateral or unilateral 
approaches to problem solving.40 At the same time, even while fearing the 
explosive forces of nationalism, internationalism also recognizes the need 
to include and simultaneously tame, to appease and simultaneously shape 
nationalist aspirations and demands by subjecting them to international law 
and international legal authority.41 Indeed, for almost two hundred years, 
international law has struggled to develop an effective framework of inter-
nationalist responses to nationalist conflicts through a variety of legal tech-
niques to harness nationalism and contain sovereignty, such as 
37. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FoR LoVE OF COUNTRY, supra 
note 17, at 4. Cosmopolitanism has roots in the ancient Greek Stoics who favored a community that '"is 
truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this comer nor to that, but measures the 
boundaries of our nation by the sun."' Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Cosmopolitanism is also defined as 
"[t]he belief in, and pursuit of, a style of life which ... [reveals] acquaintance with, and an ability to 
incorporate, the manners, habits, languages, and social customs of cities throughout the world." RoGER 
SCRUTON, A DICTIONARY OF PoLITICAL THOUGHT 100 (1982). Jeremy Waldron characterized a 
cosmopolitan as someone who does not secure his or her sense of identity by deeply entrenched 
moorings to any particular or bounded subset of place, culture, or tradition. Jeremy Waldron, Minority 
Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992). For a classic 
denunciation of the notion of world citizenship, see HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 89 (1968) 
("A world citizen, living under the tyranny of a world empire, and speaking and thinking in a kind of 
glorified Esperanto, would be no less a monster than a hermaphrodite."). 
38. In a celebrated work, Professor Haus Kohn described nationalism thus: 
Its roots seemed to reach into the dark soil of primitive times and to have grown through 
thousands of hidden channels of unconscious development, not in the bright light of rational 
political ends, but in the mysterious womb of the people, deemed to be so much nearer to the 
forces of nature. 
KoHN, supra note 36, at 331; see also Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair": European 
Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1792, 1798, 1803 
(1993) (describing the post-World War I conceptual framework as one designed to strike "a 
paradoxical 'alliance' between turbulent nationalist passion and a newly autonomous international law" 
because "'[p]eoples and nationalities' were viewed as seething cauldrons of unpredictable forces and 
passions, rather than as sources of simple and rational first principles"). For the internationalist, the 
national is primal and the international rational; "if faced with a choice between reason and belief, law 
and politics, the secular and the sacred, to choose the first term is to build the international, to choose 
the second is to reinforce the national." Kennedy, supra note 36, at 93. 
39. Slaughter Burley, supra note 36, at 585. 
40. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 23; Slaughter Burley, supra note 36, at 586. 
41. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 38, at 1803 (discussing how the interwar lawyers "attempted to 
rejuvenate law by opening it up to the vital energy of nationalism, while reshaping nationalism by 
endowing it with legal form"); see a/so HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446-47 
(1952) (viewing internationalist as defending "internationalism and pacifism" over "natioualism and 
imperialism"). 
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self-determination,42 international minority protections,43 internationaliza-
tion through international administration,44 supranational legal integra-
tion,45 mandates,46 and universal human rights.47 
42. WILSON, supra note 32, reprinted in 1 WAR AND PEACE 159 (1970). One solution to address 
the collapse of the European empires was to create "national" states. The creation of a Polish state from 
areas with Polish populations was addressed in Wilson's Thirteenth Point. See also Damrosch, supra 
note 32, at 493 ("Wilson gave expression to the nationalist aspirations of peoples around the world, 
through his endorsement of the principle of self-determination. He also initiated the first institution that 
had as its objective the organization of the international community to apply concerted power in 
support of universal values."). 
43. The redrawing of the European political map after World War I inevitably created minority 
groups within the territorial borders of the new states. These new states were compelled to sign 
minority protection treaties or to make declarations guaranteeing rights for their minority groups, 
including civil rights for all and specific cultural, educational, and lingnistic autonomy rights for 
minority group members. See generally INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES I6 (1955). There 
were other attempts to administer minority identity within states. For example, in territories transferred 
from German to Polish sovereignty, German nationals were to acquire Polish citizenship. However, the 
plebiscite principle allowed German nationals over eighteen years of age to opt for German nationality 
after two years. In deference to Poland's sovereign powers as a state, Poland was allowed to refuse 
citizenship to certain residents of the new Polish territories. And Polish citizenship could be granted to 
certain Poles outside the territory of Poland. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 91, 225 Consol. 
T.S. 188,240-41. 
44. When Britain relinquished its mandate over Palestine in 1947, the U.N. General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 181, which provided for the partition of the territory and the internationalization of 
Jerusalem. Jerusalem was to be placed under the administration of the U.N. Trusteeship Council, with 
the following plans for the implementation of an international solution: the creation of two states, one 
Arab, one Jewish, with self-determination rights; guarantees of minority protection for Jewish and Arab 
minorities in the new states; supranational integration through the "Economic Union of Palestine," 
overseen by Arab, Jewish, and U.N. representatives; and internationalization subject to plebiscite 
review by the residents after ten years. See Berman, supra note 38, at 1795-96. 
45. Between 1919 and 1921, the area known as Upper Silesia, the territory divided between 
Poland and Germany, was placed under international tutelage providing for temporary unity of the 
region under a fifteen-year complex legal regime, which included the following arrangements: the 
imposition of a plebiscite, with an International Commission conducting the vote and a Committee of 
Experts and the Conference of Allied Ambassadors interpreting the results; the establishment of a 
supranational regime that reflected parts of the two sovereigns' legal systems; extensive provisions for 
minority rights; the creation of a quasi-internationallegal personality to residents of Upper Silesia; and 
the establishment of mixed local and international tribunals. See generally Berman, supra note 38, at 
1893-98. 
The formation of the European Economic Community and the European Union might constitute 
another example. See Mann, supra note 2, at 120-28. 
46. International law responded to the collapse of European empires by formal recognition of 
national states and minority rights protections. See supra notes 43 & 45. The non-European possessions 
of the collapsed empires, deemed not yet ready for statehood, were subjected to the mandate system. 
Treaty of Versailles, supra note 43, at 203. The mandate system was divided into Class A, B, and C 
mandates. Class A mandates were composed of the former territories of the Ottoman Empires. These 
former territories were deemed to "have reached a stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice 
and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." !d. at 203. Accordingly, 
the administering authorities had only nominal supervisory power over Class A mandates. Class B 
mandates were made up of the former German colonies in Central Africa, and the administering 
authorities had greater supervisory power over them. Other former German territories in Africa and the 
Pacific were deemed Class C mandates and part of the territory of the mandatory, "subject to the 
mandatory municipal law." Ramon E. Reyes Jr., Nauru v. Australia: The International Fiduciary Duty 
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The contrasts between nationalism and internationalism have become 
even more stark as a result of globalization. As Part ll will show, one might 
characterize globalization as a hyper state of intemationalization.48 Thus it 
is not surprising that nationalism and globalization might be viewed as 
each other's antithesis.49 For nationalists, globalization is associated with 
an inevitable "move from public to private. The state will be weaker and 
commerce will be strengthened"50 in ways that will result in the increasing 
homogenization of social and economic relations51 and accordingly, the 
dilution of national distinctiveness and control. The nationalist agenda thus 
includes a vigorous defense of "a basic reality-that a major value of hu-
man life is a rootedness in place."52 
and the Settlement of Nauro's Claims for Rehabilitation of its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. 
lNT'L & COMP. L. 1, 16 (1996). 
47. The Versailles system had aimed towards the preservation of sovereignty, national identities, 
and individual and minority rights. The system eventually collapsed and the international minority 
protection system was replaced with the notion of universal individual human rights. Josef L. Kunz, 
The Present Status of the International Law for the Protection of Minorities, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 282, 
284 (1954). 
48. Or, as antiglobalization critics may characterize it, "globalization is merely capitalism writ 
large." Globalisation and Its Critics, THE EcoNor.nST, Sept. 29,2001, at 5. 
49. Franck, supra note 27, at 362 (discussing the "thesis of nationalism and antithesis of 
globalization"). Some have noted the dangers should nationalism feel itself diminished by the 
dominance of globalization. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Soeiology of 
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 88-89 (1996) ("Modem nationalism and ethnocentrism 
may be particularly virulent and dangerous, precisely because group identity is constantly threatened by 
the forces released by modernity. These powerful forces of globalization include mass communications, 
mobility, and tourism, and the rapid spread of fashions and tastes."); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or 
the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 345, 348 (2000) (''As integration and 
globalization increase, there is simultaneously a growing fragmentation within States and strong 
pressures for decentralization of decision-making. Ethnicity, nationalism, and the need for personal 
affiliations and satisfaction push toward fragmentation and decentralization.''). 
50. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 40; see also Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of 
Us: Retrieving Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe, 41ND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 59, 63 
(I 996). Eisenstein commented: 
Because privacy always exists in relation to publicness, and because they shift and conflict 
with each other simultaneously, the privatization of the public realm has created a crisis for 
both realms .... If a notion of public is gone, how does one live outside the self? 
Transnational capital needs privatization of multiple publics. So neocons revise democracy 
for global marketing. 
!d.; Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 589, 592 
(2000) (describing proglobalization internationalism as being devoid of "any conception of a world 
beyond the market-the political or civic or cultural world in which ideas, beliefs, traditions, even 
innovations have meaning beyond their salability''). 
51. Suzanne Berger, Introduction to NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1 (Suzanne 
Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996) (criticizing the "convergence across nations in the structures of 
production and in the relations among economy, society, and state"); Robert Wolf, The Regionalist 
Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 621 (2000) (describing "globalization of world trade and 
culture [as] a process of homogenization which an increasing number of people perceive as soulless and 
dehumanizing" and decrying "world-wide monoculture now being created by the corporations"). !d. 
52. John Miller, Globalization and its Metaphors, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL 'TRADE 594, 598 (2000); 
see also HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON Goon 233-35 (1989) (arguing that 
global trade erodes local communities and promotes an imagined and nonexistent "world community''). 
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Fear of globalization as a commodity-centered modeP3 of social and 
economic arrangement is exacerbated by the apparent cozy relationship 
that seems to have been struck between globalization and international 
economies. "Many see a lag between the bold new world of international 
commerce, communications, regulation, and policy which has adapted to 
life in a global village and the international political institutions which 
have not."54 In this way, globalization is equated with erosion of sover-
eignty and governmental control.55 Sovereignty at the nation-state level is 
thus all the more necessary to defend against the global economic system 
and "the Golden Straitjacket"56 states must increasingly accept as a precon-
dition to attracting capital. For many countries, wearing the Golden 
Straitjacket has meant, as nationalists bemoan, "your economy grows and 
your politics shrinks,"57 a narrowing of politics and further erosion of 
53. Paul B. Thompson, Globalization, Losers and Property Rights, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
602, 606 (2000). 
54. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 39; Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modem State? The 
Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 483, 511 (1998) 
("[G]lobalization of the economy has meant that there is no escaping the market. Interstate corporations 
and the consolidation of the domestic economy threatened to outstrip the capacity of the states or the 
market to control them .... "). 
55. Whittington, supra note 54, at 512 ("[G]Iobalization has weakened governmental 
sovereignty, the perceived governmental ability to make and enforce autonomous decisions."). 
Additional charges against globalization include assertions that it erodes democratic values. Wolf, 
supra note 51, at 614 (condenming the "megalithic" corporations); Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, supra note 
50, at 593. 
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note !0, at 86. "The Cold War had the Mao suit, the Nehru jacket, the 
Russian fur. Globalization has only the Golden Straitjacket." This means that for countries to generate 
the growth necessary to embark on a program of economic development, they have to link with and 
engage the global market and its rules: 
[M)aking the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low 
rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as 
close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs on 
imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas and 
domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries .... 
!d. at 86-87. 
57. Id. at 87. Once plugged into and linked with the global market, in other words, states are 
expected to manage their economies according to the rules of the international market-to wear the 
global straitjacket. Those who do not have to deal with the consequences of capital flight. In India, even 
the coalition led by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which campaigned on a Hindu-first platform, 
conceded that "[t)he priority is to build a national consensus on the acceptance of global capital, market 
norms and whatever goes with it. ... You have to go out and compete for investments." Jonathan Karp, 
India's BJP Is Shifting Priority to the Economy, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 7, 1999, at A21. Similarly, even left-
of-center parties in Europe have had to accept the straitjacket of globalization, prompting critics to 
ask: After all, "what is the point of 'Europe', if Europe is turning out to be just another United States?" 
What Is Europe?, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 12,2000, at 15. Korea's Prime Minister in the mid-1990s, Lee 
Hong Koo, said, "The big decisions today are whether you have a democracy or not and whether you 
have an open economy or not. Those are the big choices. But once you've made those big choices, 
politics becomes just political engineering to implement decisions in the narrow space allowed you 
within this system." FRIEDMAN, supra note I 0, at 89; Cf Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 48, at 
18-19. 
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national sovereignty. 58 Increasingly, nationalists defend the national project 
as a populist movement that speaks not an abstract, universal language but 
rather, the people's language-"the emotionalism, the vulgar populism, the 
highly-coloured romanticism of most nationalist ideology (all the things 
intellectuals have always held their noses at)."59 
To further complicate matters, for nationalists, the "marketization of 
international law"60 has created an international domain that is not only 
global and antinational, but also culturally American and therefore, by that 
very fact, additionally problematic.61 As globalization spreads, the nation-
alist opposition to globalization on economic grounds has taken on an addi-
tional cultural element: "We have our own culture, our own values, and 
we will do it our own way at our own pace."62 Nationalism thus proclaims 
itself to be "against civilization being disseminated out and downwards 
from the appropriate centers."63 Nationalism is a movement not just to lib-
erate people whom imperial powers had forced to live together in empires 
but also to oppose the self-serving ideology of ''big battalion" states that 
58. The global market in general and the WTO in particular are viewed as stealthy, 
antidemocratic, sovereignty-eroding bodies. Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18; see also Patti 
Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL lNT'L 
LJ. 631, 634-43 (1994); Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 734-37 (1994). For a thoughtful examination of the WTO and its impact on 
sovereignty and democracy, see Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 401, 
410-19 (2000). 
59. TOM NAIRN, THE BREAK-UP OF BRITAIN 354 (2nd exp. ed. 1977). 
60. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 34. 
61. The Marxist cultural critic Fredric Jameson has called the merger of economic globalization 
and culture a "postmodern hyperspace" that expands without regard to territorial boundaries. Fredric 
Jameson, Postmodemism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, NEw LEFT REv., July-Aug. 1984, 
at 53; see also Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Postmodemism, NEw LEFT REv., July-Aug. 1989, at 31. 
Prominent Neo-Marxists like Tom Nairn now associate cosmopolitanism and internationalism with the 
self-serving elitist ideology of "big battalion" states that hide their particularistic agenda of infinite 
capital accumulation behind a facade of universalistic norms, and more specifically, behind the agenda 
of the American empire. Nairn, supra note 3, at 157, 161. According to Nairn, the recent unrestrained 
movements of production and capital transnationally have resulted, for poor countries, in "[p ]rogress in 
the abstract [and] domination in the concrete," and domination as "Anglicization or 
Frenchification .... [or] more globally: 'Westernization' or 'Americanization."' NAIRN, supra note 
59, at338. 
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 90; see also Frank E. Manning, Reversible 
Resistance: Canadian Popular Culture and the American Other, in THE BEAVER BITES BAcK? 
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE IN CANADA 4, 4 (David H. Flaherty & Frank E. Manning eds., 1993). 
Manning quotes Margaret Atwood in the following: 
I d. 
Canada as a separate but dominated country has done about as well under the U.S. as women, 
worldwide, have done under men; about the only position they've ever adopted towards us, 
country to country, has been the missionary position, and we were not on top. 1 guess that's 
why the national wisdom vis-a-vis Them has so often taken the form of lying still, keeping 
your mouth shut, and pretending you like it 
63. Nairn, supra note 3, at 160. 
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employ universalistic norms against local cultures.64 Fearing that globaliza-
tion is now the vehicle for cultural imperialism, the nationalist struggle 
adds local culture to the long list of ideals to be defended.65 
Internationalists, on the other hand, do not condemn globalization, 
transnationalization, or postnationalization66 on a wholesale scale, but 
64. Nationalists are "protagonists of medieval particularism" against the abstractions of 
universality, "favoring [n]ot the implacably prescribed common sense of internationalism, but the 
nonlogical, untidy, refractory, disintegrative, particularistic truth of nation-states," Nairn, supra note 3, 
at 157, 158, precisely because of the "thinness of cosmopolitanism and the crucial humanizing role 
played by identity politics in a deracinated world of contracts, markets, and legal personhood." Barber, 
supra note 17, at 30. In repudiating the notion of a cosmopolitan ethics, Hannah Arendt proclaimed that 
a citizen "is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries. His rights and duties 
must be defined and limited, not only by those of his fellow citizens, but also by the boundaries of a 
territory." ARENDT, supra note 37, at 81. 
65. See Richard A. Falk, Culture, Modernism, Postmodernism: A Challenge to International 
Relations, in CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 268 (Jongsuk Chay ed., 1990) (commenting 
that the rhetoric of globalization tends to "disguise patterns of interstate hegemony, especially as 
between Europe and the rest of the world"); L. Amede Obiora, Feminism, Globalization, and 
Culture: After Beijing, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 355,380-81 (1997). Obiora stated: 
Marginalized by exposure to an onslaught of conditions of modernity, the market economy, 
and imperialistic transnational entctprises, distinct cultural groups tend to view themselves as 
being under pressure to demonstrate their ritual purity and allegiance to traditional high 
culture. In certain quarters, changes emanating from globalization are suspiciously perceived 
as Trojan horses in service of cultural imperialism. As such, they are countered with fervent 
expressions of nationalism .... 
Id; Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, supra note 50, at 593, 590 (decrying support by "global marketers," for 
"globalization, 'the American steamroller,' which decimates languages, traditions, and the environment 
at whim"). 
66. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. Terms such as globalization, 
internationalization, transnationalization, postnationalization, and even denationalization have been 
used to describe the process by which activities which were once taking place within national borders 
are now taking place beyond national borders. See generally R.J. BARRY JONES, GLOBALISATION AND 
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 (1995). Goods, financial 
instruments, capital, services, technology, and even culture itself, are being exchanged across national 
borders. Each of the terms above describes something about that process, although each term may 
connote something specific about the character of and consequences to this phenomenon. 
The term "globalization" is generally associated with various forms of linkages among businesses 
and markets across and without regard to national borders and usually connotes some erosion of the 
national, provoking questions about the meaning of democracy, participation, and sovereignty. 
"Internationalization" or "transnationalization" may simply mean "cooperative activities of 
national actors," bilaterally or multilaterally; see Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An 
Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 375 (1996), so that the national is not necessarily 
diminished. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183, 
184 (1997) ("The state is not disappearing, it is desegregating into its separate, functionally distinct 
parts. These parts--courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-are networking with 
their countetparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental 
order."). 
"Postnationalization" implies a shift, conceptually and paradigrnatically, from the national to 
something beyond the national, although the term does not necessarily implicate a shift in the 
relationship between the state and the market, as in "globalization," but rather a shift in the relationship 
between the state and other nonmarkct, non-state entities, such as nongovernmental organizations in the 
fields of human rights and the environment. See, e.g., RiCHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAUGH, 
GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 429-30 (1994); Richard 
Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 39, 
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rather defend internationalization and the international order in various 
ways and at various levels. In the economic field, internationalists, as com-
pared to nationalists, are also more or less comfortable with an interna-
tional system that extends beyond the national and nationalism, governs 
"from a space beyond culture,"67 and protects the market and its cosmo-
politan ordet8 against the political interference of the state.69 
47-48 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993); Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental 
Activism and World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311,312-13 (1995). 
"Denationalization" is used less, but refers to the primarily economic phenomenon, in which the 
national is diminished. See SASKIA SASSEN, LosiNG CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 33 (1996) ("[E]conomic globalization has contributed to a denationalizing of national 
territory ... .''). 
"Transnationalization," "postnationalization," and "denationalization" have also been used to 
describe wholly noneconomic developments, to capture the emergence of crossnational or subnational 
identities to give rise to a new meaning of citizenship that is multiple and transterritorial. See, e.g., 
Yasemin Nohuglu Soysal, Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organized Islam 
in European Public Spheres, 26 THEORY AND Soc'y 509, 513 (1997) (postnational citizenship); Peter J. 
Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1999) (book review). 
67. Kennedy, supra note 36, at 82; see also Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global 
Governance, 22 MicH. J.lNr'L L. 1 (2000). Paul commented: 
The whole legal structure of the free trade norm rests on a rational economic 
model. ... Cultural claims threaten that rationality argument. Cultural claims derive from 
sentiment, nostalgia, insecurity; they are rooted in non-rationality. To protect the rationality 
of the market from the non-rationality of nationalism and culture, the international 
community rejects cultural exceptions. 
!d. at 80. For a critique of the internationalist assumption that the international is acultural, see David 
Kennedy, Background Noise? The Underlying Politics of Global Governance, HARv. lNT'L REv., 
Summer 1999, at 52 [hereinafter Background Noise?] ("Common but mistaken ideas-like the idea that 
international governance is separate from both the global market and from local culture, or is more a 
matter of public than of private law-sharply narrow the sense among foreign-policy professionals of 
what is possible and appropriate for foreign policy.''). 
68. Karl Marx was one of the earlier critics of the international market's claim to 
cosmopolitanism: 
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan 
character to production and consumption in every country .... [I]t has drawn from under the 
feet of industry the national ground on whieh it stood. All old-established national industries 
have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, 
whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, ... industries 
whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe .... In 
place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in 
every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. 
Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 476-77 
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
Similarly, today's critics argne that the supposed cosmopolitanism of market-driven globalization 
entails "a pen.l'ective of the whole [world] that is totally oblivious to the ethical imperatives of human 
solidarity," Richard Falk, Revisioning Cosmopolitanism, in FoR LovE OF COUNTRY supra note 17 at 
53, and is in no way related to the cosmopolitanism espoused by those like Martha Nussbaum, supra 
note 37; see also Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, supra note 66, at 44. 
69. For example, the European common market has been depoliticized: 
In a technocratic private market, the locus for political choice is less opened up than it is 
rendered invisible. Take the European Union, whose political decision-making always seems 
to take place "elsewhere" .... The idea of a "govemmenf' promoting a "program" has been 
replaced by the enlightened management of prosperity .... EU policy managers[, for 
example,] treat the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe less as a set of 
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Globalization of trade and investment, the free movement of goods 
and services, and, increasingly, of capital, across national borders, are gen-
erally compatible for private internationalism.70 Even though some interna-
tionalists would like to see a superinternational regulatory structure-a 
globalized New Deal, so to speak-instituted to manage these changes, 
they are not opposed per se to the rise of transnational economic activi-
ties. 71 Indeed, international economic law has over the years aimed to build 
an international liberal regime of WTO rules to overcome a protectionist 
national regime of local rules72 more susceptible to capture by parochial 
political interests.73 Recently, in an effort to create a dispute settlement sys-
tem that is based less on diplomacy or power and more on rules and law, 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO was empowered to issue deci-
sions that are binding unless the Dispute Settlement Body, including 
the winning party, votes unanimously to overturn it.74 To private 
political exclusions and choices than as the technical management of different natural stages 
of development. 
Background Noise?, supra note 67, at 53. 
70. There is a set of characteristics that define private internationalism: 
International economic law ... is defined not by the subjects it governs, but by its regulatory 
terrain-the law, of whatever origin, which governs international economic transactions. It 
mixes national and international law, and is rooted in private law-both national regimes of 
contract or property and international regimes of private law unification and conflict of laws. 
We might have called aspects of this field "private international law" some years ago, but the 
newer phrase "international economic law" embraces the public law institutional machinery 
of trade law and policy-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North American 
Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the European Union, Mercado Comunitario Suramericano 
(MERCOSUR), and the rest. 
Kennedy, supra note 36, at 38-39. 
71. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burly, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and 
the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND 
PRAXIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FORM 125 (John Gerard Ruggie ed., 1993); Shell, supra note 19, at 907 
(arguing for a "trade stakeholders" model which would allow individual and nongovernmental 
organization participation in the WTO). 
72. International trade legalism allows governments to resist domestic resistance to free trade. 
For the argument that free trade internationalism is more democratic than domestic protectionism, see 
generally Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade 
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 311 (1993); McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 20 
(discussing how internationalism of the type manifested in the WTO provides the antidote to naked 
interest-group politics and domestic rent-seeking at the national level); Jan Tumlir, Need for an Open 
Multilateral Trading System, 6 THE WORLD EcoN. 393, 406 (1983) (arguing the trade system and its 
"international rules represent a truer expression of the national interest of all the countries concerned 
than the mass of national [economic] legislation''). 
73. For a discussion of how interest groups, particularly industries with significant political 
strength, press for protectionist measures that further their own rather than the national interest, see 
ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23-24 
(1986); see also Edward John Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffi and the 
Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 290-91 (1987) (discussing how special 
interest groups worked to block the opening of U.S. markets for exports from poor countries). 
74. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 
16(4), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1235 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on Rules]. The losing party is to comply 
with the decision. Understanding on Rules art. 21(3). If the losing party does not, the parties are to 
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internationalists especially, the idea that conflicts can be "privatized" or 
"economized"-that is, cabined in a private, economic sphere-and dis-
agreements among states resolved through a rational regime of 
"technocratic cosmopolitan governance" consisting of "technocratic 
means, sound management and trade deals"75 is appealing. Thus, the inter-
national is appropriately cosmopolitan and universal, the correct antidote to 
parochial politics, national controls, political interventions, and other forms 
of capitulation to organized interest groups.76 
As one example of the nationalist versus internationalist response to 
economic globalization, take the case of a Japanese automaker that ships its 
design components for assembly in its plant in Mexico, and then distributes 
the finished product to buyers in the United States and in other parts of the 
world. The company, motivated in part by its ability to engage in "wage 
arbitrage"77 in Mexico, has chosen to move production from a high-wage to 
come up with a "mutually acceptable compensation." Understanding on Rules art. 22(2). And failing 
that, the winning party may seek authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body to withdraw 
concessions "equivalent to the level of the nullification and impairment" suffered. Understanding on 
Rules art. 22(4). The losing party thus could comply with the WTO ruling, by changing the law or 
practice that had given rise to the complaint, or it could pay damages for noncompliance. Contrast this 
with the old GATT system, where the losing party could veto dispute resolution panel decisions to keep 
them from becoming binding. JoHN H. JACKSON, REsTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 61-65 (1990). 
75. Background Noise?, supra note 67, at 54 ("Specialists tend to overestimate the technocratic 
or apolitical nature of economic concerns, including the independence of economic development from 
background cultural, political, and institutional contexts.''). 
76. See Michael D. Pendleton, A New Human Right-The Right to Globalization, 22 FORDHAM 
lNT'L LJ. 2052, 2052-53 (1999) ("Globalization offers a realistic vehicle for escaping from failed 
nationalism to an expanded concept of global rights and duties .... [Its] economic potential is what 
gives globalization power even against antagonistic national governments.''); see also Wesley A. Caun, 
Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the 
Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and 
Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 414 (2001). Cann quoted Renato Ruggiero, Director-General 
of the \VTO, as follows: 
[T]he need is not to discuss whether globalization is a good thing, but to ask •.. "what would 
be the alternative?" It would be a world divided by economic and political nationalism-a 
world in which we would go down the road towards power-based relations, increased tension 
and violence, as history has taught us. 
/d. at 414-15 n.4; Renato Ruggiero, Reflections After Seattle, 24 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 9, 14 (2000) 
("Without the WTO, we will go back to a world of national barriers, protectionism, economic 
nationalism, and conflict. History has repeatedly showed where this road can lead.''). The state is all too 
susceptible to the push and pull of "local politics (of protectionism, exchange controls, redistribution, 
corruption, etc.) ..•. " Kennedy, supra note 36, at 86. International economic rules such as those of the 
\VTO are thus necessary for "bringing law in general to bear on politics in particular, order to bear on 
anarchy, reason on chaos, the international on the national.'' /d. 
77. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 58; see also Michael Kelly, Globalization: No Pain, No Gain, 
WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 2001, at A31 ("[T]he purpose of globalism is to allow capital to freely chase 
profits around the world: to allow corporations to make more money by manufacturing their goods in 
dirt-wage, low-regulation undeveloped countries instead of in high-wage, high-regulation developed 
countries ...• [Thus] [m]anufacturing jobs must migrate from developed countries to undeveloped 
countries ... .''). However, although the desire to engage in ''wage arbitrage" is a contributing factor to 
a company's global expansion, it is not the only one. The economist Lester Thurow noted that the 
inability to develop skills for a technology-oriented information economy is as significant a threat to 
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a low-wage labor market in order to reduce the cost of production and in-
crease its profit margin, and to position its products for preferential treat-
ment by NAFTA. 
The ease with which multinational companies move globally sets up 
the following: a tug of war between workers from the mature industrial 
economies who are threatened with losing their fifteen-dollar-per-hour jobs 
and workers from the agrarian, newly industrializing ones who may in fact 
gain two-or three-dollar-per-hour jobs.78 Globalization has shifted certain 
types of economic activities from one region of the globe to the other. For 
lower skilled workers in industrial sectors in rich countries, the concern is 
simply stated: "to what extent has, or will, the pay of low-skilled 
Americans or French or Germans be set in Beijing, Delhi and Djakkarta 
rather than in New York, Paris, or Frankfurt?"79 But globalization has also 
rewarded, whether in rich or poor countries, those workers in the "high-
value"80 information-oriented sectors who are the economic beneficiaries 
of the global age. The national and international trade regime has crafted 
radically different responses to these shifts.81 
In response to the rifts that have arisen between countries (rich and 
poor) and groups within countries ("high-value" and "high-volume" work-
ers), nationalists and other antiglobalization groups, particularly from rich 
countries, have generally favored more protectionism against "foreign" 
companies and "foreign" goods in favor of "domestic" ones (invoking the 
high-volume, manufacturing-based workers as is the large pool of low-wage workers in the poorer 
countries. LESTER C. THUROW, THE fUTURE OF CAPITALISM 166-84 (1996); see also infra note 155. 
For a discussion of how, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, "free international trade benefits 
the abundant factor and harms the scarce factor," and the impact this has on U.S.-China trade (or trade 
between any capital-abundant country and labor-abundant country), see STEVEN HusTED & MiCHAEL 
MELVIN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 105, 106-09, 116-17 (5th ed. 2001). 
78. Put another way, as then-U.S Trade Representative Micky Kantor reportedly asked his fellow 
cabinet members in a 1993 meeting: "Who are my clients-American companies or American 
workers?" Daniel F. Burton, Jr. et a!., Multinationals: The 'Who Is Us' Debate, CHALLENGE, Sept.-
Oct. 1994, at 33. 
79. MARINA WES, GLOBALISATION: WINNERS AND LoSERS (Commission on Public Policy and 
British Business: Issue Paper No.3 (1996)). 
80. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 82-84 (1992); see also Joseph Kahn, Unions 
Prepare to Hit the Street in Washington, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at A16 (discussing the rift between 
high-tech workers and other union-based workers and the tension between presenting an internationalist 
image versus a protectionist one for the U.S. Democratic Party). For a discussion of the importance of 
the new information technology, see also S. REP. No. 104-359 (1996) (recommending the enactment of 
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996). 
81. See generally SYLVIA 0STRY, THE POST-COLD WAR TRADING SYSTEM (1997). Using an 
"exit" and "voice" paradigm suggested by Alfred 0. Hirschman in EXIT, VOICE, AND LoYALTY (1970), 
Professor Ostry noted that the United States pursues a strategy of "exit" for displaced U.S. workers, 
whereby the workers themselves, not the government, are expected to make the necessary adjustments 
to their own losses sustained as a result of international trade. Workers who may be forced to exit thus 
oppose trade liberalization. Europe pursues a strategy of"voice," where the government plays an active 
role in minimizing the costs of adjustment in order to maintain social cohesion, even at the expense of 
economic efficiency. OSTRY, supra, at 235. Here, workers may oppose trade liberalization if they 
believe it will accelerate a loss of voice. 
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name of nationalism and sovereignty). As applied to the example above, 
this could mean keeping out, through quotas or high tariffs, foreign auto 
components of Mexico-in order to save the jobs of U.S. workers who 
would otherwise lose their jobs to workers in Mexico. Yet, by overlooking 
the costs of propping up sunset industries in which rich countries no longer 
have a comparative advantage,82 First World economic nationalists insist 
on the politics of the local at the expense of aggregate wealth generally and 
Third World economic development particularly.83 
Besides the fact that "nationality" has become increasingly blurred, 
this nationalistic solution is also flawed because it will have the effect of 
producing allocative inefficiency and decreasing efficiency gains for the 
richer countries, as well as increasing barriers to trade and developmental 
possibilities for the poorer countries. The solution to the distributional 
problem within the rich countries, I argue, should not be one that com-
pounds the distributional problem between poor and rich countries. That 
engagement in the global economy produces greater total wealth is the ba-
sic premise of the international economic system and of this Article. 84 
On the other hand, as I have mentioned, internationalists have empha-
sized the economic and efficiency benefits of international trade and in-
vestment without paying sufficient attention to the pull of the national and 
the local. The internationalist response to the above example: push for 
more liberalization, perhaps expand NAFTA to include a Free Trade Area 
for the whole of Latin America, and allow the rules of trade and the law of 
comparative advantage to sort out winners and losers. In certain areas al-
ready, the boundaries of the international economic regime have been 
82. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 52, at 597 (voicing concern for industries such as "steel, 
petroleum, and agricultural production"). For a discussion of the costs of protectionism, see supra note 
21. 
83. The World Bank defines extreme poverty according to a set of"reference lines" of$! and $2 
per day in 1993 terms. THE WORLD BANK, MEASURING POVERTY, at http://www.worldbank.org/ 
poverty/rnission/up2.htm (last modified Oct. 16, 2000). Openness to trade, not protectionism or 
isolationism, increases wealth and reduces poverty. See infra note 84. 
84. This Article relies on works by liberal trade scholars and accepts that free trade creates wealth 
for and among nations. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988). The U.N. concluded in a 
recent report that "[t]here is now widespread acceptance that, in the long run, the expansion of 
international trade and integration into the world economy are necessary instruments for promoting 
economic growth and reducing and eradicating poverty .... " U.N.G.A., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL TO THE PREPARATORY CO~!M. FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL INTERNATIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
EVENT ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 26 (Dec. 18, 2000) (NAC.257/12). 
A number of studies have also shown that growth benefits not just the rich but also the poor. See, 
e.g., Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality, 10 WoRLD BANK 
EcoN. REv. 565 (1996); William Easterly, Life During Growth, 4 J. EcoN. GROWTH 239 (1999); see 
also David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth Is Good for the Poor 2 (Development Research Group, the 
World Bank, March 2001 draft), available at http://www.worldbank.org/researchlgrowthlpdfiles/ 
GlGFTP3.pdf (concluding, based on an empirical study involving a sample of ninety-two conntries 
where the median number of growth episodes is three per country, that "on average, within countries, 
incomes of the poor rise equi-proportionately with average incomes''); Globalisation and Its Critics, 
supra note 48, at 10-11. 
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expanded to give the international the mechanisms it needs to frustrate na-
tional protectionist ambitions. Indeed, free trade norms developed by pri-
vate international arbiters have increasingly acquired the force of law, 
granted direct legal effect in domestic courts through the adoption of a 
number of legal devices. 85 Economic internationalism, then, is precisely the 
shield needed to counter the temptation of economic nationalism. For in-
ternationalists, "national interest'' is but a code word for parochialism and 
economic protectionism. 86 
There are still other responses that are neither strictly nationalist nor 
internationalist but a populist mix of the two. Composed of a broad coali-
tion of religious, environmental, organized labor, student, and other ad hoc 
groups, 87 this movement has emerged in recent years to oppose economic 
globalization and the perceived antinational excesses of the WTO. 88 At the 
85. Note that a decision issued by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, though binding as WTO 
law, does not have to be implemented domestically. See supra note 74. By contrast, there are now 
parallel economic regimes that go much further, at least as far as enforcement is concerned, and allow 
awards by international tribunals to be recognized and enforced by domestic courts with minimal 
domestic scrutiny. NAFTA's dispute resolution provision, Article 19, for example, "creates a binding, 
supranational arbitration scheme accessible directly by private business parties through which 
businesses may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions of domestic trade 
regulators." Shell, supra note 19, at 887. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, creates 
a system where domestic courts of signatory countries are bound, subject to minimal "public policy'' 
exceptions, to enforce arbitration agreements rendered by private international commercial arbitrators. 
Similarly, under the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), 
contracting states may be sued by private parties and must "recognize an award rendered pursuant to 
this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State." Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between State and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1965, 
art. 54(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, at 1291,575 U.N.T.S. 159, at I94. 
The rise of international economic arbitration has been explained as the attempt by international 
business to develop "in appropriate cases, ajus gentium or a lex mercatoria of a new type, free of the 
contingencies and prejudices which dominate the scene in the various States." RENE DAVID, 
ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985). "[W]hen parties request that arbitrators adjudicate 
their dispute in accordance with international law or with the general principles of law, their intention is 
to escape from the national systems of law." !d. at 350-51. 
86. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE I, 4 (2001) (counseling "vigilance against protectionist wolves cloaked in wooly talk about 
'national interests,' 'public order,' and 'precautionary prudence"'). 
87. See Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18. The Turning Point Project's website and the 
series of ads in the New York Times may be viewed at http://www.turnpoint.org. For a disparaging view 
of the antiglobalization protestors, see Robert L. Bartley, Clinton Gives a Pass to Globaphobia, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 31,2000, at A44. In the words of then-Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo: 
!d. 
A peculiar alliance has recently come into life. Forces from the extreme left, extreme right, 
environmentalist groups, trade unions of developed countries and some self-appointed 
representatives of civil society are gathering around a common endeavor: to save the people 
of developing countries from development. ... [They express] a very revealing common 
denominator: the word protection. 
88. Invisible Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, I999, at Al5 (advertisement number three in a 
series for The Turning Point Project, http://www.turnpoint.org). The advertisement included: 
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now-infamous Battle in Seattle,89 followed in succession by protests else-
where,90 the antiglobalization protestors managed to derail the opening of 
the WTO's rounds of trade talks and oppose its plans towards increased 
liberalization.91 In language that is resoundingly nationalist, yet at the same 
time internationalist in tone, protestors, joined by a common concern for 
"global justice,"92 complain about the loss of national sovereignty, the 
WTO and its "unprecedented powers ... to rule on whether laws of 
nations-concerning public health, food safety, small business, labor 
standards, culture, human rights, or anything-are 'barriers to trade' by 
WTO standards."93 
I d. 
The WTO is already among the most powerful, secretive, and undemocratic bodies on Earth. 
Its authority extends deeply into the internal political processes of sovereign countries, 
forcing them to alter laws and priorities. It is fast becoming a bonafide global government for 
the new millennium .... The central idea of the WTO is that free trade-actually the values 
and interests of global corporations-should supersede all other values. 
89. For a critique of the antiglobalization critics, see Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 48, 
at 3-30. For a critique of the antiglobalist position that globalization hurts poor workers in poor 
countries, see id. at 10-13 & 28-30. For a defense of the Seattle protests and mass resistance generally, 
see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Ta!..ing Seattle Resistance Seriously, THE HINDU, Dec. 11, 1999, at 10, 
and Saadia Toor, Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming of Age in the New World Order, 575 ANNALS 194 
(2001). 
90. David Montgomery, For Many Protesters, Bush Isn't Main Issue, WASH. PoST, Jan. 20, 
2001, at Al4 (describing protests against the IMF and World Bank in Washington D.C. and Pragne, 
and against further trade liberalization for the Americas in Quebec City); America Prepares Law and 
Politics, BoSToN GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2001, at Al (conunenting on protests in Seattle in 1999, Pragne in 
2000, Quebec City in the spring of2001, and Genoa in the sununer of2001); see also supra note 18. 
I d. 
91. Invisible Government, supra note 88. The advertisement included: 
[T]he Godzilla of\VTO plans is to revive some of the old, discredited Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment. Those rules would impose restrictions on every level of government; down to 
states, countries and cities. Foreign companies would have to be given "national treatment," 
i.e., treated exactly as if they were local companies. 
92. America Prepares Law and Politics, supra note 90 (describing how Mobilization for Global 
Justice led antiwar protests and denounced economic injustice as the "root causes" of terrorism); R.C. 
Longworth, Rebels with Many Causes, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 5, 2001, at Cl (describing the antiglobalization 
movement as a "call for global justice" uniting religious activists, students, environmentalists, labor, all 
opposed to "Washington Consensus" of free trade, privatization and free markets); Montgomery, supra 
note 90 (describing the "global justice" crowd of "save the rain forests" and antisweatshop activists, 
feminists, and human rights workers); Tom Morganthau, Getting Ready for "Seattle II," NEWSWEEK, 
Apr. 24, 2000, at 40 (describing the "Mobilization for Global Justice" as opposed to Third World debt, 
child labor, and environmental degradation). 
93. Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18. The antiglobal movement is not confined to the 
United States. Jose Bove, a Frenchman arrested on charges of vandalizing a McDonald's in August 
1999, has been lauded in French newspapers for standing up to globalization, particularly American-led 
globalization, with his slogan '"McDo Dehors, Gardons le Roquefort!' (McDonald's Get Out, Let's 
Keep the Roquefort!)" Even President Jacques Chirac was prompted to declare "that he, too, detests 
McDonald's food." Suzanne Daley, French See a Hero in War on "McDomination," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
12, 1999, at Al. Bove's opposition to U.S. imposition of high tariffs on Roquefort cheese and pate de 
foie gras in retaliation for the EU's decision to ban U.S. hormone-treated beef struck a nerve with the 
French, who view the issue in wider terms-the tyranny of the market versus "nostalgia for a way of 
life," local culture, and local tastes. Id. As Bove himself put it: '"There have been three totalitarian 
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While protestors rallied in the streets of Seattle and condemned multi-
national corporations for their exploitation of Third World workers, 
President Clinton delivered his indictment of child labor and his call to 
provide Third World children with a way "out of the soccer ball industry in 
Pakistan, out of the shoe industry in Brazil, the fireworks industry in 
Guatemala."94 The movement that Seattle epitomizes, in other words, com-
bines the typically nationalist denunciations of globalization95 with con-
comitant expressions of concerns for international matters beyond the 
national boundary.96 
In these ways and through these dichotomies and polarities, national-
ism and internationalism, and their particular subvariants, "as ideologies, as 
sets of mental attitudes;m have staked out their respective boundaries on 
market and state. The tensions and conflicts between the two have only 
increased in recent years as globalization-"probably the most contentious 
philosophical issue underlying the law of trade and development"98 
today-is added to the mix of politics and sovereignty on the one hand, and 
markets and interdependence on the other. 
forces in our life time .... The totalitarianism of fascism, of communism and now of capitalism. How 
can people try and tell us that we must import hormone-enhanced beef? What is that?" Id 
94. Roger Cohen, Clinton Remark on Child Labor Irks Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al4. 
In response to President Clinton's remarks, Brazil noted, for example, that the shoe industry has made 
huge progress towards eliminating child labor, as U.N. studies have corroborated, and that the use of 
child labor is commonplace only in the coal business. '"But it so happens that Brazil does not export 
coal to the United States, or street children."' Id (quoting Klaus Kleber of Gazeta Mercantil, Brazil's 
leading business newspaper). According to Brazil, behind the apparent lofty concern of countries like 
the United States for workers' and children's rights in developing countries lies "down-to-earth 
political and economic considerations." /d. 
95. "Under globalized free trade, countries as diverse as Sweden and India, Canada and Thailand, 
Bolivia and Russia are meant to merge their economies, and homogenize their values toward maximum 
commodity accumulation. This puts the whole planet in a single giant economic (and political) 
structure, with global corporations in charge," so that "[o]lder values like preserving nature, or 
protecting workers, or public health, or communities, or democracy are viewed as impediments to 
global corporate growth." Globalization vs. Nature, supra note 18. 
96. For a description of the protestors' position, see Mark Weisbrot, Last Stop for Corporate 
Globalization: Seattle '99, available at http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalisrnlwtoweis.htm 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with author) {describing protestors' concern for "European 
consumers," "workers," and "the poor," in rich and poor countries, because free trade with Mexico has 
left workers in Mexico and the United States with lower real wages than those they had in the 1970s); 
see also America Prepares Law and Politics, supra note 90 (favoring the '"globalization of social 
justice, of human rights, of environmental protection"'); Montgomery, supra note 90 {denouncing 
globalization as "a war against the poor in the Third World, conducted by the corporate power structure 
in the U.S.," according to a codirector of the International Action Center). 
97. Slaughter Burley, supra note 36, at 585. 
98. Chen, supra note 86, at 7. 
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II 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE MARKET 
A. Globalization of Production 
At the heart of the globalization debate lies the market, or at least the 
ideology of the free market-the "global business civilization,"99 in other 
words, and its relationship to the nation-state. Globalization marks the 
beginning of a new era in the relationship between modernity and the 
nation-state on the one hand and postmodernity and the global age on the 
other. "Fundamentally the Global Age involves the supplanting of 
modernity with globality .... "10° Consequently, the nature of competition 
between and among states has changed from one of competing for territo-
ries to one of competing for markets, making trade and finance policies 
more significant than defense and foreign policies.101 For scholars writing 
about this globalist framework, markets and other nonstate entities are 
deemed to be the principal actors in the political and economic orders. 102 
For others who study globalization from an international framework, 
the emphasis is on the political variant of economic globalization. 
Although "[t]he nation-state has 'lost' sovereignty to regional and global 
institutions and to markets[, it] has also acquired new areas of control in 
order to promote 'national competitiveness. "'103 From this perspective, the 
99. Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA-CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A 
WORLD TRANSFORMED 238, 260 (Nicholas X. RizopouJos ed., 1990) [hereinafter SEA-CHANGES). This 
"global business civilization" consists of a "complex network or web of transnational, bilateral 
bargains-bargains between corporations and other corporations, between corporations and 
governments, and between governments." Susan Strange, Protectionism and World Politics, 39 lNT'L 
0RG. 233,234 (1985); Cf BOA VENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, 
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 261 (1995) (describing the Jinks among 
economics, culture, and politics); H. W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the 
Restructuring of Legal Fields, 12 CAN. J. L. & Soc'Y 219 (1997) (describing "globalization of the 
mind" as equally as important as globalization of business). 
100. MARTIN ALBROW, THE GLOBAL AGE 4 (1997); see also ROLAND ROBERTSON, 
GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 113 (1992); MALCOLM WATERS, 
GLOBALIZATION 1 (1995) ("[G]lobalization may be the concept of the 1990s, a key idea by which we 
understand the transition ofhuman society into the third millennium."). 
101. Susan Strange, The Defective State, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 55-74; see SEA-CHANGES, 
supra note 99, at 243 ("When states ..• try to use their power to influence where and how international 
production takes place, they find they cannot direct, as with trade. They can only bargain."). 
102. See generally LoWELL BRYAN & DIANA FARRELL, MARKET UNBOUND: UNLEASHING 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1996); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE (1996); HENRY WENDT, 
GLOBAL EMBRACE: CORPORATE CHALLENGES IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD (1993). 
103. Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power, 
DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 23-24; see also Meinhard Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International 
Economic Organizations: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the GAIT Dispute 
Settlement Procedures, in THE NEW GATI RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL 
AND EcONOMIC PROBLEMS 285, 321 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard HiJf eds., 2d updated ed. 
1991) (commenting that "[i]ntemational economie integration, influenced by a multitude of 
uncontrollable actors, entails a Joss of sovereignty"). 
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nation-state itself has not been diminished but has simply allowed itself to 
be internationalized, acting as mediator and negotiator with the global 
political economy and ensuring that the domestic economy can be effec-
tively adjusted to the mandates of the world economy.104 
From either globalist or internationalist orientation, commerce has 
transcended territorial definition and is now extraterritorial and global in 
orientation.105 Because "almost every factor of production-money, 
technology, factories, and equipment-moves effortlessly across 
borders .... ",1°6 in time "[t]here will be no national products or 
technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no 
longer be national economies, at least as we have come to understand that 
concept."107 No longer are "national corporations," that is, corporations 
incorporated in or identified and associated with a certain nation-state, lim-
ited, either in their production or operation, to the territory of their own or 
any particular nation-state. 108 
104. See generally ROBERT W. Cox & TIMOTHY J. SiNCLAIR, APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER 
(1996). For a different version of this argument, see Anne Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. lNT'L L. 
367, 378 (1998) (arguing that the state is no longer a unitary actor but a disaggregated entity, where 
distinct government institutions such as legislatures, executives, courts, and administrative agencies, act 
quasi-autonomously with their counterparts internationally). 
105. This transformation from national to global parallels the earlier transformation in the 
American economy from regional to national. As technological developments affect transportation and 
communication and as global markets are further integrated, the need for an amended legal regime 
becomes more pressing. The American economy went through similar changes during the period from 
1815 to 1860, the period of major innovations in rail, canal transportation, and communication. See, 
e.g., GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, I 8 I 5- I 860 (1989); Richard B. Du 
Boff, Business Demand and the Development of the Telegraph in the United States, /844-1860, 54 
Bus. HisT. REv. 459 (1980). Such changes facilitated the formation of an integrated national economy, 
as foreign, out-of-state corporations-no longer disadvantaged by physical distance-began expanding 
their businesses into states other than their home states, resulting in the erosion of local monopolies. 
SIDNEY RATNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN EcONOMY: GROWTH, WELFARE, AND 
DECISION MAKING 123 (1979). 
106. REICH, supra note 80, at 8. 
I 07. /d. at 3; see also GREIDER, supra note 20, at 44 ("What is a nation, after all, if commerce has 
destroyed the meaning of national boundaries? For that matter, what is a citizen?"). For opposing views 
that argue that corporate nationality still matters, see, for example, Paul Magnusson, Why Corporate 
Nationality Matters, Bus. WK. July 12, 1993, at 142, and D'Andrea Tyson, supra note 8, at37. 
108. American companies, for example, employ, at least according to a 1994 report, 5.4 million 
people abroad, with 80% in manufacturing. The issue is the loss of jobs and the question thus is "Why 
can't the goods and services that these foreign workers produce be supplied from the United States? 
Why must companies migrate abroad, shedding some of their national identity and loyalty?" Louis 
Uchitelle, U.S. Corporations Expanding Abroad at a Quicker Pace, N.Y. TiMEs, July 25, 1994, at AI. 
It should be noted that historically, there have been business enterprises with some degree of 
foreign presence since the Middle Ages. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
AND THE LAW 19-20 (1995); Yitzhak Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 
MICH. L. REv. 729, 735 (1973). For example, trading firms in Italy had operations and branches in 
other European countries as early as the thirteenth century. Id at 735. Similarly, one could also 
consider some of the European colonial trading companies of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
such as the British East India Company, a multinational corporation. Nonetheless, most business 
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This shift has meant more than simply the internationalization of eco-
nomic activities.109 It has, rather, also resulted in a fundamental 
transformation in the relationship between market power and state author-
ity, in which the state is increasingly unable or unwilling to regulate the 
activities of its internationally mobile corporate actors.110 This transforma-
tion provoked, in turn, a shift from public to private modes of regulation 
and a shift from territorially based to nonterritorially based centers of 
authorityY1 It was remarked, even as early as 1969, that 
[t]he international corporation has no country to which it feels 
more loyalty than any other, nor any country where it feels 
completely at home .... The nation-state is just about through as 
an economic unit .... The world is too small. It is too easy to get 
about.II2 
In more recent years, the global economy has made it all the more easy for 
multinational companies113 to engage in transnational economic activities 
such as "world-wide sourcing"114 and foreigu direct investment, 115 thus 
historians mark the mid-nineteenth century as the point at which the multinational corporation as we 
currently know it first emerged. See MuCHLINSKI, supra, at 19-20. 
109. Some of the transformations associated with globalization were identified as early as 1944 by 
Karl Polanyi. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). However, while the rise of 
the market and the retreat of the state might have occurred previously, they did not occur with such 
speed or breadth. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman observed: 
[T]oday's era of globalization is not only different in degree; in some very important ways it 
is also different in kind .... Today's era of globalization is, built around falling 
telecommunications costs-thanks to microchips, satellites, fiber optics and the Internet. 
These new technologies are able to weave the world together even tighter. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at XV. 
110. See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., PROGRAMME ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPS., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1993: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTEGRATED 
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION, at 161, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/156, U.N. Sales No. E.93.II.A.l4 (1993) 
[hereinafter WIR 1993] (describing inability of states to regulate corporate multinational activities 
whether for tax and other revenue-raising purposes or to restrain unfair business practices). 
Ill. In this way, free market globalization, like its antithesis from a prior era (communist 
internationalism), is obtuse to the pull of the particular and instead exhibits behavior that generally 
scorns the relevance of place. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL QUESTION, SELECTED WRITINGS BY ROSA 
LuxamURG 135, 159, 161 (Horace B. Davis ed., 1976) (favoring internationalism over nationalism, 
which Luxemburg considered to be a mask for class division); see also JOHN GRAY, FALSE 
DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 3 (1998) (equating the flaws of global capitalism 
with those of global communism). 
112. C.P. KlNDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 207 (1969). 
113. The term "multinational corporation" was coined in 1960 by David E. Lilienthal, who was 
then the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission. See PAUL A. BARAN & PAUL M. SWEEZY, 
MoNOPOLY CAPITAL 192 (1966); see also D. K. Fieldhouse, The Multinational: A Critique of a 
Concept, in MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Alice Teichova ed., 1986). 
114. SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS 82 (2d ed. 1994); see also Norman Jonas, The 
Hollow Corporation, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1986, at 57, 58. Jonas wrote: 
Outsourcing breaks down manufacturers' traditional vertical structure, in which they make 
virtually all critical parts, and replaces it with networks of small suppliers .... In the short 
run, the new system may be amazingly flexible and efficient. In the long run, however, some 
experts fear that such fragmented manufacturing operations will merely hasten the hollowing 
[out of U.S. industry]. 
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freeing companies from the restraints and "factor endowment of a single 
nation"116 and allowing them access to resources and markets across 
national boundaries. 117 
Firms have pursued internationalization in two ways, by engaging in 
"glocalization" or "globalization." Firms may "glocalize," diversifying 
internationally as a business strategy, primarily to avoid "being treated as 
an 'outsider,' or being hit by trade or investment barriers and thus losing 
market share ... .''118 "Glocalizing" firms are deemed multinationals, that 
is, more international than global. While they do decentralize production 
and sales by extending their operations internationally, their decision-
making apparatus remains home-centered, with the more high-value-added 
/d. Various industries are resorting increasingly to outsourcing. See, e.g., J. Linn Allen, Chicago Mecca 
for Real Estate Gurus, CHI. 'TRIB., Sept. 3, 1996, at 1 (describing how a major telecommunications 
company outsources management of its real estate assets to another company}; Leslie Helm, The 
Fading Metropolis, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at Dl (describing how a major accounting firm institutes 
"hoteling'' for its auditors; auditors are to make reservations to use a limited number of office spaces 
when not conducting audits); see also infra note 140. 
115. In the United States, foreign direct investment is defined as "the ownership or control, 
directly or indirectly, by one foreign person of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an 
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business 
enterprise, including a branch." 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a) (2001). '"A key element of the structural 
transformation into the global company town was the role played by the multinational corporation and 
foreign direct investment. ... Technological advances have played a part in triggering the global 
revolution, but the multinational corporation has evolved to become an important vehicle for allocating 
resources.'" Gordon R. Walker & Mark A. Fox, Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 375, 387 (1996) (quoting Bijit Bora, The Implications of Globalisation for 
Australian Foreign Investment Policy, in EcONOMIC PLANNING ADVISORY COMMISSION, 
GLOBALIZATION: ISSUES FOR AUSTRALIA 92 (1995). 
The flow of foreign direct investment into and out of a country is routinely used as a reliable 
indicator or gauge of corporate international expansion. See U.N. Center on Transnational 
Corporations, The Process of Transnationalization in the 1980s, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS: A DECISION APPROACH 23, 26, 33 (Robert Z. Aliber & Reid W. Click eds., 1993). The 
growth of foreign direct investment in 1995 exceeded that of export of goods by 18% and world output 
by 2.4%. U.N. CoNFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT I996: INVESTMENT, 
TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.96.li.A.l4 (1996) 
[hereinafter WIR 1996]. At one point, almost half of the total world stock of foreign direct investment 
could be traced to one single country, the United States. MucHLINSKI, supra note 108, at 26-27. But as 
European and Japanese corporations began to expand internationally, by 1985, the United States 
accounted for only 25% of the world's total foreign direct investment share, with Western Europe as a 
region accounting for almost 50% and Japan for 11%. /d. at 28. 
116. MICHAEL E. PoRTER, THE CoMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 14 (2d ed 1998). 
117. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., a Swiss-Swedish electrical engineering company, considers itself 
"a company without any regard to national boundaries," for example. Charlene Marmer Solomon, 
Transplanting Corporate Cultures Globally, PERSONNEL J., Oct. 1993, at 78, 80 (statement by Richard 
P. Randazzo, ABB's vice-president of Human Resources). ABB also planned to lay off a thousand 
Swiss workers and invest $1 billion in Asia. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 62. 
118. WINFRIED RUIGROK & ROB VAN TULDER, THE LoGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING 
179 (1995). For example, the growth of regional trading blocs, such as the European free trade region, 
was one of the key factors that caused U.S. and Japanese firms to establish subsidiaries in European 
member countries for fear of being excluded from "Fortress Europe." U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMMISSION, 
THE EFFECTS OF GREATER EcONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE 
UNITED STATES (USlTC Pub. No. 2204 (July 1989)). 
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component of production, such as research and development, to be retained 
at home.119 
By contrast, globalizing firms, transnationals in the true sense of the 
word, are "[t]ransnational in operation, ownership, and often in origins."120 
Transnationals "exceed national boundaries, transcend definitions of 
national identity, and regard the entire globe as a single theater of 
operations."121 Transnationals are more likely to adopt a functional and 
decentralization approach to decision making so that if research and devel-
opment is allocated to a particular unit of the fum, then that unit bears 
responsibility within the company for all research and development. 122 
The debate as to whether or not corporations are multinational or 
transnational, glocalizing or globalizing, regional or global in orientation, 
does not significantly change my central point:123 corporations are adopting 
production and investment strategies that result in linkages across national 
119. RUIGROK & VAN TuLDER, supra note 118, at 9-10; Louis W. Pauly & Simon Reich, National 
Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization, 
51 INT'L 0RG. I, 1-30 (1997). Others defme multinational corporations more generally, as affiliated 
corporations incorporated in different jurisdictions but under common control conducting a common 
enterprise. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION 
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993); WIR 1993, supra note 110, at 183-
91. 
120. WENDT, supra note 102, at 3. Others disagree about the extent to which a firm is truly global. 
See, e.g., William R. Miller, The Role of Global Corporations, in GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND 
NATION-STATES: Do COMPANIES OR COUNTRIES COMPETE? 21 (Richard S. Belous & Kelly L. 
McClenahan eds., 1991); Ethan B. Kapstein, We Are US, NAT'L INT., Winter 1991-92, at 55-62; Robert 
Kuttner, One Big, Happy Global Economy? Not Yet, Friend, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1990. 
121. WENDT, supra note 102, at 5. For example, Asea Brown Boveri, a Swedish company formed 
through a merger between Asea, a Swedish engineering company, and Brown Boveri, a Swiss 
company, has 85% of its sales and 50% of its shares held outside of Sweden. William J. Holstein, The 
Stateless Corporation, Bus. WK., May 14, 1990, at 98, 103. The company's official language is 
English, although it is the mother tongue of only one third of its approximately 18,000 employees 
located in forty different countries; members of the company's coordinating executive committee come 
from eight countries; and its approximately 500 global managers routinely alternate among various 
foreigu assignments. The ABB of Management, THE EcoNor.nST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 56. 
122. Holstein, supra note 121, at 98. Such a fully globalizing strategy might be contingent on the 
fact that markets are truly global and consumer tastes truly standardized so that there is little need for 
customization. RUIGROK & VAN TuLDER, supra note 118, at 180-82. Coca Cola, McDonald's, and Levi 
Jeans are examples of firms whose products reflect universal tastes. Other transnationals, especially 
those from smaller markets, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, have adopted global 
strategies as well. Those often cited include Shell, Unilever, Volvo-Renault, Asea Brown Boveri, Arjo 
Wiggins Appleton, Sony, ffiM, and Nestle. WENDT, supra note 102, at 12; see also The Discreet 
Charm of the Multicultural Multinational, THE EcoNor.nST, July 30, 1994, at 58 [hereinafter Discreet 
Charm] (discussing how McDonald's issues its employees worldwide operation manuals and how 
Unilever brings managers from around the world to its training headquarters in the United Kingdom); 
The World Turned Upside Down, THE EcoNor.nST, June 24, 1995, at S5. 
123. To the extent that glocalizing firms may exhibit less economic commitment to the particular 
national community in which they operate, that may be a siguificant factor in the state's determination 
of corporate nationality and consequently, the state's relationship with the firms at issue. See infra Part 
Ill. 
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borders. The internationalization of economic activities have produced at 
least three identifiable and significant changes in the economic landscape. 
First, it is likely that a product produced by a multinational corpora-
tion can no longer be unambiguously identified as the product of a particu-
lar state; equally likely, its components parts have been internationally 
sourced and produced. "During earlier years when the norm was to produce 
goods in one country and export from there, the use of origin rules to 
define a product's place of manufacture was simple. Over the past decade 
the issue has become more complicated."124 A Pontiac Le Mans, ostensibly 
a General Motors product of American nationality, is in fact a globally 
composite product involving South Korean assembly; Japanese engines, 
transaxles and electronics; German design and style engineering; 
Taiwanese, Singaporean, and Japanese small components; British advertis-
ing and marketing; and Irish and Barbadian data processing.125 To under-
line the multinational composition of its product, Toray, Japan's largest 
synthetic-fiber manufacturer, has adopted the label "Made in Toray."126 
This internationalization of a product's "origin" has profound implications 
for an international and national trade regime still very much based on the 
124. E. Ivan Kingston, The Economics of Rules of Origin, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL 
'TRADE 9 (Edwin Vermulst et al. eds., 1994). Consider the following examples. An official of the 
Caterpillar Tractor Corporation noted that 
while we export from the U.S., our views as to transportation, markets, and product are 
worldwide. For example, there is no U.S.-made Caterpillar tractor. A Caterpillar product-
wherever it is built-is just that-a Caterpillar product-graphic evidence that people of 
different national origins and political interest can achieve common objectives. 
DAVID H. BLAKE & ROBERTS. WALTERS, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 112-13 
(4th ed. 1992). Similarly, precision ice hockey equipment may be "designed in Sweden, financed in 
Canada, and assembled in Cleveland and Denmark for distribution in North America and Europe, 
respectively, out of alloys whose molecular structure was researched and patented in Delaware and 
fabricated in Japan." REICH, supra note 80, at 112. Products can no longer be presumed to be made in 
one or even two countries-hence the following label affixed on a computer part: "This part was made 
in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, China, Mexico, Germany, the U.S., Thailand, Canada and 
Japan. It was made in so many different places that we cannot specifY a country of origin." FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 10, at 33. 
125. REICH, supra note 80, at 113. The confusion associated with product nationality is by now 
routine, especially in automobile manufacturing. The Chevy may be built in Mexico from imported 
parts and then reimported into the United States; a Ford built in German plants by Turkish workers and 
sold in Hong Kong and Nigeria; a Toyota designed by an American designer at Toyota's Newport 
Beach, California, Calty Design Research Center, assembled at the Georgetown, Kentucky plant from 
American-made parts (except that the engine and drive trains are still Japanese) and then test driven at 
Toyota's Arizona proving ground. BARBER, supra note I, at 24, 315 n.7. The 1977 first-generation 
Honda Accord made in Marysville, Ohio, originally had no American parts. The 1982 model contained 
50% American parts and the new fifth-generation Accord 80%. See Doren P. Levin, Honda's Star Gets 
Another Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at Dl. 
Other industries have gone through similar experiences. McDonnell Douglas, for example, 
engaged its global partners in the construction of its MD-95 planes, with Halla Engineering of South 
Korea building the wings, BMW/Rolls-Royce developing the engines, and Alenia of Italy building the 
fuselage. Stanley Holmes, When Jobs Go South, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at AI. 
126. Andrew Pollack, Breaking out of Japan's Orbit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at Dl. 
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presumption that products, like corporations, have distinct and identifiable 
countries of origin.127 
Second, this confounding combination of product cross-nationalities 
is matched by a similarly confounding parallel cross-ownership among the 
corporations. The national corporations that were once clearly identified 
with their countries of origin are now international, or global, in orientation 
and ownership.128 Equally significant, corporate players are more likely to 
engage in "genuinely strategic alliances"129 of "low or non-equity ventures 
that mix and match corporate strengths in research, development, 
manufacturing, marketing, service, and other business functions"130 than in 
"establishing dominance in all of [a] business system's critical areas,"131 
allowing them to spread the costs and risks of product development and 
127. For a discussion of the policies underlying rules of origin, see RULES OF ORIGIN IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 124. 
128. Daimler-Benz AG, a German industrial champion, and Chrysler Corp., the American maker 
of Jeeps, merged in a culture "where shared values of open markets, hard money and standardized 
technology increasingly take precedence over old-fashioned nationalism." Joseph B. White, Global 
Mall, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1998, at AI ("More and more, national boundaries, cultural variations and 
accidents of geography such as the Atlantic Ocean aren't stopping business leaders who see a chance to 
expand their reach as trade barriers fall, communication becomes cheap and cousunter tastes for 
everything from cola to cellular phones converge."). Anheuser-Busch owns a stake in Japan's biggest 
brewery, Kirin, as well as a 5% share of China's Tsingtao and a 10% share of Antarctica, Brazil's 
leading beer company (as of 1997). GREIDER, supra note 20, at 20. In the past ten years, the growth of 
worldwide cross-border mergers and acquisitions has approxitnated the growth of foreign direct 
investment flows. \VIR I996, supra note 115, at 7. In 1995, the total value of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions was S229 billion, twice the value of the 19881evel. Id. at 10. 
129. Kenichi Ohmae, The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1989, 
at 143 (discussing alliances forged among corporations for distribution purposes and for research and 
development in industries ranging from automobile to pharmaceutical). This phenomenon is also 
referred to as international strategic alliances, see U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations, supra 
note 115, at 27, where separate entities engage in various collaborative agreements for marketing, joint 
ventures, subcontracting, cross-licensing, research and development, technology exchanges, and so 
forth. See BERNARD MICHAEL GILROY, NETIVORKING IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 34 (1993); see 
also What Is a U.S. Company?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. and the 
Subcomm. on Int'/ Scientific Cooperation of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech., lOlst Cong. 30 
(1989) (describing "cross-border alliances between companies from different countries that blur the 
national identity of products, processes and individual enterprises''), 34 !describing how "[d]etennining 
the nationality of corporate ownership requires sorting through this interwoven network of transnational 
alliances"), 66 (explaining that because of costs, technology, and marketing reasons, companies have 
had to enter into alliances, as "no single company can afford the cost of staying on the leading edge") 
(statements of Dr. John Kline, Deputy Director, Langegger Program, Georgetown University) 
[hereinafter What Is a U.S. Company Hearings]. 
In the 1980s, U.S. firms entered into an estimated 2,000 strategic alliances with European firms. 
GILROY, supra, at 26 (1993). Germany's Siemeus has forged a partnership with Skoda Plzen to produce 
steam turbines in the Czech Republic; Japan's NEC collaborated with Korea's Samsung to make 
DRAM memory chips; AT&T formed various alliances with the telephone companies of Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and MCI with British Telecommunications. GREIDER, supra note 20, 
at 20-21. 
130. 
131. 
What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, at 33 (statement of Dr. John Kline). 
Ohmae,supranote 129,at 143. 
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providing each firm with access to new technology that is not yet available 
within the firm. 132 
Third, and perhaps most significant, the internationalization of eco-
nomic activities has coincided with the transition from high-volume pro-
duction such as manufacturing to high-value production such as 
information technology,133 resulting in an even more accelerated transfor-
mation of the multinational corporation-from one territorially bound to 
one more decentralized and hence less connected to its country of national-
ity.134 Consequently, high-volume production of standardized commodities 
requiring heavy investment in immobile assets has been supplanted by 
high-value production of nonroutine, specially tailored products and ser-
vices requiring neither fixed machinery nor factory. 135 For example, in 
132. John M. Kline, The Inverse Relationship Between Nation-States and Global Corporations, in 
GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND NATION-STATES: Do COMPANIES OR COUNTRIES COMPETE?, supra note 
120, at 2. 
133. See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, ELECTRONIC 
ENTERPRISES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 13-15 (1994); Peter F. Drucker, Management and the World's 
Work, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 65 (relating the decline of manufacturing and the rise of 
information industry in the United States); Siew Meng Leong & Chin Tiong Tan, Managing Across 
Borders, 24 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 449,449 (describing shift in "volume to value production''). 
The essential difference of the new information technology-its capacity to amplify human 
intellect rather than muscle-is integral to the social and economic consequences that are 
unfolding .... [D]ecision-making can be decentralized in reformed workplaces and 
production jobs can be scattered across many distance places, even at a computer terminal in 
one's home. 
GREIDER, supra note 20, at 28; see also BARBER, supra note 1, at 59-87. Indeed, the information 
technology industry is widely acknowledged to be the new coin of the realm in international trade. See, 
e.g., LAURA D'ANDREA TYsoN, WHO's BASHING WHOM?: TRADE CONFLICTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRIES 11-13 (1993). 
134. Corporations are eager to present an "anational,'' or cosmopolitan, face. Reebok's advertising 
campaign promoted the company under the banner "On Planet Reebok." BARBER, supra note 1, at 24. 
Ralph Lauren's perfume for men, Safari, promoted the concept of"Living Without Boundaries" in its 
1992 launch campaign. /d. Toshiba proclaimed in its 1992 annual report that "'as good corporate 
citizens' they 'do our part to ensure that progress continues within the world community.'" /d. In 1997, 
British Airways removed the Union Jack emblem from the tails of its planes and replaced the British 
flag with various ethnic designs because "the airline was no longer a British company with global 
operations, but a global company that happened to be headquartered in Britain." Undoing Britain?, THE 
EcONOMIST, Nov. 6-12, 1999, at 3. According to its chief executive, Bob Ayling, "'We are proud to 
have been born and raised in Britain ... [b ]ut we want to show Britain as modem, not imperial."' Id 
135. During the Industrial Revolution, wealth was created through the mobilization of technology 
combined with the accumulation of capital and the abundance of unskilled labor, see 9 THE NEw 
CAMBRIDGE MoDERN HisTORY 31-47 (C.W. Crowley ed., 1965), for the mass production of industrial 
and consumer goods. 6 CAMBRIDGE EcONOMIST HISTORY OF EUROPE 451-54 (M. M. Postan & H.J. 
Habakkuk eds., 1966). To maximize profits, management focused on decreasing costs and producing 
ever larger quantities of products, by adopting various corporate growth strategies, such as forming 
trusts in the industrial and commercial sectors, JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW EcONOMIC 
VIEW OF AMERICAN HiSTORY 474-81, 481-88 (2d ed. 1994), leading to "the dramatic wave of 
consolidations that took place around the tum of the century ... . "/d. at 488. After World War II, many 
of the largest manufacturing firms, particularly the American ones, were transformed from national to 
multinational enterprises through the development of subsidiaries and affiliates outside the home 
country, contributing thus to the increasing integration of one national economy with another. See 
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terms of structure, the early multinational corporations in the manufactur-
ing sectors operated on a clear division between the function of the com-
pany's headquarters versus its overseas operation. The company's 
headquarters in its home territory performed research and development, 
designing, and major production operations; the company's overseas ac-
tivities were generally confined to assembly, distribution, sales, and mar-
keting. 136 Starting in the 1970s, foreign affiliates and subsidiaries of 
multinationals assumed greater responsibility in a wide array of functions, 
such as research and development, product innovation, design, as well as 
production.137 Firms with worldwide, global strategies are now likely to 
favor greater integration of the parent and its subsidiaries and the adoption 
of global product standards, production processes, and orgauizational struc-
tures.r3s 
With intellectual property as the new currency, the corporation is in-
creasingly composed of decentralized corporate webs consisting of glob-
ally dispersed, mobile independent or semi-independent entities, each 
engaged in various forms of partnerships, joint ventures, subcontracting, 
cross-licensing, and brokering relationships with each other.139 In the 
Raymond Vernon, Multinationals Are Mushrooming, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND 
INTERNATIONAL EcONO~nc POLICY: A READER 220, 220-21 (Philip King ed., 3d ed. 2000). 
The earlier multinational corporations, however, were more likely to be involved in the extraction 
and production of natural resources or in the manufacturing of agricultural commodities. See 
MucHLINSKI, supra note 108, at 22. After World War II, corporate investments internationally shifted 
toward technologically advanced manufacturing and services in other economically developed 
countries. /d. at 28. Strategic resource was capital in the industrial age. In the current postindustrial age, 
strategic resource is lmowledge. See generally Thomas A. Stewart, Brainpower, FoRTUNE, June 3, 
1991, at 44; JOHN NAISBITT, MEGATRENDS 17 (1982) ("Knowledge has already become the primary 
industry, the industry that supplies the economy the essential and central resources of production."). 
136. Typically a company's first venture abroad begins with the exporting of products to foreign 
markets, followed by the establishment of distribution and assembly operations. At the next stage of 
involvement, the foreign operation engages in manufacture, sale, distribution, and servicing of products 
sold in the foreign country, and may eventually assume responsibility for research and development 
See Hadari, supra note 108, at 746 & n.91; Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, The Internationalization of Firms, 5 
J. WORLD TRADE L. 72, 81 (1971). 
137. See Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Businesses Loosen Link to Mother Country, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 
1989, at AI; see also Raymond Vernon, Transnational Corporations: Where Are They Coming From, 
Where Are They Headed?, in I TRANSNAT'L CoRPS. 7, at 10, 12 (1992); Hadari, supra note 108, at 746; 
Hawrylyshyn, supra note 136, at 81; Holstein, supra note 121, at 98. 
138. See Discreet Charm, supra note 122, at 57-58; Holstein, supra note 121, at 104. For example, 
in 1995, the Ford Motor Company, a U.S.-origin company, began implementation of a new 
reorganization and consolidation policy aimed at integrating its regional operations into a single global 
enterprise. See The World That Changed the Machine, THE EcoNo~nST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 63. Xerox, 
Caterpillar, IBM, Unilever, Siemens, and Hoechst, like Ford, also began to integrate their operations 
into global units. Discreet Charm, supra note 122, at 58. 
139. John W. Kensinger & John D. Martin, Financing Network Organizations, in THE NEW 
CORPORATE FINANCE 561 (Donald H. Chew, Jr. ed., 1993); REICH, supra note 80, at 92-93 (describing 
the proliferation of decentralized corporate webs: spin-off partnerships (independent businesses 
partially owned by headquarters after the spin-offs); spin-in partnerships (independent businesses 
spinning into partnerships with headquarters); licensing; and brokering); Russell Johnston & Paul 
Lawrence, Beyond Vertical Integration-The Rise of the Value-Adding Partnership, HARV. Bus. REv., 
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knowledge-based economy, emphasis is on alacrity and flexibility. Com-
panies in the highly competitive high-technology sectors must launch new 
products in multiple world markets-hence the rush to internationalize 
corporate operations. I40 
These shifts in corporate outsourcing, international alliances and own-
ership, and structural organization have prompted many commentators to 
note the emergence of the truly global corporation.I4I The effects of this 
phenomenon on First World and Third World economic relations and on 
the international trade system are the focus of Part ll.B and Part li.C below. 
July-Aug. 1988, at 94 (describing smaller value-added partnerships); Spinning It Out at Thermo 
Electron, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 1997, at 57 (describing spin-outs or spin-offs spun from larger 
companies such as Thermo Electron, which retains a majority stake in each spin-out but allows its spin-
outs more freedom than what conventional subsidiaries would normally be given); Jerry Useem, The 
Start-Up Factory, INC., Feb. 1997, at 40, 42,46 (describing technology marketing partnerships such as 
Idealab, which is in the bnsiness of creating bnsinesses by nurturing start-up companies through a 
network of "interdependent yet nominally independent companies, all built around a core base of 
knowledge."); John W. Wilson & Judith H. Dobrzynski, And Now, the Post-Industrial Corporation, 
Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1986, at 64; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at xv-xvi (describing how new 
technologies "allow companies to locate different parts of their production, research and marketing in 
different countries, but still tie them together through computers and teleconferencing as though they 
were in one place''); Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in Asia, 12 J. 
ASIAN Bus. 75, 81-82 (1996) (describing the proliferation of the producer-driven and buyer-driven 
global commodity chain, with its many-tiered production networks). 
140. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MULTINATIONALS AND THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST: PLAYING BY DIFFERENT RULES 38 (1993) [hereinafter MULTINATIONALS AND 
THE NATIONAL INTEREST]. For a discussion of a product's "life cycle" and its relationship to foreign 
direct investment, see generally DAVID K. EITEMAN ET AL., MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS FINANCE 470-
72 (6th ed. 1992). 
Additionally, the accelerating life cycle, from conception to obsolescence, of new electronics 
products has made it too costly for even large companies such as IBM or Philips Electronics to invest 
globally in the production of new products. Jonathan Friedland & Gary McWilliams, How a Need for 
Speed Turned Guadalajara into a High-Tech Hub, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2000, at AI. As a result, 
contract manufacturing is expected to grow 20% annually over the next few years, from $60 billion in 
1998 to $149.2 billion in 2003. !d. With speed (and not just cheap labor) becoming a crucial factor in 
the production process, places like Guadalajara, Mexico, have developed into high-tech hubs and 
principal manufacturing centers for electronics products sold in the United States. Companies like 
Cisco Systems switched to contract manufacturers to build their networking gear and other products. !d. 
The technology revolution has thns reinforced the trend towards worldwide outsourcing, see supra 
notes 133-40 and accompanying text, as companies increasingly shed their previous organizational 
model of vertical integration to pursue a strategy of "buying parts or whole products from other 
producers, both at home and abroad." Jonas, supra note 114, at 58. Relying on their webs of alliances, 
toy companies such as Lewis Galoob Toys, with a mere 115 employees, were able to ensure that new 
products are on the shelves in U.S. stores quickly and efficiently. Lewis Galoob Toys relies on 
independent inventors for new designs and on independent partner contractors in Hong Kong who 
subcontract the labor-intensive manufacturing to factories in China. See Wilson & Dobrzynski, supra 
note 139, at 64. 
141. See KENICHI 0HMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD 114-36 (1990); Holstein, supra note 121, at 
97; Reich, supra note 8, at 53; Cf D'Andrea Tyson, supra note 8, at 37; Kapstein, supra note 120, at 
55-62 (arguing that global corporations have not yet shed their national identities); Robert Kuttner, One 
Big, Happy Global Economy? Not Yet, Friend, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1990; see generally John H. 
Dunning, The Global Economy, Domestic Governance, Strategies and Transnational 
Corporations: Interactions and Policy Implications, TRANSNAT'L CoRPs., Dec. 1992, at 11. 
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B. The Distributional Impact: Rich and Poor, High-Volume, High-Value 
International capital is footloose and, under the right economic condi-
tions, may be enticed into or away from any country. While place-based 
communities that attract capital may have problems coping with the infu-
sion of capital in the local economy/42 place-based communities aban-
doned by capital are faced with a far more serious problem. 143 In the early 
1990s, while capital flowed into the emerging markets of historically 
lesser-developed nations and "while the advanced economies remained 
stagnant or mired in recession, a league of poorer economies was enjoying 
a spectacular investment boom."144 There is no doubt that the vast majority 
of countries in the world are still mired in "abject and dehumanizing 
poverty."145 But for a number of developing countries that have success-
fully engaged the global economy, "[t]he new fulcrum is the shifting of 
opportunities for wealth and incomes from the older, richer societies to the 
poorer ones."146 
This new opening has created real opportunities for poorer countries 
to benefit from global economic activities, not through a U.N.-declared 
redistribution that calls for a new international economic order147 or a 
"right to development,"148 but through a "market-based" framework pursu-
ant to economic integration, interdependence, and convergence. 149 As one 
142. See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and 
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftennath of the Mexican Financial 
Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539 (1996). 
143. See, e.g., Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's 
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. LJ. 1757, 1759 (1993). 
144. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 22. 
145. Report of the Secretary-General to the Prep. Comm. for the High-Level International 
Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Development 2, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.257/l2 (2000). The World Bank estimated that the percentage of the world's population still 
living in extreme and absolute poverty, defined as living on less than $1 a day, fell from 28.3 to 24.0% 
between 1987 and 1998. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONO~nc PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 29 (2000); THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 2001 POVERTY UPDATE, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/htrnYextdr/pb/pbpoverty.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2001). 
146. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 42. These govermnents vie to have corporations contribute to the 
manufacturing and capital base, as well as the research and technology capabilities of their local firms 
and local economies. MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 140, at 2-3. "[11he 
fact that people in rich countries now fret about developing countries' success, not their poverty, is 
itself a remarkable tribute to those countries' economic reforms." War of the Worlds, THE EcoNo~nsT, 
Oct. l, 1994, at 5. 
147. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 
U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. l, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
148. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 4l/l28, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. 
No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/4l/53 (1986). 
149. See L. Alan Winters, Trade and Poverty: Is T/zere a Connection?, in \VTO SoCIAL STUDIES 
No. 5: TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 43, 43 (World Trade Org. ed., 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english!news_e/pres00_e/prl8l_e.htm (June 13, 2000); see also Harold J. Berman, 
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writer has aptly noted: 
[f]or the first time in human history, ... a fateful connection is 
emerging between the first [the rich countries at the top of the 
ladder] and the last. One end of the ladder (or seesaw) cannot 
defend its own general prosperity without attending to human 
conditions at the other end. For masses of people in the global 
marketplace, economic self-interest is converging with altruism. 150 
In other words, by taking advantage of this new opening provided by the 
internationalization of trade and investment, poor countries could leverage 
themselves out of poverty. Even Japanese corporations, traditionally more 
territorially tied to Japan than other corporations are tied to their home ter-
ritories, have moved their operations, and consequently jobs, abroad.151 
Approximately 50% of Sony's employees come from outside of Japan. 152 
By the early 1990s, Toyota's international production, that is, production 
outside Japan, was up to 20% of its total production. 153 Mabuchi Motors, 
which has half of the world market for minuscule motors used to power 
toothbrushes, zoom lenses, and car windows, employs thirty-three thou-
sand workers-one thousand in Japan, but most in cheaper labor markets 
elsewhere. 154 
According to a controversial study, conventional economic analysis 
had underestimated the job losses suffered by advanced economies and 
gained by developing countries-shifts attributable to international trade in 
particular. 155 Comparative advantage for a growing number of developing 
The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617, 1621 (1995). 
Berman commented: 
/d. 
That humankind, in the aftermath of two world wars, has reached a turning point in its 
history, that the world has entered a new era of global interdependence, that all inhabitants of 
Planet Earth share a common destiny, is a historical fact, a political fact, an economic fact, a 
sociological fact, that has finally penetrated the consciousness of most of the earth's 
inhabitants. 
150. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 43. 
151. See Brenton R. Schlender, Japan Hits the Wall, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 1993, at 128. Beginning in 
the 1990s, with the appreciation of the yen, Japanese companies had to offset the proportionate rise in 
the price of Japanese goods in the export markets by shifting production to other nations in Asia. 
Sony's Walkman, for example, is now made entirely in Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. GREIDER, 
supra note 20, at 69. 
152. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 15. 
153. Andrew Pollack, Honda Setto Increase U.S. Output, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at Dl. 
154. Andrew Pollack, Today's Corporate Game Plans Know No Boundaries: Mabuchi Motors; 
an Un-Japanese Mode/for Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1994, at Cl. 
155. See generally ADRIAN WOOD, NORTH-SOUTH TRADE, EMPLOYMENT AND 
INEQUALITY: CHANGING FORTUNES IN A SKILL-DRIVEN WORLD (1994). This study has generated 
discussion because of the author's conclusion that international trade has increased trade between 
developed and developing countries, which has created adverse consequences, in terms of wage and job 
security, for lesser-skilled workers in rich countries. Economists who question the study believe, 
instead, that competition from low-wage producers in poor countries cannot be the primary cause of job 
losses of industrial workers in rich countries. For these economists critical of Wood's study, the 
technology revolution, not trade with poor countries, is the more important cause of job losses in rich 
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countries no longer means just exporting raw materials or "low-tech, 
labour-intensive goods while industrial countries keep the high-tech 
goods."156 In fifteen years, Thailand moved from being a rice producer to 
the world's second-largest producer of pickup trucks and fourth-largest 
manufacturer of motorcycles.157 For workers in the rich nations, then, jobs 
are moving overseas, but not just jobs in the traditional manufacturing or 
high-volume sectors.158 As markets become more international and open to 
increased trade and foreign direct investment, demand for information 
technology also increased, causing more companies to locate an even wider 
range of value-added activities overseas, such as research and develop-
ment, procurement, accounting, and data entry and processing.159 Even 
countries. See, e.g., Carol Stump, Comment, Free Trade Area of the Americas, 4 J. lNr'L L. & PRAc. 
153, 168 (1995). Wood's study, published in 1994, stood in contrast with the conventional 
understanding of"[m]ost economists [who] have emphasized the role of technology, arguing that skill-
biased technological improvements have reduced the relative wages of unskilled workers in the United 
States ... . "See John T. Addison et al., Technology, Trade Sensitivity, and Labor Displacement, 66 S. 
EcoN. J. 682, 682 (2000); Globalisation and Its Critics, supra note 48, at 9 (discussing a study by 
William Cline that shows that ''technological change was perhaps five times more powerful in 
widening inequality in America between 1973 and 1993 than trade (including trade due to FDI [foreign 
direct investment])"); Workers of the World, Compete, THE EcoNOMIST, Apr. 2, 1994, at 70 ("Many 
economists prefer to blame the dwindling demand for unskilled workers on the technological revolution 
of the past decade."). 
See also MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 140, at 10 (describing Joss 
of jobs, export earnings, and tax revenues faced by governments when corporations move from one 
jurisdiction to another); THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL EcONOMY (Jerry Mander & Edward 
Goldsmith eds., 1996). The apparent economic success of poorer countries, as seen in the rise in their 
exports, is considered "the single most important reason for the increase in European unemployment 
rates." See generally WES, supra note 79, at 2 (citing COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
GROWTH, COMPETmVENESS, EMPLOYMENT: THE CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD INTO THE 21ST 
CENTURY-WHITE PAPER, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 
(1993)). 
156. War of the Worlds, supra note 146, at 24. Technological changes "mean that developing 
countries don't just have to trade their raw materials to the West and get finished products in return; 
they mean that developing countries can become big-time producers as well." FRIEDMAN, supra note 
10, at XV, 45; see also WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WORKERS IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 51 
(1995). 
157. FRIEDMAN,supra note 10, at46. 
158. Traditional ship-building countries such as Finland are seeing their shipbuilding industries 
relocate to countries such as Brazil, China, Taiwan, and the countries of Eastern Europe. GREIDER, 
supra note 20, at 62. Caterpillar also shifted production to overseas plants in Brazil, Europe, and Japan. 
Id at63. 
159. See generally \VIR 1993, supra note 110. China, India, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
established computer programming and equipment-design centers; created service industries, such as 
banking, accounting, and insurance; and globalized the preparation and handling of tax returns, 
insurance claims, and the processing of airline tickets. See GREIDER, supra note 20, at 66; Keith 
Bradsher, SJ..illed Workers Watch Their Jobs Migrate Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at AI. 
Outside of Bombay is a new, high-tech town known as SCEEPZ-the Santa Cruz Electronic Export 
Processing Zone-where transnational companies like Swissair and AT&T hire Hindi-, Tamil-, and 
Mahratti-speaking computer programmers to write software. BAREER, supra note 1, at 18; see also 
Sanjoy Hazarika, An Indian City of the Future with the Lure of the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at 
D6. Call centers are thriving in India, as companies like GE and British Airways have established 
phone banks employing Indian workers with fictional American lives to handle customer inquiries from 
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without significant governmental resources to foster technology develop-
ment, a number of small countries, most spectacularly, the Philippines, 
have nonetheless managed to become a center of information activities. 160 
In many instances the global dispersion of production and investment 
has resulted in a divergence between the national and the corporate inter-
ests. While it had once been understood that the interests of the national 
corporations or the national champions were more or less aligned with the 
national interests, so that, for example, "what is good for General Motors is 
good for America," this alignment of interests can no longer be easily pre-
sumed.161 The corporation is no longer territorially confmed to its home 
the United States. Mark Landler, Hi, I'm in Bangalore (but I Can't Say So), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,2001, 
at AI (describing how customer service employees hired to field calls have set up fake telephone 
identities to convince Americans dialing toll-free numbers that the customer service employees work 
nearby; some watch American sitcoms such as Ally McBeal to learn the right phrases). 
Where physical contact with customers is not essential, there is increasing scope for 
outsourcing to countries with cheap, but relatively well-educated workforces. People can be 
employed anywhere to carry out labour-intensive computer programming and data 
processing, keeping in touch with head office by computer network and satellite. Routine 
accountancy work, for example, could be subcontracted to developing countries. 
War of the Worlds, supra note 146, at 24; Chen May-Yee, Let's Make a Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 
2000, at Rl 0. Costa Rica, for example, successfully assembled an incentive package that included an 
eight-year income tax exemption, with a subsequent four-year period of 50% reduction in the country's 
30% income tax rate, duty free import of raw materials, and free movement of capital-in order to land 
a $300 million semiconductor test and assembly plant established by Intel outside the Costa Rican city 
of San Jose. May-Y ee, supra. 
160. "Even poorer places, and those without strong links to established innovation centers, can 
piggyback on the wide distribution of skills, knowledge, communications systems and capital around 
the world." G. Pascal Zachary & Robert Frank, High-Tech Hopes, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at R4. 
In the Philippines, "poor, largely rural students from remote villages [using] the most basic tools to ride 
the digital wave" have formed programming pools and attracted companies like Motorola and 
Anderson Consulting. /d. Web developers in Asia and Europe now send their design work to the 
Philippines, and engineering companies, like Bechtel Corporation, send blueprints to the Philippines at 
night and have them turned around and computer ready by the next morning. Id. America Online is 
building a world-wide service center at the former U.S. Clark Air Force Base where Filipino engineers 
and software experts work the e-mail system answering questions from AOL users in the United States. 
I d. 
Other smaller countries that have managed to develop high-powered niches for certain 
technologies include: Israel for "instant messaging" technology, used in electronic mail; opto-
electronics technology for China; and user interfaces technology for Mexico. Id. In an effort to become 
attractive technology sites, Costa Rica has eliminated import taxes on computer-related equipment, 
adopted an aggressive policy upgrading information technology facilities in schools, and strengthened 
its intellectual property laws. South Korea has an official policy of promoting e-business, with tight 
security standards for telecommunications centers. Hungary has invested heavily in information 
technology education, and all its secondary schools are connected through network computers. 
Estonia's Parliament approved a proposal to guarantee internet access as a matter of constitutional right 
for all its citizens, with the government setting "e-readiness" as its national priority. Ghana has become 
the first West African nation to attain connectivity in 1994. Id. 
161. See generally REICH, supra note 80, at 43-68; GREIDER, supra note 20, at 76. John Ruggie 
has termed this a breakdown of the "embedded liberal compromise" between capital and labor in the 
rich industrialized countries, which has also resulted in the state's adoption of a market-oriented 
approach to economic management to replace the Keynesian, state-oriented welfare approach that had 
characterized much of the post-World War II era. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, 
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economy in the rich countries and could be lured to any country that offers 
the right combination of factors for increased profitability.162 These events 
have produced two significant changes. First, they have allowed poorer 
countries to exploit the increasing dispersal of capital to their advantage, 
reducing to some degree the raw power of the historically dominant nations 
to impose colonialist or neocolonialist terms of trade on the poorer coun-
tries.163 Second, however, it has also caused increased inequalities among 
certain groups within the advanced industrial societies, as companies shift 
their high-volume and even some high-value work from the richer to the 
poorer countries.164 
This Article proposes that these substantive issues with distributive 
impact, both nationally and internationally, be addressed in a way that 
takes into account both the fact of globalization and the social and political 
context within which globalization itself must be engaged. For the free 
trade system to survive, it must have not just economic success but also 
political appeal. But before one can institute an effective economic regime 
that strikes a balance between the free trade orientation of the global eco-
nomic system on the one hand and the protective concerns of national gov-
ernments for their national economies on the other, one must first 
accurately understand what is meant by "national" and "international" as 
those terms have been employed and understood. 
C. Confusion: Dilemmas Underlying Current Trade Law and Policy 
lt is time to reassess the extent to which the national corporation is 
still an appropriate conduit for national trade and investment policies. To 
use the United States as an example, because the benefits of U.S. trade 
Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 
379, 379-415 (1982). 
162. A brief examination of tbe history of American corporate law shows tbat individual states in 
tbe United States have also engaged in a competitive race to attract corporations by adopting liberal 
corporate enactment statutes. For example, New Jersey had long been aware oftbe revenue-generating 
aspects of corporate chartering; tbus tbe New Jersey general incorporation act was tbe broadest and tbe 
most enabling, providing for a simple incorporating procedure and lenient residency requirements. See 
generally Gordon Tullock, Entry Barriers in Politics, 55 AM. EcoN. REv. 458 (1965); ROBERT HEssEN, 
IN DEFENSE OF THE CoRPORATION 68-71 (1979). The New Jersey General Incorporation Act marked a 
complete shift from tbe states' initial hostility towards foreign corporations to one tbat welcomed 
corporate business activities within tbeir territories. GEORGE HEBERTON EVANS, BUSINESS 
INCORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, t8oo-1943, at 11 (1948); Vicki Been, Exit as a Constraint on 
Land Use Exactions: Rethinl..-ing the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473, 
534 (1991). Delaware too has followed tbe New Jersey model and "bettered" it, allowing Delaware to 
assume leadership in providing and keeping a body of liberal corporate laws. See Andrew G. T. Moore, 
Preface toR. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
AND BusiNESS ORGANIZATIONS H-11 (3d ed. 1998); BernardS. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A 
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990). 
163. See supra notes 146-50. 
164. See supra notes 151-60; David R. Howell, The Skills Myth, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1994, at 
81. 
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laws and policies are only available to American companies, what 
constitutes "American" has significant implications. 165 But how or when a 
company or product qualifies as domestic is currently determined in 
piecemeal fashion by a system without clear rules or objectives. 
Take as an example U.S. antidumping laws, one of the types of laws 
that regulate the importation of foreign products into the U.S. market. 
Dumping occurs when imports are sold in the United States at less than 
"fair value," that is, less than the price for home market or third market 
sales, and as a result, cause or threaten to cause material injury to a U.S. 
industry. 166 Since the statute itself requires that the petition be made "on 
behalf of an industry," the antidumping laws are geared to the protection of 
a domestic industry from unfair practices. 167 But the regulatory framework 
governing U.S. antidumping laws is one rooted in a time when U.S. indus-
try meant U.S. companies, as traditionally understood. 168 With the growing 
internationalization of production by corporate entities, the question of 
which party has standing to invoke the antidumping laws or which product 
is a U.S. versus a foreign product has become increasingly complicated. 
For example, in a proceeding initiated by Motorola, whereby Motorola 
claimed injury by less-than-fair-value imports of pagers from Japan, the 
definition of "domestic industry" became an issue when NEC, one of the 
Japanese importers, argued that Motorola should not be considered a do-
mestic producer because Motorola itself imported pagers manufactured in 
its facilities in Malaysia. 169 Which entity can be deemed part of the 
domestic industry is no longer simple when a domestic company (the 
165. Examples of such trade laws include those designed to protect U.S. industry from unfair trade 
or import surges, those designed to open up foreign markets for U.S. companies, or those that condition 
certain government policy initiatives on the recipients being U.S. nationals or part of domestic industry. 
See Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, Integrated International Production, and the 
United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 51, 59 (1997) ("Because special benefits 
accrue to the 'American' corporation and not to foreign corporations (including the ability to invoke the 
protection of U.S. laws), the tests for identifYing corporate nationality are crucial. United States 
corporation law has not kept pace with changes in the economic reality."). 
166. See Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 731-39 (1950), amended by !9 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673(h) (1994), 
and Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 211-234, 108 Stat. 4842-4901 (1995). 
167. Article 5.1 of the GATT Antidumping Code states the following: "An investigation to 
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall normally be initiated upon a 
written request by or on behalf of the domestic industry affected." Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI ofthe General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, art. 5.1, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 18 
I.L.M. 621 (1979). 
168. Josephs, supra note 165, at 54-55. 
169. See Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, USITC Pub. 1410, 
lnv. No. 731-TA-102 (Aug. 1983). NEC and Matsushita Communication Industrial Company argued 
that even if Motorola could be considered a domestic producer, any injury complained of by Motorola 
was only to products that were themselves imported. Matsushita also argued that injury to the domestic 
industry should be assessed only with respect to domestically produced pagers. The ITC held for 
Motorola, based on the overall nature of Motorola's activities in the United States, and concluded that 
Motorola's production of pagers, including those pagers partially assembled in Malaysia, are to be 
considered part ofthe domestic industry injured by less-than-fair-value sales of imports. 
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producer) performs operations offshore and when a foreign company (the 
importer) performs some operations in the United States. 
As complex as it is now to determine the nationality of a corporation, 
it is equally difficult and complex to determine the national origin of a 
product. In an investigation of an antidumping action involving forklifts, 
for example, the Commerce Department confessed that "strictly speaking, 
there was no such thing as a U.S. forklift, or a foreign forklift for that 
matter.'mo Nonetheless, the agency determined that a forklift would be 
considered a U.S. forklift if its frame is manufactured in the United States, 
even if the remainder of its parts is made abroad. 171 The rules that deter-
mine a product's national origin have become so convoluted that it is hard 
to tell whether they are designed to be part of a free trading system or to 
present barriers to trade. 172 
170. REICH, supra note 80, at 115. 
171. Id. 
172. Appearing before the Canadian Parliament to explain the various NAFTA provisions, then 
Canadian Trade Minister, Michael Wilson, said the following about rules of origin: "Rules of origin 
are very, very complex. You don't want to know about them. They are terrible things to deal with." 
John P. Simpson, North American Free Trade Agreement-Rules of Origin, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 33, 33 
(1994). For example, in determining which products qualify as North American and are thus eligible 
for preferential tariff treatment by the member states, trade authorities must apply NAFTA rules of 
origin. Goods wholly originating in the NAFTA trade area qualify for tariff preferences. But goods that 
contain nonregional materials are still considered North American if those materials have been 
substantially transformed so as to undergo a change in tariff classification. North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 40l(b), H.R. Doc. 103-159, 32 I.L.M. 289, 349 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
According to international standards, nationality of a product is determined by the nationality of the last 
country in which it underwent a "substantial transformation." Certain products, however, may also be 
subject to different and more specific rules of origin. For example, autos and light trucks must meet a 
specified 62.5% North American content. For computers, if the circuit board is made in North America 
and transformed in the region, the computer may be freely traded. RALPH H. FoLSOM ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 412-13 (2d ed. 2001). Under special NAFTA rules, 
television sets, for example, count as "North American" and are exempt from various taxes only if they 
are not only assembled in North Ameriea but also contain North American made picture tubes 
consisting of the screen and the electron gun. Keith Bradsher, In Twist, Protectionism Is Used to Sell 
Trade Pact, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at 26; see NAFTA, supra, annex 401, item 8528.10bb, 32 
I.L.M. at 438; Mariana C. Silveira, Rules of Origin in International Trade Treaties: Towards the 
FTAA, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 411, 442 (1997). For example, a color television receiver with a 
screen size of more than fourteen inches is a NAFT A national only if the color picture tube originates 
in North America. NAFTA, supra, annex 401, item 8528.10bb, 32 I.L.M. at 438. A color television 
receiver with a screen size of less than fourteen inches must have all of the printed circuit boards and 
the tuner originate within the region. NAFTA, supra, annex 401, item 8528.10aa, 32 I.L.M. at 437. 
Assume that a television set is made in Mexico from component parts made in Mexico, Korea, and 
elsewhere. While the television set may not receive NAFTA preferential tariff treatment unless the 
color picture tube itself is manufactured within North America, the television may nonetheless be 
classified as a product of Mexico for marking or other purposes, such as the application of a country-
specific quota or an antidumping duty. For a discussion of rules of origin, see infra text accompanying 
notes 242-248. See also David A. Gantz, Implementing the NAFTA Rules of Origin: Are the Parties 
Helping or Hurting Free Trade? 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 367, 372 (1995). 
Yet, this special rule for televisions does not necessarily assure that the product will be more 
"North American" and less "foreign." "[S]ince Japanese companies own large shares of both of the 
'American' glass companies that manufacture tubes, 'American' domestic television sets will still be 
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Without a thorough understanding of how globalization has produced 
a post-national economic system, international trade laws continue to rely 
on muddled notions of "nationality" to determine which company or which 
product is domestic or foreign. As a result, decisions are made on a scat-
tered basis, guided by obsolete rules and short-term national interests. In 
some cases, countries found that traditional concepts of nationality were 
inadequate and needed to' be revised, at least for the immediate cases at 
hand. For example, when France tried to limit Japanese automobile imports 
to 3% of the French market, Margaret Thatcher opposed the French move, 
as the Nissan Bluebirds were not only assembled in Britain but also com-
posed of parts 80% ofwhich came from Europe.173 Similarly, when Taiwan 
included Toyotas assembled in the United States in its ban on Japanese 
auto imports, the Bush administration was compelled to come to Toyota's 
defense and pressured Taiwan to back down. 174 
But at other times, traditional and anachronistic notions prevail and 
prevent countries from re-evaluating old premises. In 1986 when the 
Reagan administration negotiated a formal semiconductor agreement with 
Japan to provide a guaranteed market share to the U.S. semiconductor 
industry, and even as the U.S. government made the defense of its 
American semiconductor industry a centerpiece in its dispute with Japan, 
the U.S. semiconductor industry was already moving production abroad; 
from I982 to 1991, American jobs in this industry had suffered a 37% 
decrease, from 290,000 to 184,000.175 Motorola's workforce was increasing 
globally but its U.S. share was declining to 56%.176 In 1989, the Bush 
Administration used the threat of Section 301 177 to force Japan to open its 
substantially Japanese, even if they qualify as American under NAFTA rules." BARBER, supra note 1, 
at 25; see also Bradsher, supra at 26. Asahi Glass of Japan owns 49% of the Corning subsidiary that 
makes glass for television screens, and Nippon Electric Glass of Japan owns a subsidiary of Owens-
lllinois, the other major U.S. producer of television screen glass. 
173. REicH, supra note 80, at 118. 
174. ld. 
175. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 91. The same anachronistic notions of "American" corporate 
nationality prevail in the nontrade area as well and inform U.S. funding to Sematech, a consortium of 
American semiconductor companies such as IBM, Texas Instruments, Motorola, AT&T, and others. 
Despite the initiative's overtly nationalist objectives, at least from the perspective of the U.S. 
government, the participating companies were clearly global in orientation: Texas Instruments began 
building a $250 million semiconductor fabrication plant in Taiwan. It already had a plant in Kywhyu, 
Japan, and had also formed an alliance with Hitachi to design and make a new generation of superchips, 
as did Motorola in its alliance with Toshiba. AT&T, too, paired up with Japan's NEC and Mitsubishi 
Electric; Intel with Japan's NMB Semiconductor Company and Matsushita Group, and IBM with 
Germany's Siemens. In other words, "the consortium was in fact little more than a partnership among 
several emerging global webs whose future would be only tangentially related to the future skills of 
Americans." REICH, supra note 80, at 161. Ironically, a Japanese company, NEC, which was 
constructing a $400 million advanced-chip fabrication facility in Rosevale, California, was not 
permitted to join the Sematech consortium. See also What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 
129, at 36, 37-39 (statement of Dr. John Kline). 
176. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 91; see also Uchitelle, supra note 137. 
177. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 2011, 2041 (1976). 
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market to Motorola.178 At that point, despite its formal "American" corpo-
rate nationality, Motorola's production facilities were primarily in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia.179 In 1995, Motorola announced that it was locating its 
new $750 million wafer fabrication plant not in the United States but in 
China.tso 
Although globalization of the firm and its products has resulted in a 
convoluted concept of "national" identity and thus created awkward con-
tradictions in the way trade law is conducted, there is as yet no comprehen-
sive re-evaluation of corporate "nationality"181 in the international trading 
system. What is a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation if its op-
erations can be found in multiple national territories outside its home 
state?182 Corporate nationality has been determined by using a number of 
178. REtcH, supra note 80, at 164. 
179. Uchitelle,supranote 137. 
180. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 91, 214 (describing the movement of operations to Asia by U.S. 
auto parts producers); see also Helene Cooper, What Is the Luxury-car Fight About? A Primer, WALL 
ST. J., May 18, 1995, at A2. Similarly, when the Clinton Administration was approached by both 
Northern Telecom, a Canadian finn, and AT&T, an American company, for the Administration's 
support of their respective bids to win the phone franchise in China, the U.S. government backed 
AT&T, presumably because it is an American company. Northern Telecom, however, promised to 
manufacture the hardware in its U.S. factories, and AT&T made no such promise. AT&T was 
ultimately awarded the franchise after it agreed to build two new factories for advanced switching 
equipment, both in China. GREIDER, supra note 20, at 213. Companies that have moved their 
manufacturing operations abroad counter the suggestion that they are shedding their ties to the United 
States. When Robert Reich suggested to the Federal Communications Commission that it choose a 
high-defmition-television standard based in part on which system would. create '"the greatest 
contribution to domestic high-wage employment,"' the chairman of Zenith, which assembles many of 
its television sets in Mexico, argued that the issue should not be where the high-tech television sets are 
assembled but where the semiconductor circuitry originates. Magnusson, supra note 107, at 142. Thus 
while European companies might have moved some of their assembly operations to the United States, 
the high-value-added jobs have remained in Europe. Id. Accordingly, Zenith, by offering to buy 
components from AT&T's Florida and Peunsylvania chip factories, should rank above the European 
companies in terms ofU.S. trade priorities. 
181. The concept of"nationality'' was initially thought to be inapplicable to a corporation, because 
"national" counoted a sense of personal allegiance towards the sovereign which only a natural person 
could have. See Herman Walker, Jr., Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 
59 AM. J. lNT'L L. 373, 377-78 (I956); E. Hilton Young, The Nationality of a Juristic Person, 22 
HARv. L. REv. I, 2 (1908) (objecting to the application of the word "nationality," which carries certain 
implications of political duties and allegiance, to a corporation). In modem U.S. law, the notion of 
corporate nationality is fully accepted. See generally Yitzhak Hadari, The Choice of National Law 
Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, I974 DuKE L.J. I, 
3 [hereinafter Hadari, Choice of National Law]; Heinrich Kronstein, The Nationality of International 
Enterprises, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 983 (1952). 
182. Citations infra notes 183-87 to works on corporate nationality are drawn from compilations 
in Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations: Towards Intermediate 
Scrutiny for a Quasi-suspect Classification, 59 Mo. L. REv. 569, 677 un.2, 4, 5 & 6 (I994). See I7 
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 8290 (perm. ed., rev. vol. I987) for a widely accepted definition of corporate nationality ("With 
respect to a particular state or country, a corporation created by or under the laws of that state or 
country is a 'domestic corporation' and any corporation that owes its existence to the laws of another 
state, government or country is a 'foreign corporation."'). 
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tests. 183 First, the traditional incorporation test looks to where a corporation 
is incorporated. 184 Under this test, a corporation is a mere artificial person 
and therefore "can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the 
sovereignty by which it is created .... It must dwell in the place of its 
creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."185 Second, the so-
called control test determines corporate nationality by looking to the na-
tionality of its stockholders and others, such as officers, directors, and 
managers, who exercise control over its affairs. 186 And third, corporate na-
tionality has been assigned by reference to the seat test, which looks to the 
state where the center of a company's management is located. 187 
183. The tests for corporate nationality are described infra notes 184-87. However, "[i]nternational 
law does not provide a single, agreed answer to the problem of corporate nationality .... " Michael P. 
A vrarnovich, The Protection of International Investment at the Start of the Twenty-First Century: Will 
Anachronistic Notions of Business Render Irrelevant The OECD's Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment? 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1201, 1223 (1998); see also John H. Merryman, Nationality of 
the Corporate Person, 22 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 181 (1947) ("No one rule for the determination of 
nationality has been accepted by the various nations .... "). 
184. There are two primary and competing theories for determining corporate nationality: test of 
incorporation and the place of the corporate "seat." In the U.S and other common law countries, 
corporate nationality traditionally has been determined by reference to a corporation's place of 
incorporation. See REsTATEMENT (TIDRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 213 (1986) ("For purposes 
of international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the 
corporation is organized."}; see also Hadari, Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at 7-11. Where a 
corporation was incorporated is easily ascertainable; thus the place of incorporation test also has the 
advantage of providing clarity and predictability in choice-of-law matters. See id. at 10. For a 
discussion of the seat test, see infra note 187. 
185. Banko/ Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519,588 (1839). 
186. The shareholder nationality or control test gained ascendancy as an alternative approach to 
determining corporate nationality in the early-twentieth century due to national security concerns and to 
fear of"alien capital," as corporate nationality became crucial in the application of the Trading with the 
Enemy Acts. See Hadari, Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at 23-25; Detlev F. Vagts, The 
Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. 
REv. 1489, 1527 & n.l81 (1961); R.E.L. Vaughn Williams & Matthew Chrussachi, The Nationality of 
Corporations, 49 LAw Q. REv. 334, 337-39 (1933). In a landmark English decision, the British court 
looked to the shareholders and directors, rather than the law of incorporation, to determine whether 
legal "control" was in the hand of the enemy. See Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., 2 
App. Cas. 307, 340-41 (1916); see also Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. 
Cas. 756,2 Gall. 105 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156) (holding that because a corporation incorporated 
in England was an alien in the United States, it became an alien enemy when England and the United 
States declared war on each other). For a discussion of the control test and its use in determining 
corporate nationality in various treaties, see Walker, supra note 181, at 381 n.39. 
187. Most continental countries adhere to the seat rule, that is, the principal place of business or 
central administration of the company, with the place of the corporate headquarters being the dominant 
factor in this inquiry. Hadari, Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at 8-9. Some countries look to 
the place where the board of directors or the shareholders meet. !d. This has also been referred to as the 
"location of control" test, which involves an examination of where management decisions are taken. 
See M. Tedeschi, The Determination of Corporate Nationality, 50 THE AUSTRALIAN L.J. 521, 522 
(1976). The test of incorporation, along with the seat test, was adopted by the International Court of 
Justice in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 1970 l.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 5} (dismissing a petition by 
Belgium, which espoused the claim of Barcelona Traction, because the place of the company's 
incorporation was in Canada); see also MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 82 (1993). 
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These tests are ill suited for the postnational economy. 188 When corpo-
rate production, operation, and organization are no longer localized, as Part 
II.A shows, the mere fact that a corporation is organized under the law of 
its state of incorporation does not in itself reveal significant or meaningful 
connection or identification with that state.189 Similarly, the nationality of 
the corporation's shareholders, or its directors, officers, and managers, as 
used in the control test, is equally ineffective. First, given the frequency 
and ease with which shares change hands, nationality determinations based 
on ownership of equity is potentially inaccurate because share ownership is 
unlikely to be frozen or :fixed.190 Second, focusing on equity ownership and 
188. See generally Avramovich, supra note 183, at 1226 ("[T]he traditional tests governing 
corporations are becoming increasingly less useful in an economic world where economic decision-
making is devolving and the corporation merely represents a network of intellectual capital and 
relationships."); PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION 
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 232-33 (1993) (expressing a general 
dissatisfaction with current tests and proposing a test that treats all affiliated corporations of a corporate 
group as one "enterprise," noting that ''the concept of the corporation as a separate legal entity, a 
concept which originally had satisfactorily defined the economic entity as well as the legal entity, has 
failed to correspond to the modern realities of American and world business''); see also Phillip I. 
Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 283, 
299 (1990). 
189. This test is widely used. The Restatement states that for purposes of international law, a 
corporation's nationality is that of the state under which the corporation is organized. See 
REsTATEMENT, supra note 184. Reporter's Note 5 of the Restatement also noted that the general 
assumption under U.S. law is that the place of incorporation determines corporate nationality. That test, 
however, has also been criticized. SeeM. Tedeschi, supra note 187, at 521. Tedeschi described the 
place of incorporation test as: 
the least sophisticated way of determining the nationality of a corporation, in that it takes the 
concept of nationality of natural persons and applies it to the corporate sphere by stating that 
a corporation, if "born" in a jurisdiction, becomes a subject there. In this era of increased 
corporate mobility, the choice of the place of incorporation may be purely a matter of 
convenience without any intention on the part of those who manifest the corporate will to 
have any other connection with the jurisdiction of incorporation. 
Young, supra note 181, at 5. Young notes that the test of incorporation is inadequate because the state: 
has done nothing in connection with [the corporations'] institution; it has merely tacitly 
assented to their creation, and can in no sense be said to have created them itself, or to have 
performed any other act from which it is possible to construe an intention on its part to endow 
them with its nationality. 
Stanley J. Marcuss & Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The 
Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439,469 (1981) (discussing how the test, 
if used without reference to other considerations such as connections of the corporation in other ways to 
the state, is inadequate and simplistic); see generally H.F. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); Kronstein, supra note 181, at 990. 
190. "Even when an ownership or control determination is made at a given point in time, this 
'snapshot' picture of corporate nationality can soon fade .... " What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, 
supra note 129, at 34. "With increased dispersion of share-holdings through global stock exchanges, 
tracing ownership and control variables among transnational corporate alliances would be a constant 
and challenging definitional task." !d. at 35 (testimony of Dr. John Kline); see also M. Tedeschi, supra 
note 187, at 523 (discussing "difficulty ... of tracing ownership and voting rights"); Young, supra note 
181, at 3 (critiquing the control test because the "nationality of the majority of [shareholders], or of the 
holders of the major part of the common capital, may and often actually does fluctuate rapidly"). An 
additional problem with the test is that "control" has been determined primarily by reference to 
shareholder control, rather than to control by corporate officers, directors, and managers, who may in 
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equity control is likely to present an incomplete and misleading picture, 
because of the proliferation of transnational intercorporate alliances that 
are highly significant and strategically important, even though they may be 
low or nonequity arrangements. 191 
The premises underlying the control test are also questionable in the 
global economy. While a corporation's profits may be used to pay share-
holder dividends, which may in turn be reinvested in the local economy, 
there is a great likelihood that, with the increase in cross-border capital in-
vestment, shareholders will invest their profits in countries other than their 
countries of citizenship.192 Additionally, shareholder interest (maximizing 
share value for its shareholders through globalized production) and the lo-
cal community interest (preferring local production) or the larger national 
interest may not always coincide.193 The control test ignores this reality by 
labeling a corporation more "American" merely because its shareholders 
are U.S. nationals. 
The control test may be useful to the extent that it looks beyond the 
formality or facade of where the corporation is incorporated, or where it 
does business, to allow inquiry into where control "truly" lies. lt is not, 
fact exercise greater control in a public corporation than the shareholders do. See Sigmund Timberg, 
Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 533, 562-63 
(1946). 
191. For example, a consortia program like Sematech that uses shareholder ownership criterion to 
determine a national company would have to impose an additional requirement to "freeze" the equity 
holding of the controlling shareholder. Again, even proponents of this criterion recognize the 
difficulties of their proposal. See What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, at 48 ("[S]ome of 
the most innovative companies ... can change ownership into a foreign situation, but that just brings up 
the same question again ... and that is, should there be some limitations on key technologies as 
respects corporate acquisitions?") (testimony of Larry Hecht, Executive Director of the lacocca 
Institute, Lehigh University). However, a requirement that eligible corporate participants must 
"maintain their same operational characteristics indefmitely ... would inhibit their ability to embrace 
technological change and would isolate them from the marketplace," given their propensity to engage 
in cross-border equity and nonequity strategic alliances. Id. at 34 (testimony of Dr. John Kline). 
192. From 1980 to 1994, Americans invested a total of $1.5 trillion in foreign securities. See, e.g., 
Russell B. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States in I996, in U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, JULY 1997: SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, at 24, 26-27, 30, available at 
http:l/www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ai/0797iip/maintext.htrn (last visited Jan. 16, 2002). In 1996, U.S. 
investors had $176.4 billion of foreign stocks and $42.7 billion of foreign bonds; conversely, foreign 
investors held $1,225.5 billion of U.S. securities. Id.; see also Ted C. Fishman, The Joys of Global 
Investment: Shipping Home the Fruits of MISery, HARPER's MAG., Feb. I, 1997, at 35. 
193. See, e.g., Evelyn Iritani, In Global Economy, U.S. Job Gains, Losses Know No Borders, L.A. 
TIMES, pr. 6, 2001, at AI. Discussing corporate decisions to shift production, Tom Duesterberg, 
president and chief executive of the Manufacturers Alliance, a Washington group of 450 leading U.S. 
manufacturers, said, "Most of these decisions are being made more on the basis of the economics of the 
situation rather than what would be a more traditional concern of protecting the local community." Id.; 
Avramovich, supra note 183, at 1229-31 (critiquing the underlying presumption that shareholders act in 
the national interests inherent in the control test); Young, supra note 181, at 2 (criticizing the notion of 
allegiance assumed in the term "nationality"). To the extent that the control test relies on shareholder 
control, and by implication shareholder allegiance, it would be susceptible to the same critique offered 
by Young. 
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however, useful if it assumes that shareholders or other control persons 
make corporate decisions based on their citizenship obligations194 (as op-
posed to economic or corporate interests). Shareholders are principally mo-
tivated by the objective of maximizing their investments, and officers and 
directors are similarly duty-bound to achieve this objective for their share-
holders.195 Under the business corporation laws of many states in the 
United States, for example, controlling shareholders as well as directors 
and officers owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation, including its 
minority shareholders.196 In a fiercely competitive and global economy, the 
controlling shareholders', directors', and officers' decision-making proc-
esses are not normally determined by issues of citizenship, but rather, busi-
ness principles. 197 Moreover, under certain circumstances, companies 
owned by foreign nationals, more than "home grown" companies, may be 
less likely to pull out of a foreign market in the event of an economic 
downturn and more likely to adopt a long-term economic view, precisely 
because they have incurred large "sunken" costs to enter the market to 
194. See Timberg, supra note 190, at 566-74. The Article questions the assumption that 
controlling groups make decisions based on corporate benefit rather than personal advancement and 
asserts that the conflict between self-interests and corporate interests, as well as self-interests and 
"political allegiance to [the] sovereign state" is quite common. !d. at 572. Modem day critics have 
made similar observations. Critics have charged that the elite group of symbolic analysts, those 
engaged in "problem-solving, problem-identifying, and strategic-brokering activities," REICH, supra 
note 80, at 177, or "high tech nomadic tribe ... [have] more in common with each other than with the 
citizens of whatever country they happen to do business in." JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WoRK 176 
(1995); see also Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, supra note 66, at 44 (describing the 
emergence of a cross-national business and financial elite that has more in common with those within 
its membership than it does with other nonelite workers in its own national community); CHRISTOPHER 
LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 47 (1995) (''The 
denationalization of business enterprise tends to produce a class of cosmopolitans who set themselves 
as 'world citizens, but without accepting ... any of the obligations that citizenship in a polity normally 
implies."'); REICH, supra note 80, at 208-24 (describing "secession" by the elites who have profited the 
most from the global economy into their separate communities). 
195. See AM. L. !NST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE § 2.01, at 55 
(1994). This does not mean that corporate managers cannot consider other interests besides shareholder 
interests. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 717(b) (Consol. 2001) (other stakeholder section) see also Unhappy 
Families: Stakeholder Capitalism, THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23 (discussing how public 
companies in Japan and in Continental European countries generally adopt a broader vision of the duty 
of their corporate managers, as one that encompasses the interests of other stakeholders, such as 
employees, suppliers, and the communities in which they operate). 
196. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717(b), supra note 195 (indicating duty of directors 
includes the duty to consider the interests of the corporation and its shareholders). 
197. See What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, at 117. According to Mark Rochkind, 
then President of Philips Labs, North American Philips Corporation: 
!d. 
all of the businesses, those that are so-called foreign owned[,] those that are so-called 
American owned, are driven by business practice which seeks to make a business success of 
their endeavors. The result is that Philips chooses to invest, manufacture, and sell in the 
American market. Another result: Certain American-owned corporations, for very good 
business reasons, exercise business judgment and not economic nationalism and choose to do 
some R&D and product development and manufacture abroad. 
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begin with. 198 Such companies (even if owned or controlled by foreign de-
cision makers) are in that sense even more "loyal" to the country where 
significant investments are located than are "home-grown" companies. 
From the standpoint of the proposal, which aims to balance the local 
with the global, the seat criterion would also not be appropriate because 
nationality is conferred on the basis of management's location, that is, the 
place that serves as the decision-making center of the corporation. 199 In 
fact, the seat test reflects a quintessentially internationalist bias at the ex-
pense of that which is usually associated with the national territory; it privi-
leges the position of global elites in conferring nationality. As such, the test 
would provide global companies with no incentive to demonstrate a com-
mitment to or establish roots in any one country because no economic 
benefit would be derived from such a commitment under the seat test of 
corporate nationality. The test also ignores other factors, such as the loca-
tion oflabor and the company's investment and other assets that anchor the 
company in the territory of a particular state. 
To accept that corporations have become global in orientation and 
operations does not mean, however, that they have transcended the nation-
state200 or have no "nationality." lt is evident, for example, that a company 
can be formed only pursuant to the law of a particular national jurisdiction 
and not pursuant to international law. To that extent, at the very least, its 
corporate behavior and strategy are certainly influenced by the legal envi-
ronment of that country's corporations law.201 The concept of corporate 
nationality itself is not obsolete, but rather, the old tests for determining 
corporate nationality are misleading as globalization progresses. Given the 
new economic shift, from national to global, a different concept of corpo-
rate "nationality" is therefore needed, one that balances the appeal of na-
tionalism with the demands of internationalism. 
III 
TOWARDS A NEW MEANING OF NATIONALITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
As Part II.C reveals, there is currently no comprehensive assessment 
of the meaning of "nationality" and "origin" in an international economy 
becoming increasingly postnational. U.S. trade laws, like the trade laws of 
198. See DEANNE Juuus, GLOBAL CoMPANIES AND PuBLIC PoLICY 65 (1990). 
199. See generally Societe Constr. Ltd. v. Brown, 1897 JoURNAL DU PALAIS 84, 1897 JoURNAL 
DE TruBUNAUX DE COMMERCE 552; M. Tedeschi, supra note 187, at 524 (discussing how the "location 
of central management and control ... becomes little more than a fiction" if the seat criterion is 
determinative for corporate nationality while major corporate assets are elsewhere); Young, supra note 
181, at 18-25. 
200. For the argument that nationality still matters, see, for example, D'Andrea Tyson, supra note 
8, at 37; Magnusson, supra note 107, at 142. 
20 I. The corporations law of a country necessarily affects corporate behavior because what is 
legal, permissible, or mandated in one country may be illegal and prohibited in another. For example, 
codetermination may be required in German corporate law but not in U.S. law. 
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many countries, are designed to grant certain beneficial considerations to 
and protective measures for domestic companies and their products against 
certain acts by foreign companies and foreign products. For example, there 
are laws designed to protect domestic industry2°2 and laws that correct 
''unfair trade."203 In a globally integrated economic system, however, it is 
not always easy to differentiate the "domestic industry" seeking the protec-
tion and the "foreign" importer alleged to be injuring domestic industry. 
One of the questions raised thus is one of standing: in invoking the protec-
tion provided by the relevant laws, is the plaintiff "domestic" and thus eli-
gible for relief? Even in the foreign investment area, where the United 
States has been generally less hostile to foreign investment than other 
countries, it too has looked upon foreign investment with some degree of 
suspicion and anxiety, as evidenced by the concern exhibited in the 1990s 
over a supposed "foreign takeover" prompted by the influx of Japanese 
capital in manufacturing and high-tech industries.204 
Part ill advocates a new way of thinking about nationality that is 
compatible with the global framework laid out in the Article. Part liLA 
focuses on revising corporate nationality. The proposed corporate national-
ity test allows any corporation, wherever incorporated or seated and how-
ever controlled, to be deemed a national of a state if that corporation meets 
a domestic participation test. Global corporations that qualify under the test 
are given certain "offset benefits" as incentives to demonstrate national 
202. For example, one of the measures used by the United States as a buffer against imports is the 
escape clause contained in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which aiiows a member of a 
"domestic industry'' to seek temporary relief from imports upon proof that an increase in imports 
substantiaiiy causes or threatens to cause serious injury to domestic industries producing like or directly 
competitive articles. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat 2011 (1975), amended by 
Trade Agreements of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 106(b)(3), 1106 (d)(l)-(7), 93 Stat 193, 312, and 
Trade and Tariff Act of1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 248(a), 249, 98 Stat 2998 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2251 (1994)). Section 201 is the domestic statute that implements U.S. obligations under Article XIX 
of GATT. 
203. Unfair trade laws, such as the antidumping laws, may be invoked when a "domestic industry" 
aiieges that imported items are being sold at less than fair value, thereby causing it material injury. 19 
U.S.C. § 1673, et seq. (1994). 
204. Gregory \V. Noble, Takeover or Makeover? Japanese Investment in America, 34 CAL. 
MGMT. REv. 127 (1992). Japanese firms have provided many Silicon Valley startups with capital in 
exchange for access to or control of new technologies. Some expressed concern when Japanese real 
estate developers bought the Rockefeiler Center, Pebble Beach, Heavenly Vaiiey, and portions of 
do\'mtown Los Angeles. When Sony bought Columbia Pictures in 1989, Newsweek ran a cover of the 
Statue of Liberty clothed in a kimono. 
The exaggerated perception of a foreign "invasion" coupled with the concern that the sale would 
give Fujitsu control over chip technologies contributed to the Commerce Department's opposition in 
1986 to the proposed sale of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation to Fujitsu. Id lronicaiiy, despite 
proclamations that the "U.S. industry" must be protected, Fairchild was not even an "American" firm at 
the time because it was already controiied by the French oil field services firm, Schlumberger. 
"Nationality of ownership should have been irrelevant" REICH, supra note 80, at 155. For an analysis 
of why traditional understandings of nationality should not determine U.S. policy on which companies 
are aiiowed to participate in U.S. technology programs, see id. at 154-68. See also What Is a U.S. 
Company Hearings, supra note 129. 
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attachment. The proposal champions trade liberalism and favors engaging 
with, rather than opposing, the global economy. It does so, however, not by 
reference to the conventional internationalist sensibility that typically 
reflects a free-floating perspective detached from particular political com-
munities. Rather, the internationalism the test embodies is a rooted 
internationalism, where international economic activities flow from, rather 
than transcend, national life. 
Part III.B focuses on revising rules of origin. To the extent that rules 
of origin are part of, and not eliminated from, the trade regime, they should 
be reexamined to address the additional complications posed by the global-
ization of economic activities. Because it will not be politically feasible, in 
all likelihood, to have one simple set of rules for all products,2°5 Part III.B 
is only intended to offer an alternative framework for determining rnles of 
origin. This framework, I argue, should favor a broad interpretation of rules 
of origin, primarily in two categories: those in lower-skilled operations 
and those in the postindustrial service economy. These revisions will allow 
trade rules to better reflect the global transformations identified in the 
Article. 
205. The working committee established by the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin has been 
working since the establishment of the WTO on sector- and product-specific rules of origin. See 
Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, art. 2(a)-( c), available at http://www. wto.org/english/docs _ e/legal_ e/final_ e.htm 
[hereinafter WTO Rules of Origin]; see also infra note 285. Similarly, origin rules in NAFTA, for 
example, are also different for different products, such as television sets. See supra note 172. The 
existenee of separate rules for individual products may reflect the incumbent economic interests of 
those domestic interest groups that have organized to ensure that domestic nationality is not easily 
conferred. See Silveira, supra note 172, at 420. "Political considerations, sectorial interests and 
protectionism" are barriers to achieving simple rules of origin.Jd. at 417, 449; see also Kevin Merida & 
Tom Kenworthy, For Some a Bitter NAFTA Taste, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1993, at A I (noting that to 
secure votes for NAFTA, President Clinton had to make deals ensuring special treatment for sugar, 
citrus, vegetable, beef, peanuts, and other products). 
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A. Reforming Corporate Nationality: A Proposed Domestic 
Participation Tesf06 
The proposed domestic participation test flows from the observations 
in Part IT. The key point may be summarized in the following 
way: because the global dispersion of economic activities has rendered 
problematic traditional economic distinctions founded on an ''us" versus 
"them" or a "national" versus "international" market, to the extent that a 
"national" market can be accurately identified at all, its identification does 
not derive any longer from a "domestic" corporation or a "domestic" prod-
uct, but a "domestic" work force that for the most part is still territorially 
bound. The primary purpose underlying the new proposed test is to ensure 
that trade and investment from whichever source can be drawn into the 
national territory of a state and in the process generate positive economic 
opportunities for its people.207 
206. The articulation of this test builds on my prior work on the implications globalization poses 
for international economic development, where I argued for a conceptual approach that focuses on 
human capital, that is, on the home work force and how it might benefit from value-added activities 
drawn from global companies, rather than on protecting "home" corporations, as that concept has been 
traditionally understood. See Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Economic 
Development, 32 TEX. INT'L LJ. 209, 259-70 (1997). The domestic participation test proposed in this 
section was also inspired by Heinrich Kronstein. Kronstein, supra note 181, at 984. As early as 1952, 
Professor Kronstein recognized that there might be a disjuncture between the traditional test of 
corporate nationality and the economic reality of corporate economic activities: 
/d. 
Assuming that it is legal theory which should adjust to economic reality and not the reverse, it 
follows that any "divergence between corporate theory and the underlying economic facts" 
should be resolved in favor of the latter. Such a divergence does exist, and, despite it, 
corporate theory has been slow to change. For example, a factory in the United States is an 
integral part of the American economy although it may be owned by foreign interests. Yet 
recognition of its status as an American business enterprise does ... depend on the fortuitous 
fact of whether it is or is not incorporated in an American state. If not, it may be considered to 
have no existence distinct from that of the home office abroad even though, as a matter of 
reality, it is a distinct enterprise entrenched in the United States economy. 
The proposed domestic participation test might be analogized to similar instances where U.S. 
courts have been faced with jurisdictional cases dealing with multistate corporations. See Hadari, 
Choice of National Law, supra note 181, at II (commenting that in cases where a manufacturing 
company in which "most of the business operations and day-to-day management were carried on in one 
state, while the overall management and control of the corporation were exercised from another 
state ... the United States courts have tended to find the former to be the corporation's principal place 
of business"). A focus on significant business contacts, as evidenced by the courts' inquiry into the 
company's principal business operations, is analogous to my proposal to focus on the corporation's 
degree of domestic participation in a state. The proposed domestic participation test is also analogous to 
the traditional "principal place of business test." The principal place of business test "involves locating 
the production or processing of goods or services, the extraction of raw materials, or the investment of 
capital." See Tedeschi, supra note I 87, at 522. For a discussion of another version of the principal place 
of business test, see What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 129, and Linda A. Mabry, 
Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate 
Nationality, 87 GEO. LJ. 563 (1999). 
207. As the former President of Philips Labs, whose parent company is Dutch-owned, 
remarked: "As we examine what it means for a nation to be competitive, we must ask questions not 
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The first and foremost area of inquiry is to ask the following question 
concerning a corporation's nationality: do the corporate activities within 
the state qualify as substantial, socioeconomic participation in the state's 
economy? If the answer is yes, then the corporation qualifies as a domestic 
firm, entitled to the benefits and protection of the applicable trade laws. 
The second part proceed as follows: assuming that a company meets the 
domestic participation inquiry and qualifies as a domestic company, it is 
entitled to a "participation offset" right. With the offset right, the company 
can offset any duties, tariffs, and other protective measures208 that it may be 
subject to under current law, up to the amount calculated to be its "net 
total" participation in the domestic economy. This proposed offset would 
be available only to companies that qualify as "domestic." 
By making the offset right conditional on the company's domestic 
nationality, which in tum requires the company to demonstrate 
"substantial," "socioeconomic" participation, the test directly addresses the 
reality of globalization: corporate capital mobility. A global company is 
domestic only if it meets the participation test, which is itself a test 
grounded in territorial or national considerations to balance the global with 
the local. 
1. Step One: Substantial Socioeconomic Participation 
a. Substantial 
A company's "substantial" participation may be expressed as a 
"percentage" test, in which the amount of participation in question is com-
pared to the corporation's overall financial interests and activities. Or it 
also may be expressed as a "quantity" test, in which one looks at whether 
the amount of participation is sufficiently large to qualify as "substantial." 
about its corporations but about its work force. More and more, it becomes clear that a competitive 
work force is characterized by skills, training, knowledge, and technological sophistication." What Is a 
U.S. Company, supra note 129, at 76 (testimony of Mark Rochkind). Indeed, today's global economy, 
ironically, has made the local all the more significant "Prosperity in a nation is a reflection of what 
both domestic and foreign firms choose to do in that nation." Michael E. Porter, Attitudes, Values, 
Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity, in CULTURE MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN 
PRoGRESS 16 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000). "Domestic firms that 
produced low-quality products using unsophisticated methods hold back national productivity, whereas 
foreign firms that bring in new technology and advanced methods will boost productivity and local 
wages." I d. Given the rapid movement of capital, technology, and information, and the ease with which 
companies (and their competitors) can now source their inputs globally, global outsourcing, while 
necessary as a business practice, no longer confers a competitive advantage vis-a-vis other companies. 
As a result, "[t]he remaining sources of competitive advantages are increasingly local," id. at 17, such 
as the national or local work force, "special supplier or customer relationship, unique insights about 
market gleaned from local customers or partners, special access to technology and knowledge from 
other local institutions, or production flexibility resulting from the use of a nearby supplier." Jd. at 17. 
208. If an escape clause proceeding grants protective relief, such as Section 201 of the Trade Act 
of 1974, the protective measures may include increased tariffs or tariff rate quotas (tariffs which 
increase only after a certain quota for the imported item has been reached). See Trade Act of1974, 19 
U.S.C. § 2253(a) (2000). 
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Courts have used both approaches in evaluating "substantiality" in other 
areas of law,209 and for the most part have held that "each case must be 
decided on its own facts"210 in determining whether or not a company de-
rives "substantial revenue" from goods used or consumed in a state. 
Under either test, whether or not the economic presence counts as 
"substantial" will depend partially on the history of the corporation, the 
nature of the industry, and the level of economic development of the coun-
try at issue. The evidence required to demonstrate substantial participation 
is evidence concerning tax revenues; production and employment levels; 
systematic activities in the domestic economy that significantly utilize 
land, labor, and intellectual and financial capital for the creation of value 
domestically; domestic linkages with suppliers and subcontractors; rein-
vestment of earnings in the country in question; and research and develop-
ment.2u A company wishing to prove the extent of its domestic 
209. New York courts have found that a corporation may be subjected to personal jurisdiction in 
New York if the company derives "substantial revenue" in the state. See, e.g., Allen v. Canadian 
General Electric Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aff'd 431 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1980). In 
determining "substantial revenue," the court noted that "[o]nly a small portion of [the company's] total 
sales of goods and services are made to customers in New York State ... " which was less than I% of 
total sales of$879 million in 1976./d. at 708. This meant that revenue in New York was $8.79 million. 
The court noted that although the New York statute itself provided no firm guidance on the 
interpretation of the term "substantial revenue," "[w]hether a 'quantitative' or 'qualitative' approach is 
used, the sum of $8.79 million is too large to be considered insubstantial without further analysis or 
proof of the business which would show such fact." Id at 709. Under the quantity test, the actual 
amount, though only 1% of the company's total sales, is still prima facie "substantial" to support 
jurisdiction. Id; see also Gillmore v. J.S. lnskip, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 
1967). The court determined that "substantial revenue" should be interpreted to "require comparison of 
New York (or interstate or international) gross sales revenue with a defendant's total gross sales 
revenue or New York, interstate or international net profits with a defendant's total net profit .... " Id. 
(citation omitted). The court also noted, however, that other courts "deal with the question of 
substantiality in terms of dollar value of sales or profit in the abstract." Id (citation omitted). 
Other courts have relied on similar explications of"substantiality." In Velandra v. Regie Nationale 
des Usine Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964), the court found that "substantial economic activities" 
in Michigan could be determined by a number of factors, "including the number and value of sales 
within the state, their ratio to the total market for like or similar products within the state, the quantity 
or value of the [company's] production, the percentage of the total output sold within the state .... " Id. 
at 296; see also Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423, 429 (Alaska 1965) (holding that "substantial 
volume" is not the only method used to measure a company's business presence in a state partly 
because "when compared with the total market demands of a fledgling economy for specialized 
industrial products, it is quite likely that [the company] would be found to have been supplying a 
substantial portion of the total needs of the market .... "). 
Although these cases arise out of a different context, they show that courts have adopted a flexible 
approach to determine whether a company's presence is "substantial" and ways in which this might be 
measured. I would advocate an approach that is similarly flexible on this point, as determined by the 
state at issue. 
210. Allen, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 709. 
211. The evidence would be presented to the relevant administrative agencies that make trade-
related determinations. In the United States, they would be the International Trade Commission and the 
International Trade Administration, which is an agency in the Department of Conunerce. The 
individual countries will decide which factors are deemed more determinative or more important than 
others. 
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participation would produce evidence of its activities in the national econ-
omy, from production and assembly to servicing and promotion, or 
research, development, and design. As I explain in my discussion of part 
two of the test below, for the purpose of the proposal, the issue is a com-
parative one, the degree of a company's participation as measured against 
the duties and charges it owes. 
A corporation with a substantial degree of participation in the U.S. 
economy, for example, is one that has a substantial proportion of its princi-
pal assets or operational facilities in the geographic territory of the United 
States. The assumption here is that the physical location of a corporation's 
assets as well as linkages forged with other local businesses may provide 
some measure of the extent to which benefits granted by the state to that 
corporation may produce direct or secondary benefits for the state itself. 
Therefore, to the extent that it is an accurate reflection or indicator of a 
corporation's substantial participation in a national economy, the location 
of a corporation's assets is an important consideration in the determination 
of corporate national identity. 
U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates212 of international companies are sig-
nificant participants in the U.S. economy, measured by standard factors 
such as employment in the United States,213 reinvestment of eamings,214 
sales in the United States,215 investment in infrastructure such as plants and 
equipment,216 research and development,217 and exports.218 In 1997, the 
assets of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies reached $3 trillion. 
212. U.S. affiliates are firms located in the United States, with investment of 10% or more by a 
single or juridical person who is a national of another country. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMIII., 
EXAMINATION OF U.S. INBOUND AND OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT, Pub. No. 3383, 4-J (2001) 
(hereinafter INBOUND AND OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT!. 
213. Unless otherwise specified, figures discussed in this paragraph are from the Organization for 
International Investment, Employment at U.S. Subsidiaries: The National Picture, available at 
http://www.ofii.org/facts_figures/national_picture.cfrn (last visited Jan. 31, 2002) (on file with author). 
These U.S. affiliates created 20,000 new jobs in 1997, with expansions of existing U.S. subsidiary 
operations adding another 149,600. On average, expansions of existing U.S. subsidiary operations have 
added I 05,000 new jobs per year over the past five years. Among the NAFT A countries alone, foreign-
owned U.S. affiliates of NAFTA partners employed 628,300 U.S. workers in 1997, a figure that 
represents 12.2% of all U.S. workers employed by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. INBOUND AND 
OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 212, at 4-8 & 4-9. 
214. In terms of reinvestment of earnings in the United States, U.S. subsidiaries of foreign 
companies have reinvested an average of35% of their earnings in the years 1991 to 1996, and 49% in 
1997. 
215. Affiliates of parent companies based in seven countries (Japan, the U.K., Germany, Canada, 
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) accounted for 82% of total 1997 sales by U.S. affiliates. 
Japan's U.S. affiliates accounted for more than one-fourth of total foreign-owned firms' sales, or 
$446.4 billion in 1997. Britain's U.S. affiliates' sales constituted $258.8 billion; Germany's were 
$194.5 billion. INBOUND AND OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 212, at 4-13 to 4-16. 
216. Figures for 1997 show that they spent $100.8 billion on plants and equipment. 
217. Figures for 1997 show expenditures of $19.7 billion devoted to research and development. 
These companies employed more than 115,700 scientists, engineers, and technicians in their U.S. 
research facilities. 
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Take as an example the automobile industry in the United States: If 
defined by reference to nationality of ownership or control, the U.S. auto-
mobile industry would be comprised of the so-called Big Three-Ford, 
General Motors, and Chrysler, although as a result of the latter's merger 
with the German-based Daimler-Benz, Chrysler could be excluded.219 But 
all relevant data demonstrate that U.S. affiliates of foreign-origin auto-
makers make significant contributions to the U.S. economy, whether in the 
areas of employment,220 investment in production facilities,221 employment 
compensation, or purchases of U.S. parts, components, and materials.222 
Even excluding Daimler-Chrysler, these U.S. affiliates of foreign-origin 
manufacturers participate substantially in the U.S. domestic economy 
through design, research and development, marketing, sales, distribution, 
and innovation through the introduction of new management techniques 
and technologies.223 
218. Figures for 1997 show that U.S. affiliates accounted for 20% of all U.S. exports. 
219. William J. Holstein, Chrysler's NeJv Identity Crisis, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 26, 
1998, at 50. This association had also expelled foreign-owned U.S. manufacturers, such as Honda, in 
1992. John Maggs, Ford and GM to Chrysler: Drop Dead, NAT'L J., Oct. 3, 1998, at 2334; David 
Mastio, Chrysler Loses Clout with Big 3 Groups, DETROIT NEWS, May 8, 1998, at B3. 
220. A 1998 study by the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute found that the 
international automobile sector in the United States made significant contributions to the U.S. domestic 
economy for 1996, creating 402,700 jobs termed "direct employment" (manufacturing and dealer 
activities) combined with spin-off employment of an additional 869,600 jobs for a total of 
approximately 1.3 million jobs in the private sector. UNIVERSITY OF MICIDGAN TRANSPORTATION 
REsEARCH INSTITUTE ET AL., THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTO SECTOR TO THE U.S. 
EcONOMY, fig.ES.l, at 14 (1998), available at http:l/www.osat.umich.edu/economic.html (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2002). 
221. The U.S. affiliates have invested $12.3 billion in their U.S. production plants since 1982. !d. 
at4. 
222. The figures for 1996 alone are an estimated $43.2 billion in employee compensation and 
purchases, \vith 58% being purchases ofU.S.-produced parts, components, and materials. !d. at 5. This 
is in stark contrast to the situation in the 1980s, when sales by the transplants in the United States 
consisted almost exclusively of imports. !d. at 3. 
223. !d. at 9-12. The continued use of ownership and control as nationality criteria has had 
unfortunate consequences in nontrade-related areas as well, for example, U.S.-funded research 
initiatives. Despite their participation in the U.S. economy, anachronistic notions of "nationality" 
e~:clude foreign-origin U.S. affiliates from the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles 
("PNGV''), a collaborative research and development program between the federal government and the 
U.S. "domestic" automobile industry, represented by the United States Council for Automotive 
Research ("USCAR"), to develop technologically advanced, low-fuel, low-emission cars. Maggs, supra 
note 219. See also United States Council for Automotive Research, http://www.uscar.org (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2002), self-described as the umbrella organization of Daimler Chrysler, Ford, and General 
Motors. Ford and GM have raised questions about Chrysler's nationality upon its merger with Daimler, 
suggesting that Chrysler should be expelled from the U.S. auto partnership. Maggs, supra note 219. 
Chrysler presents itself as having dual status: "We see ourselves as a transnational company with very, 
very strong and deep roots iu the United States and Europe, especially Germany," said Chrysler's chief 
lobbyist in the United States. Chrysler has, at least for now, been (correctly) allowed to remain. See 
Holstein, supra note 219; United States Council for Automotive Research, http://www.uscar.org. Yet, 
foreign-origin automakers, which do participate iu critical ways in the U.S. economy, continue to be 
barred. Honda, for example, as the leading U.S. automobile exporter, claims the United States as its 
largest market, where it sells more cars than in Japan. What Is a U.S. Company Hearings, supra note 
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The central point of my argument is that any company that partici-
pates substantially in the economy of any given state should be considered 
a domestic company of that state. For countries at a high level of economic 
development such as the United States, the participation that may be valued 
more may be that which furthers the development of the high-value, intel-
lectual property-oriented economy, that is, research and development 
(whereas for poorer countries, participation in the form of light or interme-
diate manufacturing and assembly may be highly valued). Supporters of 
U.S.-owned or -controlled companies incorrectly assume that only 
American companies, despite the internationalization of production and 
investment, are likely to engage in secondary activities that are beneficial 
to the U.S. economy, which is not to say that U.S. companies no longer are 
significant participants.224 Certainly if U.S.-origin companies remain sub-
stantial participants in the U.S. economy, then they should remain U.S. 
companies and enjoy the attendant benefits of corporate nationality. But 
eligibility for and standing under the applicable laws should be defined in a 
way that focuses on operational indicators such as actual participation in 
the domestic economy. Indeed, this requirement of actual participation is a 
key component of the suggested test precisely because it combines the ter-
ritorial component of the nationalist approach with the trade liberalizing 
tendency of the internationalist one. 
b. Socioeconomic Participation 
Under this part of the proposed domestic participation test, a corpora-
tion demonstrates its socioeconomic commitment to the state whose trade 
laws it hopes to enjoy through its participation in activities that contribute 
meaningfully to the developmental needs of that state. There is often an 
overlap between social and economic benefits that go toward meeting a 
state's developmental needs. Many countries, for example, have foreign 
investment laws that require the relevant authorities to evaluate the benefits 
129, at 35. The decision to exclude foreign-origin companies has also been criticized by The National 
Academy of Sciences as needlessly excluding the very companies that have done cutting-edge research 
on safety and environmental technology. Japanese automakers were the first to use multivalve engines 
and fuel injection which reduce emissions and increase mileage and power; Volvo introduced the first 
side-impact airbags; the Chevrolet/Geo Metro, made by Suzuki, was the highest-mileage car made and 
sold in the United States. Robert Manor, Driving Toward the Supercar, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, 
Sept. 18, 1994, at El; Maggs, supra note 219. In this respect, the European approach is the more 
inclusive and better one, as Ford and General Motors, for example, have been allowed to participate in 
the Eurocar research alliance. Maggs, supra note 219; Neil MacDonald & Bill Loveless, Execs Discuss 
Possible Merger of U.S., Foreign Auto Research, FED. TECH. REP., Apr. 22, 1999, at 3 (discussing 
possible collaboration among USCAR and EUCAR and Japan's JCAR projects). 
224. Indeed, Department of Commerce 1991 statistics show that U.S.-based operations account for 
75% of the $6.9 trillion in total assets held by U.S. companies and that U.S.-owned parent companies 
spend $21 on research and development in the United States for every $1000 in sales. Daniel Burton, 
Jr. et al., supra note 78, at 33. 
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of the proposed investmenf25 by reference either to the country's written 
investment laws or a discretionary "operational code."226 The relevant 
agency227 considers a whole spectrum of social and economic factors, 
including location of the proposed business, its impact on national 
culture,228 employment, training, research and development, competition in 
the domestic industry, ''new training and job opportunities," effect on the 
country's balance of payments, and the nation's ability to participate in the 
world market.229 The preference mix is likely to vary among countries and 
is likely to be made by reference to guidelines established by that country, 
either applicable across the board, or applicable to particular industries as 
determined by the country.230 
Different states at different levels of development and with different 
national value systems will have different socioeconomic priorities. As is 
already the case in practice in the area of investment, it is up to the desig-
nated authorities in those states to make the necessary evaluations. There 
are no bright-line rules that will dictate the outcome of competing values, 
policy considerations, and potential tradeoffs.231 A nuclear power plant may 
be less valuable to one state than an oil-drilling project, and the construc-
tion of bridges may be less important than a project designed to transform 
salt water into fresh water. Similarly, a foreign joint venture that employs 
12,000 people has more value than just the payment of wages if the venture 
is in a small country that suffers from high unemployment and surplus rural 
labor. Conversely, the project's value in social terms would probably be 
225. FoLSOM ET AL., supra note 172, at 776-81. These authorities with investment review power 
make determinations on a case-by-case basis. The decisions are made by reference to the written law 
and also by reference to unwritten understandings of what type of investment is particularly beneficial 
to the economic development of the country. Foreign investment review is not limited to developing 
countries. Canada, for example, has had a series of laws to review foreign investment. A Canadian 
Foreign Investment Review Agency was created to determine whether investment will benefit Canada 
and whether the investment \vill have certain effects on ''productivity, efficiency, innovation, 
technological development, competition, culture and rule in world markets." Id. at 780. To encourage 
investment, the current Investment Canada Act has raised the threshold, in dollar terms, of acquisitions 
that would trigger review. !d. at 780-81. 
226. ld. at 785. 
227. See supra note 211. 
228. Canada, for example, reserves the explicit right to review foreign investment in certain 
designated cultural industries. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 172, at 780 n.4. 
229. !d. at 780. 
230. The evaluation of participation should allow reassessment by the country should a company's 
participation significantly change, either annually or biannually. The frequency with which this is 
accomplished would depend on how often the individual country already collects relevant data. 
231. One might predict that certain developing countries that place a greater value on economic 
development than other values would favor the construction of new plants in their territories even if this 
may cause environmental problems. China, for example, has forged ahead with the construction of the 
Three Gorges Dam despite widespread international concern that the dam would inflict serious damage 
to the surronnding region and to the living creatures in the Yangtze River. Andrea Wang, China's 
Energy Policy and Competing International Environmental Pressures, 2000 COLO. J.INT'L ENVTL. L. 
& PoL'Y 271,277-78 (2000). 
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small compared to its economic benefits if it were undertaken in a devel-
oped country such as the United States during a period of relatively high 
employment. 
The socioeconomic component of a company's participation will be 
evaluated "subjectively," by reference to the particular national or democ-
ratic framework that informs public decision making, but this evaluation 
will also be performed in conjunction with more "objective" criteria.232 As 
discussed above, the geographic location of a corporation's operational or 
principal assets is an important indicator of whether or not a corporation 
meets the "substantial" participation test. In making a determination of 
corporate nationality, a state may opt to give greater weight to a company's 
participation that is likely to be "locked in" a state's territory, investment 
with "sunk costs,"233 than participation that is likely to be transient. Such 
"locked-in" types of participation include investment in immobile industry-
specific assets such as automobile manufacturing and production facilities 
that are more difficult or costly for the investor to abandon, relocate, or 
convert to other use; investment in firm-specific assets such as the devel-
opment of brand-name products, which requires long-term investment 
before brand-name recognition is achieved;234 large-scale investment in 
industries with low profit margins; investment in operational facilities and 
equipment with long life spans rather than those that quickly become obso-
lete;235 and investment in facilities that require specialized, high-skill work-
ers available in only select markets, as opposed to investment in simple 
assembly operations that are easier to duplicate and require widely avail-
able low-skill, low-wage workersY6 In summary, to the extent that 
"locked-in" investment is an important consideration in determining 
232. Generally speaking, the objective factors to be included in the proposed domestic 
participation test are already considered in the United States by the International Trade Commission 
("ITC"), and the economic data needed to make a determination of a company's domestic participation 
would already be available. See In re Certain Airtight Cast Iron Stoves, U.S.ITC Pub. 1126, Inv. No. 
337-TA-69 (Dec. 1980) (finding that U.S. subsidiary of a Norwegian stove manufacturer was an 
industry in the United States for purposes of eligibility to press certain trade claims, because the ITC 
determined that the company's U.S. activities consisted of testing, repairing the imported stoves, 
shipping, servicing, and advertising); In re Certain Miniature, Battery Operated, All Terrain, Wheeled 
Vehicles, USITC Pub. No. 1300, Inv. No. 337-TA-122 (Oct. 1982) (establishing that limited quality-
control and packaging activities, sales, and promotional activities, such as distribution and advertising, 
were not sufficient to make the company a member of the domestic industry entitled to certain domestic 
trade protection); Heavyweight Motorcycles and Engines and Power Train Subassemblies Therefore, 
USITC Pub. 1342, Inv. No. TA-201-47 (Feb. 1983) (finding that in a Section 20I action U.S.-based 
subsidiaries of Japanese motorcycle producers, Honda and Kawasaki, were domestic producers of 
heavy weight motorcycles because economic data showed that a substantial portion of the value of their 
motorcycles produced in Japan was added in the U.S). 
233. RobertS. Pindyck, Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment, 29 J. EcoN. LIT. 1110, Jill 
(1991). 
234. !d. 
235. MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 140, at 24. 
236. Gereffi, supra note 139, at 84. 
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corporate nationality for certain trade and investment benefits, it is a factor 
that may be evaluated in terms of dollars and factored into the total deter-
mination. 237 
2. Step Two: The Participation Offset Right 
Under step one, the domestic participation test is applied to resolve 
the issue of corporate nationality. If a company is not considered domestic 
under step one, it is "economically foreign," thus subjecting its imports (if 
any) to all trade-protective measures applicable under the current trade 
laws.238 If, however, a company qualifies as domestic under step one, like 
all domestic companies under current law, it would have standing to invoke 
the benefits afforded by existing trade laws. Additionally, and especially 
significant to the balance this proposal aims to strike between nationalist 
impulses and internationalist ambitions, the domestic company would be 
granted a participation offset right: it would have the right, not available 
under any current U.S. trade laws, to offset any tariffs or charges it owes (if 
it imports) against the participation it has invested in the domestic econ-
omy, if its participation outweighs the amount of tariffs owed. 
Under the offset right, the company may have the following types of 
duties offset. The domestic government would waive any import duties 
such as tariffs that the company would owe under current rules-of-origin 
laws239 if it imports certain products into the United States-if the amount 
owed is less than the amount it contributes under the first part of the socio-
economic participation test. If the company is also involved in other 
importing activities that are subject to additional tariffs or charges pursuant 
237. There is growing acceptance of the notion that a corporation's nationality should be made by 
reference to the company's participation in the United States, rather than the nationality of its owners or 
the place of incorporation, at least in the area of high-technology initiatives. In the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1994), Congress included statutory guidelines on companies 
eligible to participate in cooperative R&D agreements ("CRADAS") established and referred to in the 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, IS U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1994). As amended, 
the relevant CRADA provisions provide that eligible participants are companies "located in the United 
States which agree that products ... made under the ... agreement ... will be manufactured 
substantially in the United States .... " 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(c)(4)(B) (1994). There is also a provision 
requiring that firms "subject to the control of a foreign company" be excluded from CRADA if their 
home countries do not offer reciprocal opportunities to U.S. persons. Id. See also William H. Lash, ill, 
The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. lOll, 
1020 (1996). For a critique of the control criterion, see supra notes 190-98. For a critique of these 
programs, see Mark A. Warner & Alan M. Rugman, Competitiveness: An Emerging Strategy of 
Discrimination in U.S. Antitrust and R&D Policy?, 25 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 945 (1994). 
238. To use the United States as an example, if the company imports merchandise that is deemed 
to have violated the antidumping laws, it would pay a dumping duty, as currently required; or if the 
company imports merchandise into the United States at such increased quantities that the imports cause 
serious injury to domestic industry producing like products, increased import duties or quotas pursuant 
to Section 201 could be imposed to provide relief. 
239. See infra notes 242-48 for a discussion of mles used to determine the national origin of a 
product. In Part ill.B, I propose a way to rethink rules of origin. 
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to Section 201,240 or any activities that are deemed in violation of the 
antidumping laws or other trade laws,241 it may offset these additional 
amounts, again, to the extent of the value of its domestic participation. 
As a general matter, the amount assessed on an imported product, 
either as normal import duties or as a result of a Section 201, antidumping, 
or other trade proceeding, currently depends partly on its country of origin. 
In the United States, imports are subject to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
of the United States/42 which consists of a complex set of tariff rates 
depending on the type and value of imported goods and the origin of the 
goods. Imports may be subject to either the preferential rules of origin or 
general, nonpreferential rules of origin. Preferential rules of origin 
240. Where a U.S. company conducts assembly, manufacturing, or partial manufacturing of 
certain products outside the United States and then imports those products into the United States, 
several issues need to be assessed. For example, will those products that are considered imports for 
customs purposes also be considered imports for other purposes, such as under a Section 20 I 
investigation? See supra note 202. See generally Certain Cameras, USITC Pub. 2315, Inv. No. 
TA-201-62 (Sept. 1990). In the Certain Cameras case, in an action by petitioner Keystone Camera 
Company asserting that increased imports of certain cameras was a substantial cause of serious injury 
to the domestic industry, the lTC found that imports were not a substantial cause of injury. In the 
process, the lTC had to determine whether or not to include within the domestic industry Kodak's 
production facilities of (I) 110 camera parts that are exported to Mexico for assembly and (2) its 35 
mm camera parts exported to Mexico and Brazil. Kodak opposed Keystone's petition, asserting that 
increased imports of certain cameras are not seriously injuring domestic industry and also that all of its 
U.S. camera production activity should be included with the domestic industry, even if the camera is 
partially manufactured and assembled abroad. 
The lTC unanimously concluded that domestic production facilities relating to the 35 mm camera 
parts should not be included within the domestic industry manufacturing cameras because the foreign 
value added abroad is too significant. However, with respect to Kodak's II 0 camera parts that are 
exported to Mexico for assembly, the lTC was divided. Two commissioners found that Kodak engages 
in sufficient domestic production activity relating to these II 0 cameras and that the cameras should 
thus be viewed as domestic articles. By contrast, two other commissioners classified Kodak's imported 
II 0 cameras from Mexico as imports and not as domestic products. 
The point is that products manufactured or assembled outside the United States by U.S. firms 
might not be considered domestic articles by the lTC, in which case, they would be deemed imports 
causing serious injury to the domestic industry and subject to additional Section 20 I adjustment relief 
such as increased tariffs beyond the bound tariff concessions. Under the participation offset right, if a 
company first qualifies as domestic under the substantial and direct participation test, its imports could 
be exempt from such additional tariffs imposed by the lTC. 
241. For example, the same issue regarding whether to treat certain products as domestic or 
imported, either because they contained significant foreign content or because they were manufactured 
or assembled outside the United States, also arises in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. In 
Certain Radio Paging and Alerting Receiving Devices from Japan, USITC Pub. 1410, Inv. No. 
731-TA-102, (Aug. 1983), the lTC determined that the pagers at issue, though assembled abroad and 
containing foreign parts, should be considered part of domestic production because there was a 
significant percentage of domestic value added and because the domestic activities in the United States 
involved a high level of technical expertise and capital investment. As domestic articles and not 
imports, these pagers would not be subject to antidumping duties. If, however, a product were deemed 
an import and subject to the imposition of antidumping duties, the duties would, under my proposal, be 
eligible for the participation offset right if the company at issue were deemed a domestic company 
under the proposed domestic participation test. 
242. Enacted by Subtitle B of Title I of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. See 
infra note 277. 
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determine whether imports qualify for duty-free treatment under a recipro-
cal free trade agreement or other preferential arrangements.243 General or 
nonpreferential rules of origin are used to determine a product's country of 
origin for purposes other than the granting of tariff preferences, such as the 
application of duty rates to imports, antidumping or countervailing duties, 
country-of-origin marking,244 or the implementation of country-specific 
quotas and voluntary export restraints.245 
Nonpreferential rules of origin are simple if complete production 
takes place in one country.246 But in other cases where materials, manufac-
turing, or assembly do not originate in one country, U.S. law looks to see 
where a "substantial transformation" of the materials into the fmished 
product occurs, so that, as a result of a manufacturing process, a new and 
different article, having a distinctive name, character, or use, emerges.247 
The substantial transformation test is used to confer origin for U.S. tariff 
purposes on the country where the substantial transformation takes place if 
nonpreferential, rather than preferential, rules of origin are involved.248 
If an item is deemed the origin of a WTO-member country, it would 
be subject to the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") tariff rate negotiated for 
that product. An item made in a non-WTO country would be subject to 
non-MFN tariffs, under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1929, which is 
prohibitively higher than MFN. If it is deemed the origin of a country with 
which the importing country has a preferential agreement, it would be sub-
243. Examples of preferential schemes include NAFTA, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701-2706 (1994), the Andean Group preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1994), and other 
nonreciprocal systems that accord preferential access to the U.S. market, such as those afforded to 
developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1994). 
244. Article IX of GA 'IT sets forth rules about country of origin marking requirements. One of the 
objectives of marking requirements is to inform the ultimate purchaser of the origin of the article he or 
she intends to purchase. See United States v. Ury, I 06 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1939). 
245. N. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction? A Commentary on a New Fonn 
of Protectionism. II FORDHAM lNT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1987). 
246. See 19 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(B) (1994). Products that fall in this category are the easy cases and 
include the following: live animals born and raised in a country, fish caught in a country's rivers or 
within its exclusive economic zone or caught on the high seas from a country's ships, products made 
from such animals and fish, plant and plant products grown in one country, mineral goods extracted 
from its territory, and manufactured goods where all the parts are produced in one country. See Gantz, 
supra note 172, at 378. 
247. 19 C.F.R. § 10.14(b) (2001). For a critique of the "substantial transformation" test as applied, 
see infra notes 270-310. 
248. Free trade agreements have their own preferential rules of origin. NAFTA, for example, has 
its own highly restrictive preferential rules of origin designed "to benefit regional producers of fmished 
goods by encouraging manufacturers, particularly in Mexico, to go beyond serving as staging grounds 
for final production and assembly and into the manufacture of major parts and components anywhere in 
the North American region." Gantz, supra note 246, at 376. NAFTA adopts what is called a tariff shift 
rule in cases where all parts are not obtained in the region. When a change in tariff category occurs, the 
country where that shift takes place is the country of origin. NAFTA, supra note 172, art. 401, 32 
I.L.M. at 397. The NAFTA tariff shift rule is not very different from the substantial transformation 
approach because "under the Harmonized Tariff System, a change in tariff classification usually 
ret1ects a manufacturing process that causes the shift in tariff category." Gantz, supra note 246, at 381. 
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ject to that applicable, better-than-MFN preferential rate. However, as 
noted, WTO member countries are allowed to suspend MFN tariff conces-
sions and impose higher tariff rates under specified conditions if, for 
instance, increased quantities of imports threaten or cause serious injury to 
a domestic industry under Section 20 I or if "unfair" trade acts, such as 
dumping, cause material injury to a domestic industry. 
Under the proposed participation offset right, whatever duties or 
charges a company's imports are subject to249 as described above-whether 
under the rules of origin, import relief or unfair trade actions-are still 
"owed," except that the cumulative amounts may be offset against the 
company's domestic participation (if any), provided that the value of 
domestic participation exceeds the amounts owed. Assume that a company 
is domestic under the domestic participation test. Assume also that the 
corporate participation is calculated to be worth $100.250 The company 
could be issued a participation certificate with a face value of $100. The 
participation certificate would function essentially as a "free pass," 
allowing this domestic company to be exempt from payment of all tariffs 
or duties, up to the value of its participation certificate. 251 Assume further 
that the corporation also imports a line of component parts from Germany, 
and in accordance with the U.S. rules of origin, the company owes $30 in 
MFN-rate tariffs. In a separate antidumping proceeding brought against it, 
the company is found to have sold its imports into the United States at less 
than fair value by $20. The company would therefore owe a total of $50. 
However, because it has been deemed a domestic company under the 
domestic participation test, giving it the "participation offset" right, it in 
fact will have to pay nothing because its participation valued at $100 
exceeds the $50 owed. If, however, the company owed an additional $60 
because of a separate Section 201 action which caused its imported goods 
to be dutiable at the higher non-MFN rates, it would have to pay $10. 
249. An anciJlary issue that needs to be addressed is whether or not there has to be a connection 
between the first step (the corporation's domestic participation) and the second step of the test (the 
corporation's imports against which it claims a "participation offset" right). In other words, must the 
imports at issue be related or connected to the company's current area of business participation? The 
answer should be no. Given the complex world of modern businesses, many of which produce or 
participate in the production of an ever-expanding line of products, and given the desire of companies 
to expand into new areas and new product Jines, plus the necessity of making these decisions with ail 
necessary speed, the requirement of a connection would be outdated. Thus, it would be in the state's 
interest to allow the company to select the particular imports that the company chooses to weigh against 
its own "net total" participation. 
250. See supra note 232 (discussing the ITC's reliance on existing economic data to determine 
"domestic industry"). 
251. A paralJel might be made between my proposal to give domestic companies a free pass 
exempting them from ali tariff payments up to the value of their participation and the practice adopted 
by many countries to exempt certain imports or investments (usualJy technology or high-technology 
products or sectors) from import taxes. See Zhaodong Jiang, China's Tax Preferences to Foreign 
Investment: Policy, Culture and Modern Concepts, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 549,609 (1998). 
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Faced with this scenario, a company may lower its expenditures to 
make up for the higher cost. For instance, it could cut its labor force in the 
United States, substitute higher paid employees with lower paid ones, or 
freeze its planned business expansion. If the cost of doing business is 
greater than the benefit received, the company may also opt to relocate. 
Alternatively, the company could avoid the added charge altogether. It 
could increase its domestic participation (which would further the aim 
endorsed in this Article of "localizing'' global companies and promoting 
the needs of the local without opposing the global) or give up importing 
and use local products as substitutes. In other words, the company would 
have the option of deciding whether or not to continue importing, perhaps 
because the imported products are indispensable, or substitute local prod-
ucts instead. Equally important, it could also act to lower the tariffs owed 
on its imports by taking advantage of the no-duty-GSP252 preferential pro-
gram and importing products from a GSP-eligible country which would 
enter the United States duty free. The GSP statute "represents the United 
States' participation in a multinational effort to encourage industrialization 
in lesser developed countries through international trade."253 To the extent 
that a company conducts its operations in a beneficiary developing country 
in ways that would meet certain minimum content requirements254 to qual-
ify for duty-free treatment, it would lower its own operational costs as well 
as further the policy of the United States to foster economic development 
in those countries. 
The domestic participation test and the "participation offsef' right 
strike the right balance between the national and the international because 
they encourage companies that may otherwise be even more globally 
mobile in orientation to increase their participation in a particular country's 
domestic economy. The proposed test, in essence, allows legitimate 
national interests to be brought back into the equation without succumbing 
to economic nationalism. 255 
252. Under international and U.S. trade rules, the generalized system of preferences ("GSP") 
allows rich countries to admit products from certain qualified poorer countries at a lower-than-MFN 
rate, without requiring reciprocity from the poor countries. MicHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RoBERT 
HoWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 22 (2d ed. 1999); see also supra note 243. 
253. Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
254. 19 U.S.C. § 2463(2)(A)(ii) provides that duty free treatment is applicable: 
If the sum of (1) the cost or value of the materials produced in the beneficiary developing 
country ... plus (II) the direct costs of processing operations performed in such beneficiary 
developing country ... is not less than 35 percent of the appraised value of such article at the 
time it is entered [in the customs territory of the United States]. 
Jd.; see also Torrington Co., 764 F.2d at 1565. 
255. Only companies that qualify as domestic under the domestic participation test may exercise 
the participation offset right. This means that qualified domestic companies that import products may 
not have to pay duties on their imports. Foreign companies that import the same products would. Some 
interesting issues may be raised by this proposal. First, is there a national treatment problem under the 
GATT, Article III? General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, T.l.A.S. No. 
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1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. This agreement was incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 through the creation of the WTO at the Uruguay Round of Negotiations that ended in 1994. 
See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143. This is unlikely, because the proposal does not raise any issues of 
discrimination against imported goods in favor of like domestic goods. There is nothing in the proposal 
that suggests using internal taxes, internal charges, laws, regulations, and requirements in a way that 
would favor domestic products over imported products. /d. There is no inter-product competition issue 
raised by the proposal in any way. In fact, the proposal would treat imports the same as like domestic 
products, as required by the national treatment clause in Article III, and it would treat imports from one 
country similarly as like imports from another country, so that any advantage granted by any 
contracting party to any product of one country would be granted to the like product of other 
contracting parties, as required by the most favored nation clause in GATT Article I. !d., art. I. The 
differential treatment is not between imported products versus like domestic products, but domestic 
versus foreign companies. This differential should be normatively defensible, however, because the 
concept of nationality under the proposed test is inclusive and broad-any company, even those 
deemed foreign-origin under current tests, is eligible to be a national of a country if it participates 
substantially in that country's economy. 
Consider the following example. Canadian Car Company ("CCC") makes wire mesh for air bags in 
its facilities in Michigan and Toronto. It imports French Steel Rods into both Canada and the United 
States (assume that neither NAFTA nor the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is implicated). CCC 
Toronto might or might not be a national of Canada under the proposal; it could be if it meets the 
domestic participation test (but not if its connection to Canada is merely that it was incorporated there). 
Similarly, CCC Michigan might or might not be a national ofthe United States under the proposal. For 
this example, assume that CCC Canada is a national of Canada, and CCC Michigan a national of the 
United States. CCC Michigan would be able to offset duties for the French Steel Rods if the amount 
owed is less than the value of its participation in the United States. So would CCC Toronto be able to 
offset duties for French Steel Rods if the amount owed is less than the value of its participation in 
Canada, assuming Canada adopts the domestic participation test and offset right proposed here. The 
proposal contemplates adoption of the domestic participation test and offset right not just by one 
country, the United States, but multilaterally, as a test for determining corporate nationality that is more 
in keeping with the developments posed by globalization. 
Second, does the participation offset implicate GATT rules on subsidies? Subsidies are for the frrst 
time defined in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english!docs_ellegal_e/final_e.htrn (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies]. The offset might coneeivably be deemed a subsidy under Article l.l(ii}-
"govemment revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected." The other definitions in 
Article 1.1, for example, financial contribution by government or any public body where the 
government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (grants, loans, equity infusion, or loan 
guarantees) would not be applicable. But even if the offset is deemed a subsidy, it would not be a 
prohibited subsidy under Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies because the offset is not contingent 
in law or in fact on export performance or on the use of domestic over imported goods. The offset 
might be an actionable subsidy if it is deemed a specific form of government assistance to firms or 
industries as defined in Article 2, for example, whether the granting authority "explicitly limits access 
to a subsidy to certain enterprises," and if it causes injury to the domestic industry of another country, 
nullification or impairment of benefits to another country, or serious prejudice to the interests of 
another country. /d. at art 2.1 (a), art. 5. 
Because the offset right is available only to domestic enterprises, one could argue that it might be 
considered a specific subsidy granted only to certain enterprises. However, as noted above, the very 
concept of nationality proposed in this Article is designed to broaden the traditional tests of nationality 
to be more inclusive. Thus, although the offset right is available only to domestic enterprises, under the 
new test, any company, regardless of its place of incorporation, seat of management, or nationality of 
shareholders, may be deemed a domestic enterprise. Given this broad and general reconceptualization 
of the "nationality" standard, the offset right should in fact not be regarded as a specific subsidy. 
Indeed, this Article suggests that, to the extent that many of the concerns expressed in the GATT were 
rooted in an old framework of "nationality," that is, "domestic" versus "foreign," they may no longer 
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There are a few other observations to be made. Although the test is 
formulated to adapt notions of nationality to a world in which corporations 
and products are genuinely international, its analysis does continue to work 
from a premise that nationality remains consequential-at least as reflected 
in certain trade provisions such as the antidumping law and other laws dis-
cussed above. I have argued elsewhere against the antidumping laws as a 
vestige of protectionism incorrectly premised on the assumption that pro-
tecting domestic firms from acts of foreign firms is a prerequisite to pro-
tecting the health of the national economy.256 Certainly, in a world of 
perfect free trade, antidumping laws and tariffs derived from rules of origin 
in general should be increasingly less significant. And certainly, corporate 
nationality and product identity among different countries may at some 
point be as relevant as they are among the states within the United States, 
that is, not much at all. In fact, one possible outcome of the increased own-
ership of domestically based facilities by affiliates of foreign companies as 
well as the increased reliance of domestic companies on foreign production 
and foreign outsourcing may be to discourage domestic companies from 
initiating antidumping proceedings against foreign producers with whom 
they have a preexisting relationship through equity holding or contractual 
dealings.257 
We have already seen some instances of such conduct. For example, 
when Ceramic Process Systems Corporation of Massachusetts, a U.S. 
company that manufactures ceramic parts for computer and advanced 
weapons systems, petitioned the Commerce Department for trade protec-
tive measures against Kyocera, a Japanese company that dominates the 
industry, it was successfully opposed by established players of U.S. indus-
try, such as the American Semiconductor Industry Association, I.B.M., and 
the Aerospace Industries Association, either because they were eager to 
avert a trade conflict or because they had their own significant relationship 
with the Japanese company.258 From 1989 to 1991, plans by the Bush 
administration to impose tariffs on displays for laptop computers had to be 
dropped after encountering opposition from Apple Computer and other 
U.S. customers that relied on Japanese parts for their products.259 Similarly, 
Toyota Motor Corporation used its 119 American suppliers as leverage to 
oppose import quotas or higher tariffs on minivans, urging the U.S. suppli-
be applicable in the same way, should the "nationality'' framework be expanded in the direction 1 am 
proposing. 
256. Cao, supra note 206, at 219-22. 
257. See, e.g., 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 1582 
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) ("Because of the many industries that are characterized by significant 
foreign ownership, it is quite common in the U.S. for trade associations to be unable to muster 
authorization for the filing of antidumping petitions.''). 
258. Stephen Engelberg & Martin Tolchin, Foreigners Find New Ally in U.S. Industry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993, at AI. 
259. Id 
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ers to engage in a concerted letter-writing campaign expressing disapproval 
of the Clinton Administration's plan to engage in protective measures 
against Japanese automakers.260 
Thus, as a practical matter, the modem realities of international inter-
dependence may mean that trade protective laws for "domestic" companies 
seeking relief from import competition will become less used and less use-
ful. Nonetheless, assuming that there are still laws within the WTO that 
work from a distinction between the "home" and the "foreign," the pro-
posal is designed to encourage individual countries within the existing trad-
ing system to accommodate, through their trade laws, both their nationalist 
and internationalist ambitions. 
B. Reforming Product Nationality: A New Rule of Origin Framework 
Unless the international trade system eliminates rules of origin alto-
gether, they remain relevant under current law61 and under the proposed 
domestic participation test and its offset right. But there are real problems 
with rules of origin as currently understood. First, as detailed in Part II, the 
distinction between domestic and foreign products is no longer clear, mak-
ing a rule-of-origin application increasingly indeterminate, arbitrary, and so 
complex that it is difficult to meet.262 The erosion of sovereignty calls into 
question: 
260. /d. 
261. See generally Silveira, supra note 172, at 463 n.3, 473. Rules of origin are needed for 
preferential and nonpreferential trade purposes. Rules of origin determine which products from which 
countries may benefit from preferential trade agreements. They also further nonpreferential goals such 
as the determination of the appropriate tariff rates to be applied for Customs purposes as well as for 
general statistical purposes and the identification of the relevant products where antidumping or 
countervailing duties have been imposed. See also WTO Rules of Origin art.!(!) to 1(2), supra note 
205. 
262. The European Community (the "EC") has its own rules of origin, some of which are designed 
to grant EC preferences to certain beneficiary countries by requiring certain conditions to be met before 
preferences are granted. For example, the Fourth Lome Convention between the EC and the so-called 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States ("ACP") require the following rules of origin before EC 
preferences for ACP fishery products can be granted: 
canning does not confer origin; to have origin of the ACP States the fish must be "taken from 
the sea by their vessels"; to qualifY as "their" (i.e. ACP) vessels, vessels must be registered in 
an ACP State (or an EC Member State), sail under the flag of an ACP State (or an EC 
Member State), must be owned at least 50 percent by nationals of an ACP State (or of an EC 
Member State) or by a company that has its head office in one of these states, of which the 
manager or managers, chairman of the board of directors or the supervisory board, and the 
majority of the members of such boards are nationals of an ACP State (or of an EC Member 
State) and of which, in addition, in the case of partnerships or limited companies, at least half 
the capital belongs to ACP States (or to EC Member States) or to public bodies or nationals 
of such states, and of which at least 50 percent of the crew, master and officers, are nationals 
of ACP States (or of an EC Member State). 
Jacques H. J. Bourgeois, Rules of Origin: An Introduction, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE, supra note 124, at 3. 
Besides being unnecessarily complicated, those origin rules are also too stringent for beneficiary 
countries to meet. Additionally, as has been noted, "[i]f these rules of origin are designed to encourage 
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a central notion of GATT: that all merchandise has a single 
nationality. Whether dealing with tariff bindings or "unfair trade" 
remedies, GATT rules assume (without defmition or explanation) 
that all imports into a country have an objectively certain single 
national source. But the identification of this national origin is 
often difficult and arbitrary.263 
469 
Second, these highly complex rules and the equally complex customs regu-
lations implementing them may also be a form of nontariff barrier imped-
ing duty-free trade.264 Third, there are questions about their relevance to 
consumers in today's global economy. For example, currently, under 
Section 301 of the Tariff Act of 1930, "every article of foreign origin" or 
its container must be appropriately marked to inform the ''ultimate 
purchaser"265 in the United States of its country of origin. 266 Yet, in today' s 
global economy, one could question whether or not the premise of the 
marking statute is still relevant. Do consumers care about country-of-origin 
labels or about brand? Setting aside the special scenario of boycotting 
products from countries that tolerate practices that are contrary to one's 
own sense of ethics, consumers in most other cases are less likely to care 
that Nike shoes are made in one country versus another and more likely to 
be concerned with whether or not the Nike shoes they own are authentic or 
fake.267 Fourth, the current "substantial transformation" rule, designed spe-
cifically to aid in the determination of the nationality of a product that is 
made of parts from many countries, is unsuited for the current postindus-
trial, global economy. And fifth, as I develop further below, current rules 
also exacerbate the distributional gap that globalization may impose on 
poor countries and lesser-skilled workers in rich countries. 
the ACP countries into developing a fishing and fish processing industry entirely of their own, it is 
difficult to understand why fishing vessels may be owned by EC nationals or by EC companies." /d. 
263. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 231. 
264. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S.-CANADA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT 28-31 (GAO/GGD-93-21, 1992). 
265. Who is an "ultimate purchaser" is also a contestable issue. See, e.g., Pabrini, Inc. v. United 
States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 128 (1986); National Juice Products Ass'n v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 
48, 57-58 (1986). Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994), requires that all 
imported merchandise be marked in a manner "conspicuous" to the "ultimate purchaser." An ultimate 
purchaser is defined in Customs regulations as "the last person in the United States who will receive the 
article in the form in which it was imported." 19 C.F.R. § 134.1 (WESTLA W through Sept. 4, 2001). 
266. Presumably, "the primary purpose of the country-of-origin marking statute is to 'mark the 
goods so that at the time of purchase the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where the goods were 
produced, be able to buy or refuse to buy them, if such marking should influence his will.' (Congress, 
of course, had in mind a consumer preference for American made goods.)" National Juice Products 
Ass 'n, I 0 Ct. Int'l Trade at 58 n.I 4 (citation omitted). 
267. See generally RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 397 (1996). On a related note, 
assuming that consumers do care about the country of origin of a product, current marking rules may 
not truly reflect the origin of a product because a product is comprised of global composites. The 
marking statute, in today's global economy, may have the effect of deceiving the very consumers it is 
supposed to inform. 
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As a result, questions have been raised about whether it is possible to 
retain rules of origin. 
In addition, with investment flows now growing at a far greater rate 
than trade flows, the question arises to what extent it will be 
practical to define the origin of goods. Furthermore, it might be 
questionable whether it will be of any value to do so, with growing 
multicountry production and the largest producers becoming 
international corporations through acquisitions as well as the 
increasing establishment of transplant factories.268 
However, to the extent that rules of origin remain a part of the international 
economic system,269 I propose that they be reexamined in light of the 
global economy. 
The "substantial transformation" test that is the core of rules of origin 
laws must be reevaluated.270 The test might once have been suitable for a 
nationally based industrial economic system, but is now obsolete and too 
narrow for a postnational, postindustrial economic system. There are two 
primary problems with its continuing application to the current trading sys-
tem. First, the test is unable to capture the full and complex range of eco-
nomic activities undertaken by skilled and lesser-skilled workers in rich 
and poor countries. Second, the test consequently has a detrimental impact 
on and is unresponsive to the needs of workers at the lower end of the 
skills spectrum. 
The proposal for revision starts with a reexamination of the current 
"substantial transformation" test used in nonpreferential rules-of-origin 
determinations.271 Under the "substantial transformation" test, if imported 
merchandise is produced in two or more countries, its country of origin is 
the country where the last "substantial transformation" occurred. The 
United States, for example, could "domesticate" an imported product, that 
is, transform it from an "article of foreign origin" into a domestic-origin 
product if it is "used in the manufacture in the United States of a new 
268. Kingston, supra note 124, at 24. 
269. Ru1es of origin remain part of the national trade laws of many countries and the Agreement 
on Ru1es of Origin is a part ofWTO. See supra note 205. 
270. Note that the test is retained in the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin Article 9(b): 
[R Jules of origin should provide for the country to be determined as the origin of a particu1ar 
good to be either the country where the good has been wholly obtained or, when more than 
one country is concerned in the production of the good, the country where the last substantial 
transformation has been carried out. 
WTO Rules of Origin, supra note 205. For a discussion of how the application of the substantial 
transformation test by U.S. Customs Service and U.S. courts has been "fraught with subjectivity and 
unpredictability," see Mark R. Sandstrom, Rules of Origin: Considerations for Investment and Trade 
in North America, 16 ARIZ. J.lNT'L & CoMP. L. 217,219 (1999). 
271. Although 1 focus for the most part on the "substantial transformation" test used in 
nonpreferential rules-of-origin inquiries, my critique is equally applicable to the other tests employed in 
the preferential rules-of-origin context. 
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article having a new name, character, and use."272 The Supreme Court, in a 
later case, noted that "[ m ]anufacture implies a change, but every change is 
not manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of 
treatment, labor and manipulation. But something more is necessary .... 
There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge, 
'having a distinctive name, character or use."'273 The Court's language 
suggests an emphasis on "manufacture" and a resulting "transformation" in 
the United States of the imported item. Subsequent lower court cases have 
been more restrictive, requiring "substantial transformation" plus explicit 
"substantial manufacturing."274 
Thus, although the question of"[ w ]bether a substantial transformation 
bas occurred bas depended historically upon the nature of the article 
emerging from a particular process ... and not on the nature of the process 
itself,"275 the underlying process is a crucial factor in a substantial trans-
formation inquiry. Processing or manufacturing is generally considered to 
be the activity that produces the requisite substantial transformation.276 The 
272. United States v. Gibson-Thomson Co., 27 C.C.P.A. 267,273 (1940). 
273. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1907); see also Silveira, 
supra note 172, at 415. The basic issue is "whether the 'change' (manufacturing or processing) is of 
such a substantial nature to justify the conclusion that the article is a product of the country where such 
change took place." Jd. at 416. A change in "name," for example, from "fresh broccoli" to "frozen 
broccoli" might not confer origin, whereas a change in name from "peanuts" to "peanut butter" may. ld. 
A change in the "character'' of a product usually involves a change in its chemical composition. Mere 
"finishing" processes such as painting, cleaning, or polishing, may not be a sufficient change in the 
product's character. A change in "use" may occur "if the process of manufacturing transforms the 
product from one that is suitable for one use to one applicable for another use or for multiple uses," 
Silveira, supra note 172, at 415, for example, a change from a producer to a consumer good. Jd at 416; 
see also Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of Origin and the Uruguay Round's Effectiveness in Harmonizing 
and Regulating Them, 90 AM. J.lNT'L L. 625, 629 (1996). 
274. Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1026, 1029-30 (1982) (finding that footwear 
uppers, essentially complete shoes without soles, were not substantially transformed by the addition of 
out soles because the uppers underwent no physical change and because the process of attaching the out 
soles was less time consuming and costly than that of producing the uppers). In 1985, the Treasury 
Department issued regulations requiring that "[a] textile or textile product will be considered to have 
undergone a substantial transformation if it has been transformed by means of substantial 
manufacturing or processing operations into a new and different article of commerce." 19 C.F.R. 
§ 12.130(b). 
275. Palmeter, supra note 245, at 24. 
276. See Midwood Indus., Inc. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 499, 507 (1970) (finding that "the 
end result of the manufacturing processes to which the imported articles are subjected .. .is the 
transformation of such imported articles into different articles having a new name, character and use"); 
see also Palmeter, supra note 245, at 25-26 (describing the decision in Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States 
by the Court of International Trade, 542 F. Supp. 1026 (1982)), supra note 274, as "providing the 
rationale for a new and more restrictive test: 'substantial transformation' plus 'substantial 
manufacturing."' Palmeter, supra note 245, at 25; Mark Loftin, Flavell v. Canada: Rethinking 
Canada's Domestic Import Tariff Policy, 6 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 385, 403 (1999) ("'Substantial 
transformation' occurs when, as a result of manufacturing processes, a new and different article 
emerges ... which is different from that originally possessed by the articles or material before being 
subject to the manufacturing process."). 
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major trading countries, the United States included, use three criteria to 
determine whether a substantial transformation has occurred: change in 
tariff heading,277 processing,278 and value-added operations.279 All three 
criteria are themselves linked in turn to an inquiry into the underlying 
manufacturing or processing operations.280 As a policy matter, the 
"substantial transformation" test is designed to cause importers to perform 
value-added activities in the country where the activities are to be per-
formed, to take an act of "manufacturing" or processing in that country of 
In many ways, the emphasis on manufacturing may be viewed as a proxy for some other 
concern: that the origin-conferring activity involves a process that requires a certain degree of skill, a 
certain amount of time to complete, and is not too simple. See infra notes 286-94 for a discussion of 
how the WTO Technical Committee on Rules of Origin attempts to address these concerns. See also 
infra note 285. 
277. The "substantial transformation" test does not provide guidance for what constitutes 
"substantial." Does the transformation of copper into copper wire constitute "substantial 
transformation"? Under the tariff shift approach, a transformation may be substantial if it results in a 
change in the Harmonized Tariff System classification of the good. A change in the product's origin is 
deemed to "take place in the country where, as a result of manufacturing or other processing, the tariff 
classification of the article changes from one category to another." Silveira, supra note 172, at 417. 
Thus, if copper is classified in one tariff heading category and wire in another, the transformation from 
copper to copper wire, resulting in a change in tariff heading (or as it is also referred to, a tariff shift) 
might be "substantial." However, if"[m]inor features of processing, such as simple assembly ... bring 
about a change in the tariff category, ... a change of origin will not be acknowledged because the tariff 
change was not decisive." !d. at 417. 
The Change in Tariff Heading rule relies on the Harmonized Tariff System. The Harmonized 
System groups goods in twenty-one sections, ninety-six chapters, which are established by industrial 
sector, and I ,241 headings, with additional subheadings. The headings are important for tariff 
classification and origin purposes. Headings are placed within a chapter in the order based on the 
degree of processing, and the heading number increases as a product is further processed. A "product 
obtained is considered to have undergone sufficient manufacturing or processing if it falls under a 
heading of a systematic goods nomenclature different from the headings applicable to each of the 
materials utilized." International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures, Annex Concerning Rules of Origin, May 18, 1973, annex D. I, S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-23; 
see also Hironori Asaknra, The Harmonized System and Rules of Origin, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1993). 
Again, note the emphasis on processing or manufacturing embodied in the tariff-shift approach. 
278. Substantial transformation can also be determined by reference to whether a product has 
undergone certain processing operations in a country. See N. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin in the 
United States, in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 124, at 29; Michael P. 
Maxwell, Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported Merchandise: Transforming the Substantial 
Transformation Test, 23 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 669, 670 (1990). 
279. Under the value-added criterion, a good is deemed the origin of the most recent exporting 
country where a specified percentage of value was added to the good in that country. See Silveira, 
supra note I 72, at 4 I 8 ("Under this procedure, one must consider the extent of the manufacturing or 
processing undergone in a country based on the value it adds to the goods. When this added value 
equals or exceeds the specified percentage, the goods acquire 'origin' in the country where the 
manufacturing or processing was carried out."). For example, the U.S. GSP program adheres to a 35% 
value-added test, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1994), as does the U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative program, 
I 9 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1994). In the same way that a tariff shift may occur through a minor process, 
see supra note 277, "substantial transformation" is possible by means of a minor process as well. This 
explains the requirement in the GSP scheme that there be "both a substantial transformation and a 
contribution of at least 35% to the appraised value of the new and different article." Palmeter, supra 
note 245, at 24-25. 
280. See supra notes 277-79. 
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sufficient significance to transform the imported article into a domestic 
article, in effect increasing the "local content" of a product. Aside from the 
political interests underlying a particular rule of origin, the problem with 
the "substantial transformation" rule generally is that while it might have 
been appropriate for an industrial, manufacturing-based economy, it is no 
longer suitable for today's postindustrial, global economy. If products are 
more or less composites that are conceived, designed, engineered, manu-
factured or assembled in more than one national jurisdiction: 
What are the interests our international agreements and domestic 
laws ought to protect in these cases? Is the last important step in 
completing the product as imported more significant than the first 
idea? Is the accident of 'high value' added in one operation more 
important to national interests than a less expensive, but, perhaps, 
more innovative step?281 
Although the internationalist project has aimed to contain or discipline 
nationalist impulses by instituting a set of universal rules to minimize the 
influence of politics on the international economic system, 282 rules of origin 
generally remain intensely political and reflect intensely nationalist objec-
tives. They are not just about technical or technocratic considerations, but 
rather are a reflection of political and policy preferences. "The inescapable 
fact is that rules of origin are tools of discrimination. They have no other 
purpose. They are used to implement national and international laws that 
confer special benefits on goods of some countries and special penalties on 
goods of other countries."283 The remainder of the Article looks at how 
these politicized interests should be spread if one is concerned about the 
emergence of the new knowledge economy and the distributional impact of 
global free trade on national economies. How should rules of origin be 
revised both to reflect the postindustrial economy and to alleviate global-
ization's impact on different groups in the international economic system? 
As the preceding discussion reveals, the substantial transformation 
rule as currently interpreted is inappropriate because it requires a product 
to be transformed by acts that are essentially process or manufacturing-
based.284 Thus, it tends to result in the exclusion of some other form of 
"transformation," for example, one that involves labor-intensive activities 
such as assembly or simple processing operations that would benefit both 
developing countries with abundant unskilled labor and high-volume, blue-
collar workers in developed countries.285 It also excludes acts that are not 
281. Ehrenhaft, supra note 7, at 232. 
282. See supra notes 72-73,75-76,85. 
283. Simpson, supra note I 72, at 40. 
284. See supra notes 272-80 and infra notes 286-94. 
285. For example, although the Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Origin, see 
supra note 205, states that assembly could confer origin, it also notes that "assembly cannot be always 
origin-conferring." Thus the real question is to identify the threshold of the assembly work, over which 
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industrial or manufacturing but do in fact benefit the local economy, for 
example, acts that further the development of a service industry, such as 
after-sales servicing and technical support. If those acts are not considered 
acts that "substantially transform" the product, then the performance of 
those acts in certain countries would have no impact on national origin 
determination. 
Current efforts by a WTO committee to harmonize rules of origin in 
the Agreement on Rules of Origin remain unresolved because of disagree-
ments about which types of activities qualifY as origin conferring. Indeed, 
many of the contested questions center around whether the activity at issue 
or the skill level required to perform certain operations is sufficiently sub-
stantial and transforming. Included among the list of disagreements over 
which activities may constitute "substantial transformation": in the agri-
cultural products and fish category, the slaughtering of animals;286 drying 
of fish, fish roes, and other fish products;287 smoking of meat;288 obtaining 
of fish fillets;289 obtaining of coffee creamer;290 and producing wine from 
assembly can be considered as "substantial transformation." The Technical Committee was established 
to harmonize rules of origin among Member States, such as developing uniform understandings of 
substantial transformation. WTO Rules of Origin, art. 9(1}, 9(2)(i) & (ii}, supra note 205. In 
considering the criteria for substantial transformation, the Committee will rely on the change in tariff 
classification method and, where necessary, the value-added methods. !d. at art. 9(2)(c}(ii}. 
Although the work was scheduled to be completed by July 1998, to date, it is not yet finished. 
Committee on Rules of Origin, Report by the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Origin to the 
General Council, Sept. 24, 2001, G/R0/48, No. 01-4526, at para. 3.3, available at 
http:// docsonline. wto.org. 
There is still a lack of consensus among Committee members over the type of assembly and 
processing operations that does or does not qualify as origin conferring. See infra notes 286-94 for a 
discussion of some areas of disagreement among Committee members. 
286. Those who favor deeming slaughtering to be a last substantial transformation argue that 
products obtained are completely different from the initial products in all respects: the 
products arising out of slaughtering are for human or animal consumption, whereas live 
animals cannot be used for that purpose .... Slaughtering is not restricted solely to the killing 
of the animal; a series of processes are necessary in order to obtain the meat or offal. 
Committee on Rules of Origin, Integrated Negotiating Text for the Harmonization Work Programme, 
Agricultural Products and Fish, Sept. 25,2001, G/R0/45/Add.8/Rev.l, No. 01-4529, at 4, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org. Opponents argue that slaughter does not alter the quality of the meat and thus 
cannot constitute a last substantial transformation. 
287. Those who favor counting drying offish and fish products as substantial transformation argue 
that the process of drying is time-consuming and involves a change in character of the product which is 
significantly valued over the raw material. In this case, drying should not be regarded as merely "a 
process for the preservation of goods during transportation and/or storage," which would not qualify as 
substantial transformation. !d. at 5-6. 
288. Proponents argue that smoking substantially transforms the characteristics of the meat; 
opponents argue that smoking is a simple process. !d. at 8. 
289. Proponents, Norway for example, argue that the production process from gutted fish to fish 
fillets is a comprehensive process, involving production of fillet with skin on and pin bone, splitting the 
fish into fillets, removal of the backbone, and skinning. Some of the processes require special 
machinery. Opponents argue that the process is simple and does not involve transformation of the fisb. 
!d. at 13-14. 
290. The transformation of skimmed milk powder, through the addition of milk fat, water 
emulsifiers and stabilizers, sterilization, and finally cooling, to coffee creamer should qualify for 
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grapes.291 In the textiles sector, disputes have centered on the follow-
ing: carding or combing of fibers in preparation for spinning;292 down 
proofing fabrics;293 or bleaching of fabrics,294 among many others. 
As the examples above show, the processes that are currently disputed 
are those that are relatively simple and involve lower-skilled labor. Yet, 
those are precisely the areas in which poor countries are more likely to 
have a comparative advantage because of their large pool of cheap and 
relatively lower-skilled labor. Although rich countries grant GSP or other 
preferential status to qualified poor countries, the "substantial transforma-
tion" origin rules with its focus on a manufacturing-based transformation 
often have the effect of nullifying any benefits theoretically available under 
GSP. As one commentator has noted: 
[T]he labor content of the production process is hardly ever 
sufficient to guarantee origin. The origin rules incorporated nearly 
always close the easiest route, that of simple assembly, as a way for 
management and labour of underdeveloped countries to learn the 
skills that will enable them to move first into component 
production and ultimately total manufacturing.295 
If rich countries were to allow assembly and other labor-intensive activities 
conducted in a developing country to count in the "substantial 
transformation" determination, the resulting product could be deemed the 
product of the developing country where the "substantial transformation" 
occurred, which would make the product eligible for better-than-:MFN 
treatment, attract global economic activities to those countries, and encour-
age the development of assembly facilities in poor countries. 
substantial transformation. Opponents argue that the origin of coffee creamer should remain in the 
country where the liquid milk was obtained in its natural state. !d. at 19. 
291. Grapes undergo a substantial transformation when made into wine. Opponents argue that the 
essential character of wine is determined by the grapes and the country of origin of the wine is where 
the grapes were produced. !d. at 69. 
292. See Committee on Rules of Origin, Integrated Negotiating Text for the Harmonization Work 
Programme-Textile Products and Textile Related, Sept. 25, 2001, G/R0/45/Add.l/Rev.l, No. 01-
4530, available at http://docsonline.wto.org. Those who contend that this activity constitutes a 
transformation argue that the process is a substantial one and that these operations are necessary before 
natural fibers are suitable for spinning. Wool or animal hair must be carded and combed in preparation 
for spinning, which involves disentangling the fibers, removing extraneous matters, laying the fibers 
into wide webs, and condensing them into slivers, which must be combed before they are converted 
into rovings. Other members argue that the process does not qualifY as substantial transformation 
because it is simple. 
293. Some committee members argue that fabric treated by down-proof finishing (pillows and 
sleeping bags, for example) to ensure that feathers are retained inside the cover should be deemed 
substantially transformed by the physical and chemical process involved. Others contend that the 
process does not qualify as substantial transformation because it is only a finishing process. !d. 
294. Prior to bleaching, a fabric is subjected to a number of processes, such as shearing or 
cropping, desizing and scouring. Bleaching, which is a controlled chemical reaction, substantially 
transforms dirty fabric into clean, absorbent white fabric free of impurities. Opponents argue there is 
not sufficient transformation involved. !d. 
295. Kingston, supra note 124, at 14. 
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The same reasoning applies to areas in rich countries such as the 
United States with displaced, lower-skilled workers in technologically 
superseded sectors. While it is reasonable that for richer countries, the de-
velopment of a higher-skilled, technology-oriented sector is of paramount 
importance, this shift towards higher-skilled work has also left workers, 
many of whom are lower-skilled minority and immigrant workers in the 
high-volume sectors, economically vulnerable.296 What rules should trade 
law adopt to ease the transition period for workers in countries undergoing 
the high-volume to high-value shift, one further exacerbated by the move-
ment to globalize production? One way to address this distributional con-
flict is to encourage the establishment of activities, whether it be simple 
assembly or more sophisticated assembly, that employ otherwise displaced 
U.S. workers. Again, this may be achieved by altering the "substantial 
transformation" rule from one that currently excludes the assembly stages 
of production to one that includes assembly in the determination of origin 
rules.297 
An alternative and more expansive framework for rules of origin 
determination could work this way. An imported item may be 
"domesticated" into a domestic-origin item if its parts, though imported, 
are assembled in the country at issue, for example, the United States.298 In 
order to ensure that domestication involves more than mere perfunctory 
assembly, an additional requirement could be imposed, for example, man-
dating that the U.S. assembly facilities meet certain standards regarding 
investment of capital in land, buildings, and employment. Other require-
ments may be imposed to address any concern that allowing assembly to 
count in origin determination would only attract maquiladora-type opera-
tions into the United States. For example, a requirement that assembly in 
the United States may be included but must be capped so that it could ac-
count for only a certain (limited) percentage of the U.S. value of an item. 
Similarly, including assembly in the overall origins determination might 
also be phased out over a period of years, during which high-volume or 
lesser-skilled workers may be helped by adjustment programs such as 
training and job search assistance. 
296. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, KEEPING JOBS IN fASHION: ALTERNATIVES TO THE EUTHANASIA 
OF THE U.S. APPAREL INDUSTRY 1-6 (1989) (describing the impact of the decline of the U.S. apparel 
industry on rural women, blacks, Hispanics, and immigrant workers). 
297. This suggestion still may not work effectively in First World countries like the United States 
because what draws global companies to perform certain economic activities in the United States is not 
likely to be lower-skilled, lower-wage U.S. workers. Others have favored tax-financed remedies and 
direct wealth transfers to these workers. See Chen, supra note 16, at 212. 
298. In fact, Customs rulings already allow certain assembly operations in the United States to 
confer U.S. origin: assembly of mechanical equipment such as laptop computers, printed circuit 
boards, video display terminals for televisions, and televisions. Nomio Komuro, International 
Harmonisation of Rules of Origin, in THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION (Philip 
Ruttley et al. eds., 1998). 
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Changing the existing "substantial transformation" rule to include 
postindustrial activities would also allow for more logical treatment of the 
postindustrial economy itself. Besides the fact that the wrong political 
choices currently underlie the "substantial transformation" test, the test is 
also better suited for the older industrial economy in so far as its focus is 
on the manufacturing act in the final production process. If the production 
process is divided into four different stages-research and development, 
intermediate production, fmal production, and marketing and distribu-
tion--origin rules founded on a "substantial transformation" criteria "have 
their impact on the third stage (final production) .... The effect of the 
widespread use of substantial transformation criteria is that in products 
where origin is important, a bias is created towards the localization of the 
third stage in the production process."299 This eliminates other possibilities 
from serious consideration. 
In certain products it might be considered that one key component 
is so vital to the essential character of the final product that it 
should provide the key to determining origin. In such products the 
final production stage, no matter how complex, may be considered 
little more than simple assembly and thus not regarded as sufficient 
to determine origin. 300 
For example, it might be that for some products such as those that are 
chemically based, the fourth stage, marketing and distribution, or the first 
stage, research and development, constitutes a substantial proportion of the 
value or cost of the final product. Yet, those stages are usually not included 
in origin determination.301 
The considerations set forth above to help guide a "substantial trans-
formation" analysis are also applicable in preferential rules-of-origin con-
texts. Referring to the rules of origin in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, for example, 
commentators have remarked that "reading even one chapter of each 
agreement is enough to make one forget what the agreement was about, as 
one searches for clues to rules within rules, exceptions to exceptions, and 
299. Kingston, supra note 124, at 16. 
300. ld. 
301. Kingston observed: 
With the rapid increase in crossborder investment flows, governments are now recognizing 
that the important elements in the manufacturing process in the case of high technology 
consumer goods seldom lie in the final production (substantial transformation) stage but 
rather in the R&D stage and in the capital equipment that is employed in the production stage. 
It could be argned-althougb it would add confusion to the debate-that the country of origin 
of a product should be where the capital equipment for producing the product is made. There 
is a clear difference between increasing a country's capital stock by installing imported 
modern equipment and having the technological ability to produce the equipment 
domestically .... Despite its importance, traditional concepts of origin-such as substantial 
transformation-do not therefore reflect the origin of the technology. 
Id. at 17. 
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bewildering cross-references."302 Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, for example, a good containing third-country components may 
be transformed into a Canadian or U.S. product if each of the non originat-
ing components is transformed in the territory of one or more of the parties 
through processing and assembly and if this transformation also results in a 
change in tariff classification.303 But where the change in tariff classifica-
tion occurs from one heading to another heading within a chapter (rather 
than from one chapter to another),304 the good is not necessarily entitled to 
duty-free treatment. In most cases, such a product must meet an additional 
test-that 50% of the value of the product when exported from one party to 
the other must consist oflocal North American content.305 With this under-
standing, are Honda Civics produced in the United States, whose engines 
are made from U.S.-origin components and imported parts from Japan, 
shipped to Canada for incorporation into cars, and then shipped to the 
United States, North American in origin and therefore eligible for duty-free 
treatment by U.S. Customs? 
U.S. Customs said no, partly because it refused to allow certain costs 
incurred in North America to count towards the determination of the North 
America value of the product. According to Customs, the statutory allow-
ance of "costs directly incurred in the production of goods" applied only to 
direct costs, not to costs such as payments for on-site technical assistance, 
royalties, and production controls.306 Under the expanded framework I am 
proposing here, activities that are not based on manufacturing but that con-
fer value, such as service and technical assistance and support, marketing 
and distribution, should be included in the determination of origin. A dif-
ferent result might have been produced in the high-profile U.S.-Canada 
automobile dispute above were we operating under such a framework. 
Similar issues about which activities would count or not count 
towards origin determination have also arisen in the NAFTA context. In 
determining the North American content of a product, trade administrators 
must decide how nonoriginating materials should be valued in the calcula-
tion of the local content of a component. What costs could be included? 
Although NAFT A permits processing costs to be included, partly to allow 
local manufacturing to count towards local content determination, NAFTA 
rules also specify as nonallowable costs those costs associated with sales 
302. Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 389. 
303. See NAFTA, supra note 172, art. 301(2), 32 I.L.M. at 299-300; Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra 
note 5, at 377. 
304. The Harmonized Schedule classifies goods into twenty-one sections and ninety-six chapters, 
with each chapter divided into headings with four-digit numerical codes, which are further subdivided 
into subheadings, with two additional digits. See supra note 277. 
305. See Cantin & Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 378. 
306. Id. at 381. 
2002] RETHINKING U.S. TRADE LAWS 479 
promotion, marketing, and after-sales service307-precisely the costs asso-
ciated with activities that contribute towards a service industry. 
1 propose that a different framework be adopted to consider a wider 
range of activities for inclusion in "domestication" determinations, particu-
larly those that are currently left out of the manufacturing or industrial ori-
entation that underlies the current focus.308 If they are not eliminated 
altogether, rules of origin, already themselves a reflection of political 
choices, should at least aim to address, first, the political pressure points 
that currently pose the most serious threat to the free trade system and, sec-
ond, the emergence of nonindustrial activities that will define the new trad-
ing economy. 
The "domestic participation" test, in conjunction with the new rules-
of-origin approach, would work as follows: Under the first step, the com-
pany has to establish that it is economically domestic. Assuming the com-
pany qualifies as domestic, the "participation offset" right delineated in the 
second step of the test would be triggered, allowing the company to bal-
ance the net total of its participation against any tariffs owed on any prod-
ucts it imports. The alternative sketch proposed to reform the rules of 
origin would then be used to guide the determination of whether the prod-
uct at issue is a domestic or imported item subject to which tariff or charge. 
If it is an import and produced in two or more countries, the "substantial 
307. /d. at 388. 
308. To ensure that minimal acts do not qualify for origin determination, the proposed test would 
exclude acts normally undertaken by a pure "middleman," such as receivership, storage, wholesale, 
delivery of goods, or handling directly associated with these activities. An analogy may be made with 
cases in the products-liability area that deal with the concept of a middleman. Under these cases, a 
middleman (who merely deals in goods and does nothing to alter the goods or the use of the goods) 
cannot be held liable in implied strict liability for selling a defective product in a sealed container. See, 
e.g., Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972). A "sealed container'' means a "box, 
container, package, wrapping, encasement or housing of any nature that covers a product so that it 
would be unreasonable to expect a seller to detect or discover the existence of a dangerous or defective 
condition in the product." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.18, § 7001(a)(3) (2001); Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 331 
So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1976). 
However, if a party undertakes to repair or rebuild a product, the party may be treated as if it were 
the product's manufacturer. Anderson v. Olmsted Uti!. Equip., Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1991). 
Under the doctrine, a mere retailer of a product is deemed to be a middleman, not a manufacturer, even 
if the retailer possesses or holds himself out as possessing special knowledge with regard to the 
product. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991). Furthermore, even the right to 
exercise supervision over the manufacturing process does not turn a middleman into a manufacturer. 
See, e.g., CAL. C1v. CoDE § 3434 (West 1997). 
For the purposes of international trade, the definition provided by the "sealed-container'' doctrine 
cases is helpful because the doctrine offers a test designating one as a ''manufacturer'' if one produces 
goods supplied in a box, container, package, wrapping, encasement, or housing of any nature that 
covers a product, or alters, repairs, or improves the product in any way. However, mere retail sale or 
supervision over production does not convert one from "middleman" to "manufacturer." In the trade 
context, mere importing and then retail (and activities associated with mere retail, such as minimal 
employment of warehouse and storage facilities, handling, delivery, development of customer lists of 
retailers, and local middlemen) would not qualify as activities that may be included in the calculation of 
the local content of a product. 
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transformation" test (expanded as proposed) would be triggered. The com-
pany importing the product would owe tariffs under the applicable origin 
rules, unless the company has domesticated the product, thus transforming 
the product into one of domestic-origin, not an import; or the company's 
domestic participation is greater than what it would otherwise owe in tar-
iffs and other protective measures. 
One may object that the proposal is costly for companies to adminis-
ter. Rules of origin compliance requirements, whether currently applied or 
as proposed in this Article, are indeed complex and costly to administer, 
which is one additional reason, among the other reasons discussed/09 why 
a true free trading regime would no longer retain them. This is especially 
true if an importer seeks the duty-free rate for products satisfying the par-
ticularly strict NAFTA rules of origin (or other strict preferential rules of 
origin) because the regulatory cost and inconvenience of meeting the 
requirements for customs verification purposes may outweigh the bene-
fit.310 The transaction costs, however, could be balanced out by the incen-
tives created by the proposal for participation offset, as described above. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the United States and other countries in the world 
trading system should rethink two fundamental issues: "nationality" and 
"national origin." Trade laws are replete with provisions that make refer-
ence to domestic companies and domestic products. But dynamic changes 
caused by the international movement of capital and the globalization of 
production pose new challenges for the trading system. In a world in which 
U.S.-origin companies have significant operations offshore and foreign-
origin companies have substantial operational presences in the United 
States, which standards should the United States or any other country use 
to determine what constitutes a domestic company? And if products are 
essentially global composites, with research and development, manufactur-
ing, assembly and processing, and marketing each conducted in a different 
country, what is their country of origin? Under those circumstances, what 
is a domestic product? 
The United States and other countries have responded to these devel-
opments in a disappointingly piecemeal manner, without a thorough 
examination of the changes that have blurred the distinction between the 
"national" and the "foreign" and without a reevaluation of the impact these 
changes have on international trade law and policy. Thus, depending on the 
political interests at issue at the time, a Honda is a North American product 
309. See supra notes 262-65, 267-68. 
310. See Gantz, supra note 172, at 395-97; Silveira, supra note 172, at 418, 449 ("[C]ompliance 
with the rules in many cases forces eompanies to set up expensive internal procedures that add 
significantly to the cost of sales. Many would rather pay the tariff."). 
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sometimes and a Japanese product another time. And more often than not, 
the nationality of a corporation continues to be determined in a reflexive 
manner, that is, by reference to antiquated tests more appropriate for a 
national, not postnational economic system. Yet, why should the place of 
incorporation continue to be a determinative factor in nationality determi-
nations when companies are global in their orientation and conduct? And 
why should the nationality of controlling persons matter when their fiduci-
ary duty obligates them to make corporate decisions to maximize share-
holder interest, not to further the general national interest? 
Although "nationality" and "origin" are inextricably woven into trade 
laws and policy and thus are highly relevant to the globalization debate, 
neither nationalists nor internationalists have engaged in an examination of 
these issues. Instead, both accept the assumptions behind the terms 
"domestic" company, "domestic" products or "foreign" products, however 
inaccurate or misleading such terms have become. The nationalist project 
aims to derail international economic liberalization and reassert the rightful 
place of the national in the world trading system through the reinforcement 
of national borders and national economies against foreign companies and 
foreign products. The state is defended as the site for political governance, 
national cultures, and national sovereignty. The moorings of national 
community and the politics of identity are preferred over the abstractions 
of economic internationalism and universalism. 
By contrast, the internationalist project, perhaps because it is suspi-
cious of nationalist passions and ambitions, is favorably inclined towards 
international liberalization, convergence, and interdependence. Within this 
economically integrated system, conflicts among nations are to be adminis-
tered through a regime of rational and universal rules whereby the interests 
of the national and the international generally, and of domestic industry 
and foreign industry, domestic products and foreign products more particu-
larly, are to be balanced and managed. Domestic industry should not be 
protected against imports as a general matter, except in cases of undue 
import surges or in cases of dumping or other unfair acts. Like the national-
ist, however, the internationalist fails to grasp fully the extent to which dis-
tinctions between the national and the foreign have blurred. 
Thus, despite their claims of difference, both, curiously enough, share 
a few common assumptions. First, both continue to speak the same lan-
guage and accept the same assumptions behind the current distinctions 
between "foreign" and "domestic" in trade laws, except that the nationalist 
seeks to protect that which is domestic-domestic companies and domestic 
products-from that which is foreign, and the internationalist seeks to 
accommodate and reconcile one with the other. And second, both continue 
to have their own blind spots: the nationalist to the global reality, and the 
internationalist to the populist appeal of matters grounded in the traditional 
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framework of nationality. Human beings continue to respond to the pull of 
the community and the plight of those within their home territory. A 
French person might be a cosmopolitan citizen of the world, a European in 
the European Union, but she will also remain French. The internationalist 
somehow seems oblivious to those realities. 
The proposal I advocate in this Article is one that aims to reconcile 
the appeal of loyalty to the national and the particular on the one hand with 
the current global logic of economic integration and liberalization on the 
other. I propose that these two interests be accommodated within the trad-
ing system itself, by re-evaluating the two basic premises of trade laws and 
adopting a new understanding of these premises. We thus return to the two 
original and pivotal questions posed at the outset: What is a domestic 
company and what is a domestic product? The test for corporate national-
ity, I argue, should be grounded in the company's substantial socioeco-
nomic participation in a state's economy. Multinational or transnational 
companies maximizing their economic objectives in the global economy 
may be "anchored" in a state, not by the artifice of where they are incorpo-
rated or where management and shareholder control lies, but by their 
degree of commitment to that state's territorial boundaries. While the new 
test responds to the economic interests of the national, it does so without 
the threat of reinforcing national fortresses to keep out the international. 
Indeed, it does the opposite, by using the reality of corporate transnational-
ism to embrace the international within the national fold (through the 
added benefits and incentives of a participation offset right). In other 
words, corporate nationality, as revised, serves as the conduit through 
which to reassert the nationalist commitment to the relevance of place and 
at the same time reaffirm international aspirations and the global orienta-
tion of economic activities. Equally significant, this proposed test, I argue, 
is simply a more accurate reflection of developments that have 
occurred as a matter of fact. 
One may worry, as an internationalist, however, that the proposed 
domestic participation test would cause multinational companies to vie for 
"nationality" status in rich countries with rich markets and iguore poor 
countries with poor markets. Given the trend towards regionalism and fol-
lowing in the examples of the European Union and NAFTA, developing 
countries have been exploring the possibility of forming their own regional 
free trade agreements. Initiatives towards such arrangements "can promote 
further liberalization and may assist least-developed, developing and 
transition economies in integrating into the international trading system."311 
311. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/Min(96)/DEC, No. 96-5316 (Dec. 9-13, 1996), at 
http:l/www.docsonline.wto.org. There has been an increase in trade blocs, such as the Southern Cone 
Common Market ("MERCOSUR'') and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area 
("AFTA"). An examination of regional trade agreements is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
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The establishment of a robust regional economy would also provide the 
incentives for companies to become domestic participants of member 
countries. 
In stark contrast to internationalists, nationalists, particularly from the 
developed world, have bemoaned the shifting of corporate capital from the 
national borders of rich countries into those of the poorer countries. 
Globalization has produced both an international and national distributional 
fault line, among countries and groups within countries. Again, revising a 
basic premise of trade laws, product origin, would address this political 
problem. Rules of origin, far from being neutral or innocuous, are in fact 
quite political. How they are interpreted has a direct and profound impact 
on where factories will be located and where economic activities will be 
centered. As the Article shows, products that are globally sourced are in 
fact the products of no one country in particular. Country-of-origin desig-
nations thus merely perpetuate this chimera of nationality in a world of 
internationality. Currently, the various tests used to elevate certain activi-
ties as endowing origin and to exclude other activities as not being relevant 
for origin determination are themselves a reflection of political choices. 
These tests merely "freeze" the broad global picture to provide a "snap-
shot" that captures but a brief "national" moment, whereby the qualifying 
activities undertaken within that national territory are then deemed origin-
conferring activities. 
An internationalist corrective to this state of confusion would favor 
the elimination of the concept of product origin altogether, on the grounds 
that it is but a virtual figment of the national imagination. This remedy, I 
admit, is appealing if one allows oneself to indulge fully in one's interna-
tionalist fantasies. My proposal, however, works from the existing frame-
work of the WTO where rules of origin are very much a political and 
economic fact. In that respect, the proposal seeks to alter the current politi-
cal choices behind rules of origin by expanding the range of qualifying 
activities in order to accomplish two objectives: first, to reflect the emer-
gence of the postindustrial economy and second, to address the nationalist 
fault lines that need to be dealt with to ensure the continued political sur-
vival of the current trading system. 
The internationalist may want to tame nationalism, subject it to inter-
national discipline, and even exclude it as being incompatible with eco-
nomic liberalization. And the nationalist, in turn, may want to exalt 
nationalist identity and protect national companies and products against the 
unboundedness of international capital movements. Yet, the world trading 
system to which the majority of countries belong would be best served if 
discussion of trade regionalism within the landscape of international trade, see, for example, Sungjoon 
Cho, Brea!.ing the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade 
Regionalism, 42 HARv.INT'L L.J. 419 (2001). 
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internationalism could enlist nationalism as its ally and vice versa. In this 
Article, I select two areas that form a basic foundation of trade laws, and 
illustrate how revising them along the lines articulated could achieve this 
objective. 
